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F-2012-567

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Mario Lenard Phenix v The State Of Oklahoma

F-2012-567

Filed: Sep. 23, 2013

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: The State of Oklahoma

Summary

Mario Lenard Phenix appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder. Conviction and sentence were modified to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for Count 1, life imprisonment for Count 2, and seven years imprisonment for Count 3. Judge Caputo originally sentenced Phenix to life without parole for the murder. Phenix argued that he acted in self-defense and challenged the trial process and evidence used against him. The court denied most of his claims but agreed to reduce the sentence for the murder charge, allowing the possibility of parole. There was dissenting opinion from two judges.

Decision

As to Count 1, the Judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED, but the Sentence is MODIFIED to LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE. As to Count 2, the Judgment and Sentence is AFFIRMED. As to Count 3, the Judgment is AFFIRMED, but the sentence is MODIFIED to seven years imprisonment. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2013), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

  • Was there error in failing to provide the jury with the option of convicting Appellant of a lesser form of homicide?
  • Did the trial court err in the way the trial was structured, relating to the order of conviction and sentencing phases?
  • Was Appellant unfairly prejudiced by evidence of his other bad acts during the trial?
  • Did the prosecutor engage in misconduct during closing arguments that denied Appellant a fair trial?
  • Was there error in the trial court's response to a jury question about the meaning of a life sentence without parole?
  • Was Appellant prejudiced by his trial counsel's deficient performance?

Findings

  • the trial court did not err in failing to provide the jury with the option to convict Appellant of a lesser form of homicide.
  • the trial court erred in the structure of the trial, affecting Appellant's substantial rights; the sentence on Count 1 was modified to life imprisonment with possibility of parole.
  • the evidence of prior bad acts was properly admitted and did not prejudice Appellant.
  • the comments made by the prosecutor did not amount to plain error nor did they deny Appellant a fair trial.
  • the trial court's response to the jury's question during punishment-stage deliberations was moot due to the modification of Appellant's sentence.
  • Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was denied as he did not demonstrate prejudice.
  • the Judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED as to Count 1, but the Sentence is MODIFIED; the Judgment and Sentence is AFFIRMED as to Count 2, and the Judgment is AFFIRMED with a modification of the sentence to seven years imprisonment for Count 3.

F-2012-567

Sep. 23, 2013

Mario Lenard Phenix

Appellant

v

The State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

MICHAEL S. RICHIE C. JOHNSON, JUDGE:

Appellant, Mario Lenard Phenix, was convicted by a jury in Tulsa County District Court, Case No. CF-2011-13, of Count 1: First Degree Murder (21 O.S.Supp.2009, § 701.7); Count 2: Shooting with Intent to Kill (21 O.S. Supp.2007 § 652(A)), After Conviction of a Felony; and Count 3: Possession of a Firearm After Conviction of a Felony (21 O.S.Supp.2009, § 1283). On May 30, 2012, the Honorable James Caputo, District Judge, sentenced Appellant in accordance with the jury’s recommendation as follows: Count 1, life imprisonment without parole; Count 2, life imprisonment; and Count 3, ten years imprisonment. The district court ordered all sentences to be served consecutively. This appeal followed.

