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F-2014-764

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Loretta Marjorie Hawks v The State of Oklahoma

F-2014-764

Filed: Apr. 5, 2016

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: Loretta Marjorie Hawks

Summary

Loretta Marjorie Hawks appealed her conviction for first-degree murder, kidnapping, and burglary. Her conviction and sentence included life imprisonment for murder, plus other sentences for kidnapping and burglary that were to be served one after the other. One judge dissented. The case involved Loretta Hawks being tried and found guilty for her role in a crime involving murder, burglary, and kidnappings. She argued that there was not enough evidence against her for murder and that the jury did not get the facts they needed to make a fair decision. Some of her claims were about the jury not being properly informed about the law regarding her involvement in the crimes. The court agreed that there was a mistake in how prosecutors presented the law to the jury, which affected Hawks' conviction for murder. As a result, they decided to reverse that conviction and said there should be a new trial for it. However, the court upheld the convictions for the kidnapping charges, stating there was enough evidence for those. The appeal concerning the burglary charge was not contested, so it was also affirmed.

Decision

The Judgments and Sentences of the District Court of Cleveland County as to Counts II, III and IV are AFFIRMED. The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Cleveland County as to Count I is REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial. Appellant's Application to Supplement Appeal Record or alternatively the Request for Evidentiary Hearing is DENIED; the Motion for New Trial is DENIED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2016), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

  • Was there sufficient evidence to support the verdicts of guilty on Counts I, III, and IV, violating Appellant's rights to due process?
  • Did the admission of irrelevant character and sympathy testimony contribute to an unreliable verdict and violate Appellant's rights to fundamental fairness?
  • Did the admission of irrelevant and prejudicial information from Eddie Thompson's cell phone contacts violate Appellant's rights to fundamental fairness?
  • Was Appellant denied the effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the 6th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution?

Findings

  • the court erred in finding insufficient evidence to support the verdict for Count I, resulting in a reversal and remand for a new trial
  • there was sufficient evidence to affirm the convictions for Counts III and IV
  • the admission of evidence and argument did not improperly prejudice Hawks' rights
  • the admission of irrelevant evidence from Thompson's phone did not affect the outcome of the trial
  • trial counsel was not ineffective in their representation of Hawks

F-2014-764

Apr. 5, 2016

Loretta Marjorie Hawks

Appellant

v

The State of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

SMITH, PRESIDING JUDGE:

Loretta Marjorie Hawks was tried by jury and convicted of Count I, Murder in the First Degree in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 701.7(A); Count II, Burglary in the First Degree in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 1431; Count III, Kidnapping of Arthur Strozewski in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 741; and Count IV, Kidnapping of Z.S. in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 741, in the District Court of Cleveland County, Case No. CF-2012-1637. In accordance with the jury’s recommendation the Honorable Thad Balkman sentenced Hawks to life imprisonment (Count I); fifteen (15) years imprisonment (Count II); fourteen (14) years imprisonment (Count III); and fifteen (15) years imprisonment (Count IV), to run consecutively. Hawks must serve 85% of her sentences on Counts I and II before becoming eligible for parole consideration. Hawks appeals from her convictions and sentences on Counts I, III and IV.

Hawks raises four propositions of error in support of her appeal:

1. Hawks was charged jointly with Eddie James Thompson and Sebastian Forest Shepherd. Each of those defendants was tried separately, and each received a sentence of life without parole.

I. The evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts of guilty on Counts 1, 3 and 4, violating Appellant’s rights to due process under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. II, § 7, of the Oklahoma Constitution.

II. Irrelevant character and sympathy testimony and argument, accusing Appellant of lying and materially mischaracterizing evidence contributed to an unreliable verdict and combined to violate Appellant’s rights to fundamental fairness under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. II, § 7, of the Oklahoma Constitution.

III. Admitting irrelevant and prejudicial information of Eddie Thompson’s cell phone contacts violated Appellant’s rights to fundamental fairness under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. II, § 7, of the Oklahoma Constitution.

IV. Appellant was denied the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed her by the 6th and 14th amendments to the United States Constitution and art. II, §§ 7 and 20, of the Oklahoma Constitution.

