Aaron Mitchell Stigleman v The State Of Oklahoma

F-2013-1129

Filed: May 20, 2015

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: Aaron Mitchell Stigleman

Summary

# Aaron Mitchell Stigleman appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder. Conviction and sentence: life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. # Lumpkin and Lewis dissented. In this case, Aaron Mitchell Stigleman was found guilty of killing his mother, Karen, in February 2013. During the trial, Stigleman’s defense team said he was suffering from methamphetamine-induced psychosis and needed an expert to support this claim, but they didn't get to hire one in time. The court denied their request for a mental health expert, saying it was made too late and didn’t show enough need. Stigleman's attorneys felt that without this expert, they couldn't properly argue that he didn't know right from wrong when he did the crime. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with Stigleman and decided to reverse his conviction because they believed he didn’t get a fair trial. They said that the failure to have an expert witness on methamphetamine's effects could have changed the trial's outcome. The case is sent back for a new trial. Наrrowly, the dissenting judges felt that the trial was fair and that Stigleman's defense should have shown how he was harmed without the expert testimony.

Decision

The Judgment and Sentence of the district court is REVERSED and REMANDED for a NEW TRIAL. Requests by both parties to exceed the Supplemental Brief page limitation are GRANTED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2015), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

• whether the refusal of the OIDS executives and the trial court to provide his appointed counsel an expert witness denied him his constitutional right to a fair trial, the effective assistance of counsel and due process of law;
• whether the admission of inflammatory, irrelevant, and cumulative evidence deprived him of a fair trial;
• whether his right to due process of law and his right to confrontation were violated when the trial court allowed into evidence a number of hearsay statements from the deceased;
• whether the trial court committed reversible error by admitting irrelevant and/or highly prejudicial evidence into the record concerning his legal ownership of multiple firearms/weapons and ammunition;
• whether the introduction of other crimes evidence deprived him of a fair trial;
• whether prosecutorial misconduct denied him a fair trial;
• whether he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel;
• whether cumulative error deprived him of a fair trial;
• whether an evidentiary hearing on his Sixth Amendment claims was warranted.

Findings

• the court erred in denying the request for a forensic psychologist, violating the defendant's constitutional right to present a complete defense
• the admission of inflammatory, irrelevant, and cumulative evidence deprived the defendant of a fair trial
• the defendant's right to due process of law and confrontation was violated with the admission of hearsay statements from the deceased
• the trial court committed reversible error by admitting irrelevant and prejudicial evidence concerning the defendant's legal ownership of multiple firearms
• the introduction of other crimes evidence deprived the defendant of a fair trial
• prosecutorial misconduct denied the defendant a fair trial
• the defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel
• cumulative error deprived the defendant of a fair trial

F-2013-1129

May 20, 2015

Aaron Mitchell Stigleman

Appellant

v

The State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

JOHNSON, JUDGE: Appellant Aaron Mitchell Stigleman was tried by jury in the District Court of Beckham County, Case No. CF-2013-70, and convicted of First Degree Murder in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2011, § 701.7. The jury set punishment at life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Honorable Doug Haught, who presided at trial, sentenced Stigleman accordingly. From this Judgment and Sentence Stigleman appeals, raising the following issues: (1) whether the refusal of the OIDS executives and the trial court to provide his appointed counsel an expert witness denied him his constitutional right to a fair trial, the effective assistance of counsel and due process of law; (2) whether the admission of inflammatory, irrelevant, and cumulative evidence deprived him of a fair trial; (3) whether his right to due process of law and his right to confrontation were violated when the trial court allowed into evidence a number of hearsay statements from the deceased; (4) whether the trial court committed reversible error by admitting irrelevant and/or highly prejudicial evidence into the record concerning his legal ownership of multiple firearms/weapons and ammunition; (5) whether the introduction of other crimes evidence deprived him of a fair trial; (6) whether prosecutorial misconduct denied him a fair trial; (7) whether he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel; and (8) whether cumulative error deprived him of a fair trial. Stigleman also requests an evidentiary hearing on his Sixth Amendment claims. We have determined the Judgment and Sentence of the district court must be reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Background

Aaron Stigleman shot and killed his mother, Karen Stigleman, in her home in Elk City on February 13, 2013. At the time of the shooting, Stigleman and his girlfriend, Melissa Pruitt, were staying with Mrs. Stigleman. Although both Pruitt and Stigleman had a history of using methamphetamine, Pruitt was trying to quit and had not used drugs during the week or two that she and Stigleman had been staying with Mrs. Stigleman. During this time Stigleman had methamphetamine in the house and he used it. Pruitt testified that she did not see Stigleman use drugs during the three days immediately prior to February 13 but she also testified that he was away from the house ninety percent of the time. She suspected that he had used drugs during the night on February 12 because on the morning of February 13 he was paranoid and hallucinating as he typically did when he used methamphetamine.