The charges in this case stem from a domestic incident on December 31, 2010, involving Appellant, his former girlfriend Breaun Pennington, Pennington’s friend Nicholas Martin, and Martin’s friend Alex Shaw. Appellant fatally shot Martin and wounded Shaw using the same firearm. The State presented evidence that Appellant was angry that Pennington had ended their brief relationship. Pennington testified that on the evening of the shooting, while she was on a date with another man, Appellant called her cell phone and threatened to kill her and her date. Later in the evening, Pennington’s date dropped her off at a local club, where she spent the rest of the evening with friends. When the club closed in the morning hours of December 31, Pennington got a ride home from Anthony Hubbert. Several other people (Martin, Shaw, and two female friends of Pennington’s) were also in the car. After dropping off the other two women, Hubbert drove to Pennington’s home. An unknown vehicle was parked in her driveway. Appellant exited the car and asked the men what they were doing in the company of his girlfriend. According to Shaw, Martin responded angrily, walking up very close to Appellant and yelling at him. Appellant backed away; Pennington went inside her home, while Shaw yelled at Martin to get back in the car so they could leave. Appellant then got back in his car and positioned it to block Hubbert’s exit from the cul-de-sac. Martin and Shaw got out of Hubbert’s car and demanded that Appellant get out of their way. As Martin walked toward Appellant’s car, Appellant, standing by the open driver’s door, fired two gunshots in Martin’s direction. Shaw, who was behind Martin, was shot in the arm. Martin punched Appellant, and as the two men wrestled and fell into the open passenger compartment of Appellant’s car, Appellant fired several more shots. He then pushed Martin out of his car, closed the driver’s door, and sped away. Hubbert and Shaw drove Martin to a local hospital, where he later died from multiple gunshot wounds. According to Hubbert and Shaw, neither they nor Martin had any firearm in their possession that night. Appellant was apprehended about two weeks after the shooting. In a custodial interrogation, he admitted waiting in front of Pennington’s home on the night in question. His account of the initial confrontation with Martin was fairly consistent with the accounts given by Hubbert and Shaw. However, Appellant denied blocking the men’s exit from the cul-de-sac and denied that the firearm used in the shooting belonged to him. Appellant claimed that his car stalled in the street, preventing exit, and that Shaw threatened to beat his ass and pull him out of his car. Appellant claimed that Martin and Shaw approached him, and that Martin was armed with a gun. Appellant claimed he was able to grab Martin’s gun, and that he shot Martin as they wrestled around and inside the passenger compartment of Appellant’s car. Appellant did not testify at trial.

With regard to Counts 1 and 2, the jury was instructed to acquit Appellant if the State did not disprove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he acted in self-defense. Furthermore, the jury was instructed that regardless of whether it believed Appellant acted in self-defense, if it had a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of First Degree Murder, it could consider the lesser alternatives of Second Degree Murder (21 O.S.2011, § 701.8) and First Degree (Heat of Passion) Manslaughter (21 O.S.2011, § 711(1)). As evidenced by their verdict, the jury rejected the self-defense theory, as well as the lesser alternatives to First Degree Murder. Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. He does, however, advance several claims of error which, he believes, entitle him to a new trial or sentence modification.