In Proposition I, Hawks claims the State failed to show that she was present for, participated in, or aided and abetted co-defendants Thompson and Shepherd in, the murder or the kidnappings. An aider and abettor is a person who, though not present, is a principal to a crime; while mere presence or acquiescence is not enough, only slight participation in the charged offense is needed. Glossip v. State, 2007 OK CR 12, I 39, 157 P.3d 143, 151; Spears v. State, 1995 OK CR 36, I 16, 900 P.2d 431, 438. There need not be proof that a defendant participated in each and every element of an offense. Rosemond v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 1240, 1246-47, 188 L.Ed.2d 248 (2014). The State had to show that Hawks procured the crime to be done, or aided, assisted, abetted, advised or encouraged the commission of the crime. Banks v. State, 2002 OK CR 9, I 13, 43 P.3d 390, 397. Hawks argues that she herself did not have the intent necessary to convict her for these crimes. Aiding and abetting requires that a defendant intends to associate herself with the specific crime charged, seeking to make it succeed. Rosemond, 134 S.Ct. at 1248. This may be shown by evidence that the defendant had knowledge, in advance, of her co-defendant’s intent to commit the charged crime. Rosemond, 134 S.Ct. at 1249. The State had to show Hawks aided and abetted Thompson and Shepherd with the personal intent to commit kidnapping and murder, or with knowledge of the perpetrators’ intent to commit those crimes. Banks, 2002 OK CR 9, I 13, 43 P.3d at 397; see also Johnson v. State, 1996 OK CR 36, i 20, 928 P.2d 309, 315.

The State argues that this Court expressly overruled Johnson on this issue, and implicitly overruled the language in Banks quoting Johnson on this issue, insofar as these cases required the State to show either personal intent or full knowledge of the perpetrator’s intent. Williams v. State, 2008 OK CR 19, I 85, n. 18, 188 P.3d 208, 225, n. 18. However, despite the language in the footnote (arguably dicta), it is not at all clear that the Court intended in Williams to remove the intent element from aiding and abetting. After a thorough discussion in Williams’ federal habeas appeal, the Tenth Circuit rejected this interpretation of note 18. Williams v. Trammell, 782 F.3d 1184, 1193-95 (10th Cir. 2015). Citing Rosemond, that Court noted that intent to facilitate the offense’s commission was a basic requirement of aiding and abetting; the Court also noted that, while apparently overruling Johnson in note 18, this Court then applied the Johnson intent test to Williams. Id. at 1194.

In the years since Williams, this Court has infrequently discussed aiding and abetting in published cases. In State v. Heath, we found that sufficient evidence supported a conclusion that the defendant aided and abetted a crime where sufficient circumstantial evidence presented from which to infer that Heath was well aware of the plan to rob Young and that she aided and assisted Atchison in carrying out this plan. State v. Heath, 2011 OK CR 5, I 9, 246 P.3d 723, 725. In doing so, we applied an intent requirement for aiding and abetting. Similarly, in Postelle, we found sufficient evidence that an accomplice aided and abetted the crime when he left a loaded rifle with the defendants, suspecting they might well be on their way to Swindle’s house intending to shoot him. Postelle v. State, 2011 OK CR 30, I 15, 267 P.3d 114, 126-27. This is in line with our longstanding acknowledgment that aiding and abetting has an intent requirement. In Conover v. State, we discussed the history of aiding and abetting as it applies to principals to a crime, rejecting the claim that a defendant charged with murder as a principal must himself personally have the specific intent to kill. Conover v. State, 1997 OK CR 6, 19 40-47, 933 P.2d 904, 914-16. We concluded jury instructions were proper where jurors were told that in order to return a verdict of guilt they must find that Appellant’s conduct caused Hardcastle’s death and that he intended to take Hardcastle’s life, or that Appellant aided and abetted co-defendant Welch’s acts knowing of Welch’s intent to take Hardcastle’s life. Id. at I 47, 933 P.2d at 916 (emphasis in original).