Pruitt testified that the morning of February 13 Stigleman had gone into the room where she was sleeping and asked if she wanted to have sex. When she declined, he responded by saying he knew what she and his mother had done to him. He said, You and my mom poisoned me and y’all are poisoning people in Elk City and killing them. Pruitt told him that he was crazy. Stigleman then went to his mother’s room where he screamed accusations that she and Pruitt were trying to kill him. He then walked down the hall and went to his room before returning to his mother’s room where he screamed at her three times, Do you want to die, bitch? He followed that query by shooting her in the head. Pruitt, having heard all this, went to the doorway of her bedroom and looked down the hall. She saw Mrs. Stigleman on the floor facedown between her bedroom door and the bathroom. Stigleman started yelling at Pruitt, insisting they had to leave. Pruitt walked into the living room where Stigleman was pacing and shaking uncontrollably. She asked him what was going on and he again accused her and his mother of poisoning him. Pruitt assured him that neither she nor his mother had poisoned him and she attempted to assure him that they would find out who had done that while Stigleman rocked back and forth repeating, What have I done? What have I done? What have I done? A siren sounded in the distance and Stigleman directed Pruitt to stand where she could look out the window toward the driveway. He paced around the kitchen island and walked circles around Pruitt for what seemed to her like an hour and a half. At one point Stigleman flipped the breaker cutting the electricity from the house and the house gradually became very cold. At her first opportunity, Pruitt ran from the house across the street to a neighbor’s house where she explained what had happened. The neighbor called 911. When the police arrived, Stigleman ran naked out the front door and down the alley where he was apprehended. Inside, officers found Mrs. Stigleman dead from a single gunshot wound to her head. Stigleman was brought into the Elk City jail and placed in a detox cell. There, he yelled repeatedly, My name is Mitch Stigleman. I just killed my mother, Karen Stigleman!

Discussion

After Stigleman was charged on February 19, 2013, the district court appointed counsel from the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System (OIDS) to represent him. On November 1, 2013, five days before trial was set to begin, defense counsel advised the district court that on August 19, 2013, they had asked OIDS for money to hire an expert witness to assist counsel in the analysis of the effects and psychoses caused by the use of methamphetamine and other drugs and that this request had been denied because of lack of funds. Trial counsel requested the district court provide funds for this expert. Defense counsel’s funding request was addressed at a hearing held on November 4, 2013, the day before trial was set to begin. The State objected arguing that the request was too late. In denying that request the court noted both that it was filed late and that counsel had not shown a clear need for an expert. Stigleman was forced to proceed to trial without the assistance of a mental health expert. He complains on appeal that the refusal by both OIDS and the trial court to provide funding for a forensic psychologist denied him the ability to present a complete defense. These errors, he asserts, denied him his constitutional right to a fair trial and due process of law. He also argues that if this Court determines that his trial attorneys did not do enough to obtain the expert, they should be found to have rendered ineffective assistance.

The United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. Gore v. State, 2005 OK CR 14, I 21, 119 P.3d 1268, 1275 (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 2146, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1985). In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82-83, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 1096, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), the Supreme Court held that [w]hen the defendant is able to make an ex parte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. It was incumbent upon defense counsel to make the threshold showing that insanity was a likely defense and to make a timely request for an expert to assist in the presentation of this defense.

In conjunction with this appeal, Stigleman has filed an application for an evidentiary hearing on his Sixth Amendment claims. Stigleman attached to his application for an evidentiary hearing affidavits from his trial counsel, from the Division Chief of the Non-Capital Trial Division of OIDS who dealt with the request for an expert, and from a clinical and forensic psychologist hired to conduct a forensic psychological evaluation of Stigleman for purposes of his appeal. That application with its accompanying affidavits contained sufficient information to show by clear and convincing evidence at least a strong possibility that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely request an expert and for failing to adequately articulate the need for an expert and that these failures could have affected the outcome of the trial.