In his first proposition, Appellant claims the trial court erred in failing to provide the jury with the option of convicting him of a lesser form of homicide: First Degree Manslaughter by Resisting Criminal Attempt, 21 O.S.2011, § 711(3). Because Appellant did not ask the trial court for this instruction, we review the court’s omission to give it for plain error only. Postelle v. State, 2011 OK CR 30, ¶ 86, 267 P.3d 114, 144-45. Instructions on lesser related offenses should only be given if a rational juror could have acquitted the defendant of the greater charge and convicted him of the lesser one. McHam v. State, 2005 OK CR 28, ¶ 21, 126 P.3d 662, 670. Manslaughter by resisting criminal attempt is committed when a homicide is perpetrated unnecessarily either while resisting an attempt by the person killed to commit a crime, or after such attempt shall have failed. 21 O.S.2011, § 711(3). The term unnecessarily, as used in the statute, is equivalent to unlawfully or without legal justification. See OUJI-CR (2d) 4-102, Committee Comments. An ‘unnecessary’ killing constituting first-degree manslaughter would thus be found under circumstances where the defendant did not initiate the difficulty, yet honestly but unreasonably believed either that he is in danger of injury, or that slaying is the only way to prevent injury. Id. In the version of events Appellant gave to police, he was set upon by Martin and Shaw without justification, and Martin, armed with a gun, was fatally shot after Appellant wrested that gun from him. Appellant claims that a rational juror could have concluded that by shooting Martin, he was resisting an unlawful attempt by Martin (with the help of Shaw) to assault him. The problem with Appellant’s argument is that his version of events, if believed, supported an outright acquittal and nothing less. Under Appellant’s theory (in which the firearm belonged to Martin), Appellant did not use unreasonable force to resist a mere criminal assault; he used deadly force to resist a deadly assault, with a deadly weapon brought to the argument by the victim himself – and that response, if believed by the jury, would be entirely justifiable under Oklahoma law. Appellant would have been justified in using the same degree of force to repel Martin’s attack, as Martin allegedly threatened to use on Appellant in the first instance. 21 O.S.2001, § 733; Davis v. State, 2011 OK CR 29, ¶ 95, 268 P.3d 86, 114-15. Under the scenario Appellant advanced, his culpability was not mitigated, it was exonerated. The jury was duly instructed to acquit Appellant of homicide, if it had a reasonable doubt that he might have been in reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury. We do not believe any rational juror could have acquitted Appellant of First Degree Murder, and instead found him guilty of the form of manslaughter advanced for the first time here. McHam, 2005 OK CR 28, ¶ 21, 126 P.3d at 670. The trial court did not plainly err here. Proposition 1 is denied.