Jurors were correctly given the standard uniform jury instruction, which sets forth the Oklahoma requirements for aiding and abetting. OUJI-CR 2d 2-6 defines a principal: Merely standing by, even if standing by with knowledge concerning the commission of a crime, does not make a person a principal to a crime. Mere presence at the scene of a crime, without participation, does not make a person a principal to a crime. One who does not actively commit the offense, but who aids, promotes, or encourages the commission of a crime by another person, either by act or counsel or both, is deemed to be a principal to the crime if he/she knowingly did what he/she did either with criminal intent or with knowledge of the other person’s intent. To aid or abet another in the commission of a crime implies a consciousness of guilt in instigating, encouraging, promoting, or aiding in the commission of that criminal offense. [Emphasis added.] This instruction reflects Oklahoma law as found in Conover and subsequent cases. It also conforms to the Rosemond discussion of the intent requirement for aiding and abetting, as it requires that jurors find, at the least, that the defendant knew the perpetrator had the intent to commit the crime.

The State agrees that the instruction sets forth the correct standard, including proof that a defendant aided or abetted another with knowledge of that person’s intent to commit the charged crime. However, it is clear from the record that both prosecutors misunderstood the basic law of aiding and abetting, and continually communicated that misunderstanding to the judge and jury throughout the trial. The record is replete with colloquy in voir dire and comments in closing argument egregiously misstating the law of aiding and abetting. They consistently omitted the intent requirement for aiding and abetting, going as far as denying that the State had to prove intent; rather, the prosecutors discussed legal principles more suited to felony murder or conspiracy. Defense counsel never objected to the prosecutors’ misstatements of law or attempted to correct them for the jury. This failure to object does not waive this issue for review. Defense counsel properly demurred on the grounds that the State failed to prove intent for aiding and abetting, and the issue is preserved.

Rather, the failure to object contributed to the certainty that, despite the correct instructions, jurors could not have understood or correctly applied the law. Jurors were correctly instructed on the law, and we presume jurors will follow their instructions. Ryder v. State, 2004 OK CR 2, I 83, 83 P.3d 856, 875. However, the correct instruction amounted to an isolated correct statement of the law, and was overwhelmed by the prosecutors’ repeated misstatements of law. Florez v. State, 2010 OK CR 21, I 8, 239 P.3d 156, 158. Jurors’ only frame of reference regarding the meaning of the instruction was the misstatement of law they [repeatedly] heard. Id. Given this barrage of misinformation, jurors never had a chance to correctly apply the law.

Hawks complains in this proposition that there was insufficient evidence to convict her of malice murder and kidnapping. As to the Count I charge of malice murder, the record shows that the real error here was the jury’s inability to properly consider the evidence as it related to the instructions and the elements of the charged crime. This error is analogous to the one in Pinkley v. State, where jurors were incorrectly instructed on the charged crime and thus unable to consider the evidence correctly. Pinkley v. State, 2002 OK CR 26, I 3, 49 P.3d 756, 760. Although jurors here were correctly instructed, they were unable to correctly apply the law. In Florez, where the prosecutor similarly egregiously misstated for jurors the meaning of a sentencing statute, the only issue was the sentence, the defendant received the minimum sentence, and no relief was required. Florez, 2010 OK CR 21, I’l 8-9, 239 P.3d at 158-59.

The same cannot be said of this case. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to show that Hawks knew of her co-defendants’ intent to commit malice murder is a question that should first be decided by the jury, not this Court. Given the prosecutors’ repeated misstatements of law, Hawks’ jury was unable to properly decide this issue. This defect, however, did not affect the jury’s ability to consider the evidence as it related to Counts III and IV, the kidnapping charges. We find that jurors could infer from the evidence presented that Hawks knew that Thompson and Shepherd intended to kidnap the victims. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational juror could find the elements of Counts III and IV beyond a reasonable doubt. Count I must be reversed and remanded for a new trial, where a correctly informed jury may thoroughly consider the evidence as it relates to the law. This proposition is granted as to Count I, and that count is reversed and remanded for a new trial. The proposition is denied as to Counts III and IV, and those counts are affirmed. Hawks does not contest her conviction and sentence for Count II, which is affirmed.

