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F-2012-437

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Mark J. Lawler v The State Of Oklahoma

F-2012-437

Filed: May 6, 2013

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: Mark J. Lawler

Summary

Mark J. Lawler appealed his conviction for rape in the first degree. His conviction and sentence was for thirty-five (35) years in prison. Judge Timothy L. Olsen gave the sentence. Lawler argued that the trial court made two mistakes: first, it would not let him represent himself during the trial, which he felt was his right; and second, it denied his request for a speedy trial, causing an unfair delay. The court agreed that Lawler's right to represent himself was violated because he made a clear and timely request to do so. The court realized that he was capable of understanding the risks of representing himself and that the trial court had no good reason to deny his request. Because of this, the court decided to reverse his conviction. However, regarding the second argument about the speedy trial, the court found that even though there was a delay, it was not enough to affect his rights. Therefore, this part of Lawler's appeal was denied. In the end, the court reversed Lawler's conviction and ordered a new trial. Judge Lumpkin agreed with the result, and the other judges also supported the decision.

Decision

The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Hughes County is REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2013), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

  • Was there a violation of Appellant's rights under the Sixth Amendment and Article II, § 20 of Oklahoma's Constitution by the trial court's refusal to allow him to represent himself pro se at his jury trial?
  • Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial in violation of his rights under the Sixth Amendment and 22 O.S. §§ 812.1 and 812.2?

Findings

  • the court erred
  • evidence was not sufficient

F-2012-437

May 6, 2013

Mark J. Lawler

Appellant

v

The State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE:

Mark J. Lawler, Appellant, was tried by jury and found guilty of rape in the first degree, in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2008, § 1114(A)(5); in the District Court of Hughes County, Case No. CF-2010-85. The jury sentenced Appellant to thirty-five (35) years imprisonment. The Honorable Timothy L. Olsen, Associate District Judge, pronounced judgment and sentence accordingly.

Mr. Lawler appeals the following propositions of error:

1. The trial court erred when it refused to allow Appellant to represent himself pro se at his jury trial and forced counsel upon Appellant in violation of Appellant’s rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, § 20 of Oklahoma’s Constitution;
2. The trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial in violation of Appellant’s rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 22 O.S. §§ 812.1 and 812.2.

Appellant must serve 85% of his sentence before being eligible for consideration for parole. 21 O.S.Supp.2009, § 13.1(10).

In Proposition One, Appellant argues that the trial court’s denial of his request to represent himself violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). We have often reviewed the denial of such a request for abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Halbert v. State, 1987 OK CR 57, 9 4, 735 P.2d 565, 566. An abuse of discretion is a clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment, one that is contrary to the logic and effect of the facts presented. Neloms v. State, 2012 OK CR 7, I 35, 274 P.3d 161, 170. We note, however, that under Faretta, a trial court has no discretion to deny a valid request for self-representation. Parker v. State, 1976 OK CR 293, I 5, 556 P.2d 1298, 1300-01 (overruling pre-Faretta cases which held self-representation was discretionary); Coleman v. State, 1980 OK CR 75, I 4, 617 P.2d 243, 245 (holding trial court cannot force a defendant to accept counsel if the defendant elects to represent himself).

The scope of our review is therefore essentially whether Appellant made a valid request for self-representation, which the trial court denied. The State concedes that Appellant’s request to represent himself was unequivocal, but argues that the request was untimely and his waiver of the right to counsel was not knowing and voluntary. We disagree. Appellant’s request, made at least five (5) days before trial, was reasonable and timely under the circumstances. Gregory v. State, 1981 OK CR 56, I 11, 628 P.2d 384, 387 (finding Faretta request, coupled with request for delay, was not timely after jury was selected and sworn); Coleman, 1980 OK CR 75, 9 3, 617 P.2d 243, 245 (finding denial of request made just before jury selection violated Sixth Amendment); Johnson v. State, 1976 OK CR 292, II 28-29, 35-39, 556 P.2d 1285, 1290-96 (holding defendants validly elected self-representation by discharging counsel five days before trial).

From the record, we find that the request was not a tactical attempt to delay the trial or trifle with the court. The State and Appellant were ready for trial. Granting the request would not have required a continuance. Coleman, 1980 OK CR 75, I 6, 617 P.2d at 245 (finding motion for self-representation was well-taken where nothing suggested delay of trial would have resulted from granting motion). Before denying Appellant’s request, the trial court properly warned Appellant of the dangers of self-representation. Fitzgerald v. State, 1998 OK CR 68, I 7, 972 P.2d 1157, 1162 (finding trial court advised defendant against self-representation; that he did not know what he was doing; that it was a bad decision; and that defendant could face greater punishment as a result). Appellant indicated he knowingly accepted the risks of his decision. We repeatedly have said that the merit of such a request is not measured by the wisdom of the decision or its effect upon the expeditious administration of justice. Johnson, 1976 OK CR 292, 1 34, 556 P.2d at 1294. It is only necessary that a defendant be made aware of the problems of self-representation. Technical knowledge of the law and its operation at trial is totally irrelevant in the assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself. Id.