In Proposition 2, Appellant claims the trial court erred in the way the trial was structured. Appellant faced three felony charges. The sentences on two of them were enhanceable with Appellant’s prior felony conviction; the third (Count 1, First Degree Murder) was not. Without objection by either party, the trial court had the jury decide Appellant’s guilt on Count 1 in the first stage of the trial, but the jury did not consider the appropriate sentence for First Degree Murder until after it had received evidence of Appellant’s prior conviction. Ultimately, the jury imposed the maximum sentence available to them on Count 1 (life imprisonment without parole). For many crimes in Oklahoma, the defendant’s criminal history is relevant to enhance the available sentence. In that situation, the trial is usually bifurcated into a guilt stage and a punishment stage, so that evidence not normally relevant to the determination of guilt (criminal history) does not taint the jury’s deliberations on that issue. See generally 21 O.S.2011, § 51.1; 22 O.S.2011, § 860.1. But unless the State seeks the death penalty, the punishment options for First Degree Murder are only two – life imprisonment, with or without the possibility of parole – and there is presently no statutory procedure for enhancing a non-capital, First Degree Murder sentence with prior felony convictions. McCormick v. State, 1993 OK CR 6, ¶ 40, 845 P.2d 896, 903; Carter v. State, 2006 OK CR 42, ¶ 2, 147 P.3d 243, 244; 21 O.S.2011, §§ 701.7-701.10. If the defendant is charged with non-capital First Degree Murder, as well as other crimes which are enhanceable with prior convictions, the murder charge should be tried to completion (guilt and punishment) before evidence of the prior convictions is offered to enhance sentence on the other crime(s). Marshall v. State, 2010 OK CR 8, ¶ 57, 232 P.3d 467, 480-81. Because Appellant did not object to the procedure used at his trial, we review this claim for plain error. Marshall, 2010 OK CR 8, ¶ 55, 232 P.3d at 480. That is, we must consider whether there was a deviation from a legal rule, and if so, whether it is an obvious error which affected the defendant’s substantial rights, such that failure to correct the error would seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings, or otherwise represent a miscarriage of justice. Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, ¶ 38, 139 P.3d 907, 923 (citation omitted); see also Marshall, 2010 OK CR 8, ¶ 58, 232 P.3d at 481. The State concedes that an error occurred, but argues that it did not prejudice Appellant, given the circumstances surrounding the murder itself. We, however, are not confident that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In the guilt phase of the trial, the prosecutor conceded that according to the testimony of the State’s own witnesses, the murder victim was somewhat aggressive during the altercation with Appellant. The prosecutor’s punishment-stage arguments asked the jury to consider Appellant’s prior conviction when assessing punishment for the murder charge. We conclude that evidence of Appellant’s prior felony conviction may have improperly influenced the jury’s sentence recommendation on Count 1. Compare Marshall, 2010 OK CR 8, ¶ 58, 232 P.3d at 481 (bifurcation error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, where defendant robbed his elderly neighbor and beat in his skull with a hammer). Accordingly, we MODIFY the sentence on Count 1, First Degree Murder, to life imprisonment (with the possibility of parole).