We find in Proposition II that admission of evidence and argument did not improperly prejudice Hawks; given our resolution of Proposition I, we review this claim only for its effect on Counts III and IV. Hawks did not object to this evidence and these comments, and we review for plain error. Plain error is an actual error, that is plain or obvious, and that affects a defendant’s substantial rights, affecting the outcome of the trial. Barnard v. State, 2012 OK CR 15, Il 13, 290 P.3d 759, 764. We review admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Marshall v. State, 2010 OK CR 8, I 24, 232 P.3d 467, 474. An abuse of discretion is any unreasonable or arbitrary action made without proper consideration of the relevant facts and law, also described as a clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment, clearly against the logic and effect of the facts. Neloms v. State, 2012 OK CR 7, I 35, 274 P.3d 161, 170.

Hawks complains of admission of evidence, discussion in opening statements, and argument related to witness observations of the victim during and immediately after the crime, Hawks’ own character, and inferences jurors could draw from the circumstances surrounding the crime. This evidence was relevant, as it set the scene for the crime and helped jurors understand what occurred. 12 O.S.2011, § 2401. The remarks in opening statement correctly described evidence the State presented to the jury. Young v. State, 2000 OK CR 17, II 40, 12 P.3d 20, 36. Use of this evidence in closing argument was within the wide range afforded to parties to discuss the evidence and inferences from it. Taylor v. State, 2011 OK CR 8, IT 55, 248 P.3d 362, 379.

Hawks also complains about testimony from the victim’s ex-wife describing telling the children about their father’s death, and describing her feelings on entering the crime scene afterwards. Hawks also complains about evidence of her personal appearance on the night of the crimes. While this evidence appears tangentially relevant, at best, to any issue at trial, Hawks fails to show unfair prejudice from its admission, and from its use in argument. In Proposition I, we reviewed the consequences from the State’s misstatements of law regarding Hawks’ status as an aider and abettor. We conclude that, as to Counts III and IV, the misstatements of law did not unfairly prejudice Hawks, as sufficient evidence was present from which jurors could infer she knew of the intended kidnappings. This proposition is denied.

We find in Proposition III that admission of irrelevant evidence from Thompson’s phone did not affect Hawks’ trial; given our resolution of Proposition I, we review this claim only for its effect on Counts III and IV. The State admitted a report listing all of the contents of Thompson’s phone, including the Internet sites he frequently visited.³ Hawks did not object to this exhibit and we review for plain error. Barnard, 2012 OK CR 15, 13, 290 P.3d at 764. Relevant evidence is that which tends to make any material fact more or less probable. 12 O.S.2011, § 2401. The record does not support a finding that this evidence was relevant to any issue at trial. However, the record also does not support Hawks’ claim that this exhibit was inflammatory and unfairly prejudicial. She argues jurors might have used this evidence of Thompson’s unsavory character to conclude she would have known he was a bad person and likely to commit kidnapping. Prosecutors did not mention the contents of this exhibit in closing argument.

Before its admission, jurors had heard that Thompson was recently released from prison, participated in stabbing the victim dozens of times, fled the scene, and when captured, he was soaked in the victim’s blood – all relevant, admissible evidence which spoke far more eloquently to Thompson’s character than the contents of his phone. Hawks has not shown that erroneous admission of this evidence had any effect on the jury’s decision. As admission of the evidence did not affect the outcome of the proceeding, there is no prejudice, and there is no plain error. Barnard, 2012 OK CR 15, I 13, 290 P.3d at 764. This proposition is denied.

We find in Proposition IV that trial counsel was not ineffective; given our resolution of Proposition I, we review this claim only for its effect on Counts III and IV. Hawks must show counsel’s performance was deficient, and that she was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Miller v. State, 2013 OK CR 11, I 145, 313 P.3d 934, 982; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Counsel’s acts or omissions must have been so serious as to deprive Hawks of a fair trial with reliable results. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787-88, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). She must show she was prejudiced by counsel’s acts or omissions. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 394, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1513-14, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. at 2067. Where a defendant fails to show prejudice, we will dispose of a claim of ineffective assistance on that ground. Marshall, 2010 OK CR 8, I 61, 232 P.3d at 481.