On May 20, 2015, we remanded the case to the district court of Beckham County for an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance issues regarding the request for expert funding raised in Propositions 1 and 7 of Stigleman’s brief. The evidentiary hearing was held on July 10, 2015. During this hearing the defense presented five witnesses. The first two defense witnesses, Dana Hada and Robert Keith, who represented Stigleman at trial, testified that their defense had focused on mitigating the specific intent element of first degree murder. Although they initially sought the assistance of a toxicology expert to help establish a defense such as voluntary intoxication, the theory of their defense shifted to the possibility of methamphetamine psychosis and an insanity defense. They determined that they needed an expert to support the theory that Stigleman could not form the requisite intent to commit malice murder because of his chronic use of methamphetamine and perhaps other drugs. Although counsel did not raise the possibility of an insanity defense in their initial written request for an expert, the subsequent change in the theory of defense and the nature of the expert testimony needed was verbally relayed to Charles Laughlin, Division Chief, OIDS Noncapital Trial Division. Robert Keith spoke with Laughlin several times between the time the request for expert assistance was made and the beginning of trial. Keith learned a week before trial that OIDS would not provide funds for an expert and this foreclosed their ability to present an insanity defense. Hada testified that she believed Stigleman should have been provided an expert and that the failure to do so violated his constitutional rights. Keith was more specific in his testimony about the importance of a mental health expert in Stigleman’s case. He testified that having an expert to conduct a comprehensive forensic psychological evaluation of Stigleman would have changed the whole trial. He noted, correctly, that with an insanity defense, after the defense meets the threshold requirement of raising a reasonable doubt about a defendant’s sanity, the burden shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Both defense attorneys testified that a mental health expert’s testimony would have made an insanity defense possible and would have aided in the presentation of the involuntary intoxication defense.

Charles Laughlin, Division Chief of the OIDS Noncapital Trial Division, testified at the evidentiary hearing that the initial request to his office from Hada and Keith was for a toxicologist in relation to a voluntary intoxication defense. The request changed to one for a mental health expert a few weeks before trial when counsel sought to explore the possibility of presenting an insanity defense due to a methamphetamine induced psychosis. Laughlin testified at the hearing that the request for a forensic psychologist rather than a toxicologist as initially requested simply did not come quickly enough for him to secure the required expert in time for trial.

The defense also called Dr. Curtis Grundy to testify at the evidentiary hearing. Dr. Grundy, a licensed psychologist who practiced both clinical and forensic psychology, testified that he had evaluated Stigleman in person for four and a half hours and had reviewed numerous documents including trial transcripts, jail logs and police reports as well as videotapes and audiotapes introduced at trial. Dr. Grundy administered several psychological tests to Stigleman. Two tests designed to detect malingering did not show that Stigleman was malingering. After conducting the in-person evaluation and reviewing all of the relevant materials, Dr. Grundy concluded that at the time of the offense, Stigleman suffered from a stimulant induced or methamphetamine induced psychotic disorder with delusions and hallucinations.

Dr. Grundy also agreed that a methamphetamine induced psychotic episode can prevent a person from distinguishing right from wrong as it relates to a specific intent crime. He explained: [A] delusion to a firmly held false belief, where the presence of hallucinations, seeing or hearing things, can alter someone’s perception of reality to where they aren’t seeing external events correctly to where then they may engage in behaviors that are inconsistent with actual reality or perceived events. And it can impact or impair an individual’s ability to understand the wrongfulness of their behavior or the nature of their consequences of their actions. Dr. Grundy did not rely solely on Stigleman’s self-reporting in reaching the conclusion that he was in a methamphetamine induced psychotic state at the time of the offense. He also relied on the trial testimony of numerous other witnesses who testified about Stigleman’s use of methamphetamines and the testimony describing Stigleman’s delusions and hallucinations. Dr. Grundy found it significant that Stigleman told him that he had been using methamphetamine and had not slept for two weeks before the incident. It was reported on the jail log that Stigleman did not sleep for a day and a half after he was placed in custody. This information suggested to Dr. Grundy that Stigleman had been under the influence of a stimulant such as methamphetamine at the time he killed Mrs. Stigleman. He also testified that it is not unusual for a person who has been in a highly psychotic state to be unable to fully recall what happened while they were in that state. Dr. Grundy concluded that in his professional opinion Stigleman did not understand the wrongfulness of his conduct.