In Proposition 3, Appellant claims he was unfairly prejudiced by evidence that he committed other bad acts. Specifically, he complains about Breaun Pennington’s testimony that he once pushed her against a wall, and that on the night of the shooting he called and threatened to kill her and her date. In accordance with Burks v. State, 1979 OK CR 10, ¶ 12, 594 P.2d 771, 774, the State gave pretrial notice that it intended to offer the prior assault on Pennington, as well as Appellant’s guilty plea to physically abusing a previous girlfriend. Before trial, the prosecutor clarified that he did not, in fact, plan to offer evidence of Appellant’s violence against a different girlfriend, at least not in his case in chief. The prosecutor maintained that Appellant’s prior assault on Pennington, and his telephonic threat to kill her and any man she was with, were admissible as tending to show motive for the instant crimes. The trial court agreed, over defense objection. Appellant first complains that the prosecutor withdrew the written Burks notice, and that in any event, that notice did not specify the State’s intention to offer the telephonic threat. This claim is meritless. The pretrial colloquy shows that the prosecutor intended to withdraw only the domestic-abuse incident involving a woman other than Pennington. The Burks notice mentions the telephonic threat in its recitation of the facts – part of the entire chain of events on the night of the homicide – suggesting the prosecutor believed the threat was part of the res gestae, such that no Burks notice was even needed to admit it. Williams v. State, 1988 OK CR 75, ¶ 5, 754 P.2d 555, 556. And Appellant does not claim he was surprised by any of this evidence. In similar prosecutions for violence in a domestic context, we have held that prior altercations between the defendant and the victim may be relevant on the issue of intent. See Cuesta-Rodriguez v. State, 2010 OK CR 23, ¶ 27, 241 P.3d 214, 226, and cases cited therein. The testimony in question tended to support the State’s theory that when Pennington ended her relationship with Appellant, he was willing to respond with violence. The testimony also tended to undermine Appellant’s claim that the murder weapon belonged to the victim. The evidence in question was properly admitted. Cuesta-Rodriguez, 2010 OK CR 23, ¶ 27, 241 P.3d at 226. Proposition 3 is denied.

In Proposition 4, Appellant complains about several comments the prosecutor made in closing argument. Most of these comments were not objected to, and we review those only for plain error. Washington v. State, 1999 OK CR 22, ¶ 40, 989 P.2d 960, 974. As to claims of prosecutor misconduct generally, we note that both parties are permitted considerable latitude to discuss the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom. Pavatt v. State, 2007 OK CR 19, ¶ 63, 159 P.3d 272, 291. Prosecutorial misconduct will only be grounds for relief if, taken as a whole, that conduct denied the defendant a fair trial. Warner v. State, 2006 OK CR 40, ¶ 197, 144 P.3d 838, 891. Appellant first complains that the prosecutor repeatedly referred to him as a coward in closing arguments. Because Appellant did not object to these references at the time, we review them only for plain error, and find none. The prosecutor’s word choice fairly described the State’s position as to how Appellant made a threat to Pennington, armed himself with a gun, waited at her home to carry out that threat, shot unarmed victims, immediately left the scene, and then hid from authorities for almost two weeks. Cf. Malicoat v. State, 2000 OK CR 1, ¶ 32, 992 P.2d 383, 401 (prosecutor’s repeated description of the defendant as a monster in closing argument did not amount to plain error). We find no plain error here. Appellant next complains that the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jurors’ emotions in guilt-stage closing argument. None of these comments were objected to at the time, and we do not find them so egregious as to rise to the level of plain error. Taylor v. State, 2011 OK CR 8, III 55-56, 248 P.3d 362, 379. Finally, Appellant alleges several improprieties in the punishment-stage closing argument. He complains that in asking the jury to render a sentence of life without parole on Count 1, the prosecutor improperly sought sympathy for the homicide victim and his family; that the prosecutor misstated the law regarding the meaning of life imprisonment without parole; and that the prosecutor improperly asked the jury to consider his prior felony conviction as warranting a sentence of life without parole on Count 1. Because we have already found it necessary to modify the sentence on Count 1 to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole (see Proposition 2), these claims of error are moot. Proposition 4 is denied.