We found in Proposition II that instances of evidence and argument were either properly admitted or did not prejudice Hawks. We found in Proposition III that Hawks was not prejudiced by admission of irrelevant evidence from Thompson’s phone. As Hawks cannot show prejudice from counsel’s failure to object to this evidence and argument, we will not find trial counsel ineffective. Hawks also argues that, although the record shows trial counsel understood that the crucial issue was her knowledge or intent as an aider and abettor, he did not argue this to the jury; instead, she says, counsel suggested hypothetical events for which he admitted he had no evidence, and made an argument which opened the door to the State’s suggestion to jurors that Hawks’ failure to call her children in her defense was evidence of her guilt. The record does not support this claim. Hawks fails to show prejudice from defense counsel’s closing argument, and we will not find counsel ineffective. Hawks also claims trial counsel failed to impeach State witnesses with court documents regarding criminal charges related to their veracity. The record contains nothing to support these claims. Proposition IV is denied.

In connection with her argument that trial counsel should have discovered and used evidence of charges filed against two State witnesses, Hawks filed a Rule 3.11(B) motion for an evidentiary hearing. There is a strong presumption of regularity in trial proceedings and counsel’s conduct, and Hawks’ application and affidavits must contain sufficient information to show by clear and convincing evidence the strong possibility that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to identify or use the evidence at issue. Rule 3.11(B)(3)(b)(i), Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2016). In deciding whether she meets this test, we must thoroughly review and consider Appellant’s application and affidavits along with other attached non-record evidence. Simpson v. State, 2010 OK CR 6, II 53, 230 P.3d 888, 905. The Rule 3.11 standard set out above is easier for a defendant to meet than the Strickland standard, as a defendant must only provide clear and convincing evidence that there is a strong possibility counsel was ineffective. Id. at I 53, 230 P.3d at 905-06.

A Rule 3.11 motion must be accompanied by affidavits supporting the allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel. Simpson, 2010 OK CR 6, T 53, 230 P.3d at 905. Although Hawks relies on the information submitted with this motion to support Proposition IV, we do not consider it as part of the appeal, but only in the context of the Rule 3.11 motion. Rather than affidavits, Hawks provides copies of court records from Oklahoma County District Court cases (Exhibits A-G), and certified copies of court records from the Cleveland County District Court. She asks that this Court take judicial notice of the adjudicative facts in Exhibits A-G. 12 O.S.2011, § 2202. Hawks’ trial began on June 11, 2014, in the District Court of Cleveland County. She argues that trial counsel should have found a record of a second degree burglary charge filed against witness Miller, under another name, in Oklahoma County, on April 28, 2014 – six weeks before Hawks’ trial. Hawks also argues that trial counsel should have found charges of obtaining hydrocodone by fraud against witness Smith, filed in 2010 in another county; Smith received a deferred sentence for these charges, which were ultimately dismissed. Appellate counsel also appears to suggest that trial counsel should have discovered Smith was charged with the same offense in Cleveland County, two months after Hawks’ trial ended. Hawks argues that trial counsel should have impeached these witnesses with these charges, because the witnesses provided crucial evidence of Hawks’ statements regarding the crimes. Assuming without deciding that this evidence, if found, could have been used to impeach the witnesses (a matter far from certain), Hawks fails to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that there is a strong possibility counsel was ineffective for failing to discover it.

Also in connection with this proposition, Hawks moves for a new trial based on the newly discovered evidence of Smith’s 2010 and 2014 charges. In reviewing this claim we consider whether: (a) the evidence could have been discovered before trial with reasonable diligence; (b) the evidence is material; (c) it is cumulative; and (d) there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been introduced at trial, it would have changed the outcome. Underwood v. State, 2011 OK CR 12, I 93, 252 P.3d 221, 254-55. Smith’s 2010 charges were ultimately dismissed, and the 2014 charges, which were filed after trial counsel withdrew, could not have been discovered before Hawks’ trial. However, Hawks fails to show either that the evidence was material or that, had it been used at trial, there was a reasonable probability that it would have changed the outcome. Hawks’ request for an evidentiary hearing and motion for new trial are denied.