Appellant was no stranger to the criminal justice system. Id. (finding twice convicted felon could not be considered ignorant of difficulties of self-representation). He could read, write, and express himself coherently. The trial court was understandably concerned about Appellant’s 8th grade education, his lack of legal training, and the difficulty of the task before him. However, this provided no ground for forcing him to accept counsel at trial. The right to self-representation is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 950 n. 8, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984). The trial court abused its discretion by denying Appellant’s request to represent himself. This error requires reversal of the conviction.

Appellant’s Proposition Two argues that delay between the filing of charges and trial requires dismissal of the case. Appellant timely filed a motion to dismiss the case in the trial court alleging denial of a speedy trial. We therefore review this claim applying the four balancing factors established in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972): (1) length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant.

The length of delay and Appellant’s assertion of the right to speedy trial weigh in his favor. Ellis v. State, 2003 OK CR 18, I 30, 76 P.3d 1131, 1136-37 (regarding twelve month interval as threshold triggering speedy trial inquiry); McDuffie v. State, 1982 OK CR 150, I 8, 651 P.2d 1055, 1056 (holding that incarceration makes speedy trial demand for one in custody). The reasons for the majority of the delay were neither the fault of Appellant nor the State; but rather a combination of crowded local courts, limited judges, and unintentional neglect. These reasons ultimately rest upon the government, but weigh only slightly in Appellant’s favor. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192.

Regarding the fourth factor, Appellant has not shown that delay prejudiced his ability to defend himself, subjected him to more than typical stress and anxiety, or resulted in oppressive incarceration. On balance, he has not shown that the delay in his case violated the right to a speedy trial. Proposition Two is therefore denied.

DECISION

The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Hughes County is REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2013), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

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Footnotes:

  1. 21 O.S.Supp.2008, § 1114(A)(5)
  2. 22 O.S. §§ 812.1 and 812.2
  3. 21 O.S.Supp.2009, § 13.1(10)
  4. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)
  5. Halbert U. State, 1987 OK CR 57, 9 4, 735 P.2d 565, 566
  6. Neloms U. State, 2012 OK CR 7, I 35, 274 P.3d 161, 170
  7. Parker U. State, 1976 OK CR 293, I 5, 556 P.2d 1298, 1300-01
  8. Coleman v. State, 1980 OK CR 75, I 4, 617 P.2d 243, 245
  9. Gregory v. State, 1981 OK CR 56, I 11, 628 P.2d 384, 387
  10. Johnson U. State, 1976 OK CR 292, II 28-29, 35-39, 556 P.2d 1285, 1290-96
  11. Fitzgerald U. State, 1998 OK CR 68, I 7, 972 P.2d 1157, 1162
  12. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 950 n. 8, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984)
  13. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)
  14. Ellis v. State, 2003 OK CR 18, I 30, 76 P.3d 1131, 1136-37
  15. McDuffie v. State, 1982 OK CR 150, "I 8, 651 P.2d 1055, 1056

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1114. A - Rape in the first degree
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 812.1 - Right to speedy trial
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 812.2 - Dismissal for lack of speedy trial
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 13.1 - Parole eligibility

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

  • Bramlett v. State, 2018 OK CR 19, I 36, 422 P.3d 788, 799-800
  • Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)
  • Halbert v. State, 1987 OK CR 57, 9 4, 735 P.2d 565, 566
  • Neloms v. State, 2012 OK CR 7, I 35, 274 P.3d 161, 170
  • Parker v. State, 1976 OK CR 293, I 5, 556 P.2d 1298, 1300-01
  • Coleman v. State, 1980 OK CR 75, I 4, 617 P.2d 243, 245
  • Gregory v. State, 1981 OK CR 56, I 11, 628 P.2d 384, 387
  • Johnson v. State, 1976 OK CR 292, II 28-29, 35-39, 556 P.2d 1285, 1290-96
  • Fitzgerald v. State, 1998 OK CR 68, I 7, 972 P.2d 1157, 1162
  • McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 950 n. 8, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984)
  • Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)
  • Ellis v. State, 2003 OK CR 18, I 30, 76 P.3d 1131, 1136-37
  • McDuffie v. State, 1982 OK CR 150, "I 8, 651 P.2d 1055, 1056

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