In Proposition 5, Appellant alleges error in the trial court’s response to a question from the jury during punishment-stage deliberations, about the meaning of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Again, our decision to modify Appellant’s sentence on Count 1 (see Proposition 2) renders this claim moot.

Finally, in Proposition 6, Appellant claims he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s deficient performance. We review such claims under the two-part test mandated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Appellant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient, and that the deficient performance prejudiced him. Id. As to the first part of the test, we presume that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; Appellant must show there was no reasonable strategic justification for it. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. If Appellant cannot show any prejudice from the conduct he points to, we need not evaluate whether that conduct was professionally reasonable. Id. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069. To demonstrate prejudice, Appellant must show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different, but for counsel’s alleged errors. Malone v. State, 2013 OK CR 1, ¶ 16, 293 P.3d 198, 207. The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable. Harrington v. Richter, – U.S. – 131 S.Ct. 770, 792, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). First, Appellant claims that at trial, witness Hubbert related facts which were inconsistent with his preliminary hearing testimony, and that trial counsel should have impeached Hubbert’s credibility accordingly. We fail to see any material inconsistency between Hubbert’s recollections, nor do we see any material difference that a perceived inconsistency would have made in the outcome of the trial. Appellant also observes that at trial, Hubbert testified to seeing Martin throw a punch at Appellant after the first few shots were fired. At preliminary hearing, Hubbert said that after the first two shots, the two men were arguing, but he did not specifically mention Martin punching Appellant. Again, any inconsistency between these two accounts did not materially prejudice Appellant. First, the two accounts are not truly at odds with each other. Witnesses are usually not permitted to give long, detailed narratives; their answers usually depend on exactly what questions are asked of them. Furthermore, the version Hubbert gave at trial was arguably more helpful to Appellant’s self-defense theory than the version he gave at preliminary hearing, as it tended to show Martin was not just argumentative, but physically aggressive toward Appellant during the altercation. Simply put, Hubbert’s trial testimony corroborated the account that Appellant himself gave to police about being punched by Martin. Trial counsel thus had no reason to discredit this aspect of Hubbert’s trial testimony. Appellant was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to impeach Hubbert’s testimony in the way he describes. Browning v. State, 2006 OK CR 8, ¶ 16, 134 P.3d 816, 831-32. At trial, defense counsel attempted to impeach witness Shaw’s credibility using a perceived inconsistency between Shaw’s trial testimony and his initial statement to police. Appellant now claims counsel was deficient for failing to ensure that Shaw was among the witnesses specifically identified in the jury instructions on Impeachment by Prior Inconsistent Statement. Having reviewed the record, we do not believe the witness’s statements reveal an inconsistency of such gravity or materiality as would cast any doubt on the outcome of the trial. Next, Appellant faults trial counsel for not objecting to other-crimes evidence (evidence of his past physical altercations with Pennington), or at least requesting an instruction on the limited use of that evidence. Because the evidence was properly admitted (see Proposition 3), counsel could not be deficient for failing to object to it. Randolph v. State, 2010 OK CR 2, ¶ 23, 231 P.2d 672, 680. While counsel did not request a limiting instruction on the use of this evidence, that omission did not rise to the level of plain error in these circumstances. Jones v. State, 1989 OK CR 7, ¶ 10, 772 P.2d 922, 925, overruled on other grounds, Omalza v. State, 1995 OK CR 80, ¶ 98, 911 P.2d 286, 310. During Appellant’s police interview, the detective mentioned that he was facing a charge for firearm possession, in addition to first-degree murder. The interview was recorded and played for the jury in the guilt stage of the trial. Appellant claims this comment let the jury know about his criminal history prematurely, before the punishment stage of the trial, and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have the comment redacted from the recorded interview. We disagree. The detective’s comment made no reference to the requirement of a prior felony conviction in general, or Appellant’s criminal history in particular. The reference had no bearing on the outcome of the trial. Malone, 2013 OK CR 1, ¶ 16, 293 P.3d at 207. Next, Appellant complains about an allusion to parole made during the punishment-stage closing argument. The allusion was made not by the prosecutor, but by defense counsel himself. The jury was led to believe that Appellant would only serve 40-60% of any sentence imposed for Possession of a Firearm, After Conviction of a Felony. The jury imposed the maximum sentence for this count. Having reviewed the statement in context, we can find no sound strategic reason for it. See Hunter v. State, 2009 OK CR 17, ¶ 10, 208 P.3d 931, 933 (We have long held that parties should not refer to probation and parole policies in order to influence a sentence). There is a reasonable probability that the comment inflated the jury’s sentence recommendation on Count 3. We therefore MODIFY the sentence on Count 3, Possession of a Firearm After Conviction of a Felony, from ten years imprisonment to seven years imprisonment. Appellant’s remaining claims of ineffective assistance are meritless. Because we have concluded that an instruction on the lesser related offense of First Degree Manslaughter by Resisting Criminal Attempt was not warranted (see Proposition 1), counsel was not deficient for failing to ask for it. Cruse v. State, 2003 OK CR 8, ¶ 6, 11 67 P.3d 920, 922, 923. Because we found no error, plain or otherwise, in the prosecutor’s comments (see Proposition 4), trial counsel was not deficient for failing to make timely objections to them. Hanson v. State, 2009 OK CR 13, ¶ 39, 206 P.3d 1020, 1032. Because we have already determined that Appellant’s sentence on Count 1 should be modified, his charge that trial counsel should have objected to the bifurcation error (see Proposition 2) and to the court’s response to the jury’s question on the meaning of life imprisonment without parole (see Proposition 5) are moot.