DECISION

The Judgments and Sentences of the District Court of Cleveland County as to Counts II, III and IV are AFFIRMED. The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Cleveland County as to Count I is REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial. Appellant’s Application to Supplement Appeal Record or alternatively the Request for Evidentiary Hearing is DENIED; the Motion for New Trial is DENIED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2016), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

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Footnotes:

  1. 21 O.S.2011, § 701.7(A)
  2. 21 O.S.2011, § 1431
  3. 21 O.S.2011, § 741
  4. 21 O.S.2011, § 741
  5. 12 O.S.2011, § 2401
  6. OUJI-CR 2d 2-6
  7. Pinkley v. State, 2002 OK CR 26, 13, 49 P.3d 756, 760
  8. Florez v. State, 2010 OK CR 21, I'l 8-9, 239 P.3d at 158-59
  9. Barnard v. State, 2012 OK CR 15, "Il 13, 290 P.3d 759, 764
  10. Marshall v. State, 2010 OK CR 8, I 24, 232 P.3d 467, 474
  11. Miller v. State, 2013 OK CR 11, I 145, 313 P.3d 934, 982
  12. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)
  13. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)
  14. OUJI-CR 2d 4-61
  15. 21 O.S.2011, § 701.7(B)
  16. Gilson v. State, 2000 OK CR 14, I 34, 8 P.3d 883, 902
  17. Simpson v. State, 1994 OK CR 40, I 30, 876 P.2d 690, 701
  18. Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 2002)
  19. Powell v. State, 1995 OK CR 37, I 36, 906 P.2d 765, 775-76
  20. Lambert v. State, 1994 OK CR 79, 888 P.2d 494
  21. Alverson v. State, 1999 OK CR 2, I 83, 983 P.2d 498, 521

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.7 - Murder in the First Degree
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1431 - Burglary in the First Degree
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 741 - Kidnapping
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2401 - Relevant Evidence
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2202 - Judicial Notice
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22, Ch. 18, App. Rule 3.11(B) - Motion for Evidentiary Hearing
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22, Ch. 18, App. Rule 3.5(A)(5) - Waiver of Issues on Appeal

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

  • Glossip v. State, 2007 OK CR 12, I 39, 157 P.3d 143, 151
  • Spears v. State, 1995 OK CR 36, I 16, 900 P.2d 431, 438
  • Rosemond v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 1240, 1246-47, 188 L.Ed.2d 248 (2014)
  • Banks v. State, 2002 OK CR 9, I 13, 43 P.3d 390, 397
  • Johnson v. State, 1996 OK CR 36, "i 20, 928 P.2d 309, 315
  • Williams v. State, 2008 OK CR 19, I 85, n. 18, 188 P.3d 208, 225, n. 18
  • State v. Heath, 2011 OK CR 5, I 9, 246 P.3d 723, 725
  • Postelle v. State, 2011 OK CR 30, I 15, 267 P.3d 114, 126-27
  • Conover v. State, 1997 OK CR 6, 19 40-47, 933 P.2d 904, 914-16
  • Pinkley v. State, 2002 OK CR 26, 13, 49 P.3d 756, 760
  • Ryder v. State, 2004 OK CR 2, I 83, 83 P.3d 856, 875
  • Florez v. State, 2010 OK CR 21, I 8, 239 P.3d 156, 158
  • Barnard v. State, 2012 OK CR 15, "Il 13, 290 P.3d 759, 764
  • Marshall v. State, 2010 OK CR 8, I 24, 232 P.3d 467, 474
  • Miller v. State, 2013 OK CR 11, I 145, 313 P.3d 934, 982
  • Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)
  • Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)
  • Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787-88, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011)
  • Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 394, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1513-14, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)
  • Underwood v. State, 2011 OK CR 12, "I 93, 252 P.3d 221, 254-55
  • Simpson v. State, 2010 OK CR 6, II 53, 230 P.3d 888, 905
  • Gilson v. State, 2000 OK CR 14, I 34, 8 P.3d 883, 902
  • Plunkett v. State, 1986 OK CR 77, 9 21, 719 P.2d 834, 841
  • Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 2002)
  • Lambert v. State, 1994 OK CR 79, 888 P.2d 494
  • Munson v. State, 1988 OK CR 124, 27, 758 P.2d 324, 332
  • Alverson v. State, 1999 OK CR 2, I 83, 983 P.2d 498, 521

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