Finally, the defense presented the testimony of Dr. Peter Rausch, employed by the Oklahoma Department of Mental Health as a forensic psychologist. Dr. Rausch testified that he had performed a competency evaluation on Stigleman on June 13, 2013. At the time of the evaluation Stigleman was determined to be competent. Dr. Rausch testified that his evaluation did not assess Stigleman’s state of mind at the time of the offense nor preclude the possibility that he was insane at the time the crime was committed.

The only witness presented by the State at the evidentiary hearing was Gina Webb, the assistant district attorney who prosecuted Stigleman. Webb testified that the jury heard much of the same evidence upon which Dr. Grundy based his conclusion and she did not think that Dr. Grundy, with some initials behind his name would have had a significant effect on the jury’s decision. Webb also noted that the jury was instructed on the defense of voluntary intoxication and rejected this defense, sentencing Stigleman to the maximum punishment allowable.

At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing and immediately upon counsel finishing closing arguments, the trial judge announced that he had made his decision and had prepared his written findings of fact and conclusions of law. This document was provided to counsel at that time and then filed in this Court as directed. In that document the district court addressed each of the questions asked in a cursory fashion providing very little detail. Although this Court gives strong deference to the district court’s findings and reviews only for an abuse of discretion, we make the ultimate determination.

Evidence of methamphetamine psychosis may form the basis for an insanity defense. In Malone v. State, 2007 OK CR 34, 168 P.3d 185, there was evidence at trial that the defendant, a long time user of methamphetamine, killed the victim while under the influence of methamphetamine. The defense secured and presented the testimony of an expert witness who was qualified to testify about the science relating to how methamphetamine affects the brain.

Stigleman’s behavior before, during and after the killing suggested the possibility of a defense based upon methamphetamine psychosis at least as persuasively as the facts presented in Malone. These facts were known to Stigleman’s defense counsel well before trial. The record shows, however, that counsel neither made the request for funding in a timely fashion nor adequately articulated the need for the necessary expert.

The written request for district court funds for an expert filed on November 1, 2013, one week before trial was set to begin, was misleading at worst and incomplete at best. In this request, trial counsel advised the district court that they had requested expert assistance on August 19, 2013, but did not mention that they had initially asked for the wrong expert. Neither did they note that they had requested funds from OIDS for a forensic psychologist only a few weeks prior to trial. Further, they cited a lack of funds as the reason for the denial rather than the fact that the request for a forensic psychologist was not made in a timely fashion.

Additionally, while counsel requested funding to hire an expert to assist counsel in the analysis of the effects and psychoses caused by the use of methamphetamine and other drugs, they did not specifically advise the court that they were exploring the possibility of raising an insanity defense or cite facts supporting their request for this expert. Defense counsel failed to clarify the reason for their request at the evidentiary hearing explaining only that, [w]e believe that our defense in this matter would be substantially helped through expert testimony. We find that defense counsel’s request for funding for a forensic psychologist was both untimely and inadequate.

Despite the district court’s abbreviated findings and conclusions to the contrary, the record shows that defense counsel neither pursued all reasonable avenues to secure funds to hire an expert necessary to support Stigleman’s defense nor made necessary and reasonable efforts to secure those funds. As directed, the trial court next addressed the effect that the expert testimony would have had on the proceedings stating: I do not believe expert witness testimony would have affected the proceedings. The state alleged pattern of abuse as a part of the state’s case. The defendant testified at length during his trial. He told the jury what effect methamphetamine had on him.

The pattern of abuse referenced by the trial court likely refers to the State’s evidence that Stigleman had, in the months prior to February, vandalized his mother’s house and car and attempted to take money from her business. These incidents, which, incidentally, also occurred during a time when Stigleman was using drugs heavily, neither support nor preclude a finding that he was in a methamphetamine induced psychosis at the time he killed his mother.