DECISION

As to Count 1, the Judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED, but the Sentence is MODIFIED to LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE. As to Count 2, the Judgment and Sentence is AFFIRMED. As to Count 3, the Judgment is AFFIRMED, but the sentence is MODIFIED to seven years imprisonment. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2013), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY

THE HONORABLE JAMES CAPUTO, DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES AT TRIAL

APPEARANCES ON APPEAL

JOHN DALTON
RICHARD COUCH
ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER
ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER
423 S. BOULDER, SUITE 300
423 S. BOULDER, SUITE 300
TULSA, OK 74103
TULSA, OK 74103
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

BENJAMIN FU
E. SCOTT PRUITT
KALI STRAIN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLAHOMA
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
DONALD D. SELF
500 S. DENVER
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
TULSA, OK 74013
313 N.E. 21st ST.
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE
OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73105
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE

OPINION BY C. JOHNSON, J.

LEWIS, P.J.: CONCUR IN RESULTS

SMITH, V.P.J.: CONCUR

LUMPKIN, J.: CONCUR IN RESULTS

A. JOHNSON, J.: CONCUR

RB

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Footnotes:

  1. 21 O.S.Supp.2009, § 701.7
  2. 21 O.S.Supp.2007, § 652(A)
  3. 21 O.S.Supp.2009, § 1283
  4. 21 O.S.2011, § 701.8
  5. 21 O.S.2011, § 711(1)
  6. Oklahoma law
  7. 21 O.S.2001, § 733
  8. 21 O.S.2011, § 701.8
  9. 21 O.S.2011, §§ 701.7-701.10
  10. 21 O.S. § 701.10-1
  11. 21 O.S.2011, § 711(3)
  12. 21 O.S.2011, § 1289.18
  13. 21 O.S.2011, § 1272
  14. 21 O.S.2011, § 1289.13
  15. Burks U. State, 1979 OK CR 10, II 12, 594 P.2d 771, 774
  16. Williams U. State, 1988 OK CR 75, q 5, 754 P.2d 555, 556
  17. Cuesta-Rodriguez U. State, 2010 OK CR 23, I 27, 241 P.3d 214, 226
  18. Randolph U. State, 2010 OK CR 2, II 23, 231 P.2d 672, 680
  19. Hogan U. State, 2006 OK CR 19, II 38, 139 P.3d 907, 923
  20. Malone U. State, 2013 OK CR 1, II 16, 293 P.3d 198, 207
  21. Chapple U. State, 1993 OK CR 38, 918, 866 P.2d 1213, 1217
  22. Marshall U. State, 2010 OK CR 8, I 57, 232 P.3d 467, 480-81
  23. McCormick U. State, 1993 OK CR 6, I 40, 845 P.2d 896, 903
  24. Carter U. State, 2006 OK CR 42, H 2, 147 P.3d 243, 244
  25. McHam U. State, 2005 OK CR 28, I 21, 126 P.3d 662, 670
  26. Jackson U. State, 2010 OK CR 47, II 53, 241 P.3d 1174, 1185
  27. Malicoat U. State, 2000 OK CR 1, I 32, 992 P.2d 383, 401
  28. Omalza U. State, 1995 OK CR 80, q 98, 911 P.2d 286, 310

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.7 (2009) - First Degree Murder
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 652 (2007) - Shooting with Intent to Kill
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1283 (2009) - Possession of a Firearm After Conviction of a Felony
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.8 (2011) - Second Degree Murder
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 711 (2011) - Manslaughter
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 51.1 (2011) - Sentencing Enhancements
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 860.1 (2011) - Bifurcated Trials
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 733 (2001) - Justifiable Use of Force
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.10 (2011) - Non-Capital Sentencing

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

  • Postelle v. State, 2011 OK CR 30, II 86, 267 P.3d 114, 144-45
  • McHam v. State, 2005 OK CR 28, I 21, 126 P.3d 662, 670
  • Davis v. State, 2011 OK CR 29, II 95, 268 P.3d 86, 114-15
  • McCormick v. State, 1993 OK CR 6, I 40, 845 P.2d 896, 903
  • Carter v. State, 2006 OK CR 42, H 2, 147 P.3d 243, 244
  • Marshall v. State, 2010 OK CR 8, I 57, 232 P.3d 467, 480-81
  • Burks v. State, 1979 OK CR 10, II 12, 594 P.2d 771, 774
  • Williams v. State, 1988 OK CR 75, q 5, 754 P.2d 555, 556
  • Cuesta-Rodriguez v. State, 2010 OK CR 23, I 27, 241 P.3d 214, 226
  • Washington v. State, 1999 OK CR 22, II 40, 989 P.2d 960, 974
  • Pavatt v. State, 2007 OK CR 19, II 63, 159 P.3d 272, 291
  • Warner v. State, 2006 OK CR 40, II 197, 144 P.3d 838, 891
  • Malicoat v. State, 2000 OK CR 1, I 32, 992 P.2d 383, 401
  • Taylor v. State, 2011 OK CR 8, III 55-56, 248 P.3d 362, 379
  • Malone v. State, 2013 OK CR 1, q 16, 293 P.3d 198, 207
  • Hanson v. State, 2009 OK CR 13, II 39, 206 P.3d 1020, 1032
  • Randolph v. State, 2010 OK CR 2, II 23, 231 P.2d 672, 680
  • Jones v. State, 1989 OK CR 7, II 10, 772 P.2d 922, 925
  • Chapple v. State, 1993 OK CR 38, 918, 866 P.2d 1213, 1217

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