Finally, the district court noted, as support for its conclusion that an expert witness would not have affected the proceedings, that although the jury was told about Stigleman’s behavior after the death of the victim and was shown the video of him running naked through the snow at the time of his arrest they declined to find him guilty of the lesser offense of voluntary intoxication. This is a non sequitur.

Without the testimony of a forensic psychologist, the jury was left to rely only on Stigleman’s testimony and the testimony of other lay witnesses about Stigleman’s drug use and behavior. This testimony was effectively challenged by the prosecutor on cross examination and in closing argument. Contrary to the trial court’s findings, the record does not support the conclusion that expert testimony would not have affected the proceedings.

Rather, it underscores the importance of expert testimony to Stigleman’s defense. Dr. Grundy’s expert testimony would have offered the defense far more than merely a witness with some initials behind his name.

We address next the district court’s conclusion that Stigleman was personally at fault for the failure to secure funding for a forensic psychologist because he refused to waive his right to a speedy trial. In its findings of fact and conclusions the court stated: The defendant was personally at fault because he refused to waive right to a speedy trial. I believe that the defendant did not want his case continued.

The court’s conclusion is not supported by the record. Although Hada testified at the evidentiary hearing that at a pretrial docket in September, Stigleman declined trial counsel’s request that he waive his right to a speedy trial so that they could get more time to secure an expert, this did not preclude counsel from requesting court funds for an expert just one week before trial or from requesting a change of venue the day before trial.

Each request, if granted, would have required a continuance. Just as Stigleman’s refusal to waive his right to a speedy trial did not affect defense counsel’s decision to request expert assistance or a change of venue, it did not affect the district court’s ruling on these motions.

The record before this Court shows that trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that Stigleman was prejudiced by his attorneys’ actions because there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different.

DECISION

The Judgment and Sentence of the district court is REVERSED and REMANDED for a NEW TRIAL. Requests by both parties to exceed the Supplemental Brief page limitation are GRANTED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2015), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision.

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Footnotes:

1. OIDS executives and the trial court to provide his appointed counsel an expert witness denied him his constitutional right to a fair trial.
2. Bland v. State, 2000 OK CR 11, I 112-13, 4 P.3d 702, 730-31.
3. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82-83, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 1096, 84 L.Ed.2d (1985).
4. Gore v. State, 2005 OK CR 14, I 21, 119 P.3d 1268, 1275.
5. Malone v. State, 2007 OK CR 34, 168 P.3d 185.
6. Johnson v. Brock, 1992 OK CR 83, II 6-10, 843 P.2d 852, 853.
7. Lewis v. State, 2009 OK CR 30, II 11-12, 220 P.3d 1140, 1144.
8. White v. State, 1998 OK CR 69, II 9-10, 973 P.2d 306, 314.
9. Coddington v. State, 2006 OK CR 34, I 3, 142 P.3d 437, 462.
10. Marquez-Burrola U. State, 2007 OK CR 14, I 16, 157 P.3d 749, 756.

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.7 - First Degree Murder
• Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 1355.4(D) - Indigent Defense Services
• Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 3.15 - Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

• Gore v. State, 2005 OK CR 14, 119 P.3d 1268, 1275
• Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82-83, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 1096, 84 L.Ed.2d (1985)
• Littlejohn v. State, 2008 OK CR 12, 181 P.3d 736, 745
• Wood v. State, 2007 OK CR 17, 158 P.3d 467, 479
• Malone v. State, 2007 OK CR 34, 168 P.3d 185
• Stigleman v. State, 2013 OK CR 1, 293 P.3d 198, 206
• Head v. State, 2006 OK CR 44, 146 P.3d 1141, 1148
• Johnson v. Brock, 1992 OK CR 83, 843 P.2d 852, 853
• Fitzgerald v. State, 1998 OK CR 68, 972 P.2d 1157, 1166
• Lewis v. State, 2009 OK CR 30, 220 P.3d 1140, 1144
• Salazar v. State, 1993 OK CR 21, 852 P.2d 729
• White v. State, 1998 OK CR 69, 973 P.2d 306
• Coddington v. State, 2006 OK CR 34, 142 P.3d 437, 462
• Davis v. State, 2011 OK CR 29, 268 P.3d 86, 111
• Ullery v. State, 1999 OK CR 36, 988 P.2d 332, 348
• Marquez-Burrola v. State, 2007 OK CR 14, 157 P.3d 749, 756