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F-2010-555

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Keighton Jon Budder v State Of Oklahoma

F-2010-555

Filed: Oct. 24, 2011

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: State Of Oklahoma

Summary

Keighton Jon Budder appealed his conviction for First Degree Rape (Counts I and III), Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon (Count II), and Forcible Oral Sodomy (Count IV). The court affirmed his conviction and modified his sentences in Counts I and III from life without the possibility of parole to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. Judge C. Johnson dissented.

Decision

The Judgments in Counts I - IV are AFFIRMED. The Sentences in Counts II and IV are AFFIRMED, and the Sentences in Counts I and III are MODIFIED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE. The Application to Supplement Appeal Record In Regard To Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel and Application for Evidentiary Hearing is DENIED.

Issues

  • Was there an excessive sentence imposed for First Degree Rape considering the appellant's age and the Graham v. Florida decision?
  • Did the trial court err in denying the appellant's request to modify his sentences based on his age and intoxication at the time of the offenses?
  • Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to various evidentiary issues and for not presenting mitigating evidence during sentencing?
  • Did the trial court err in admitting evidence of uncharged offenses related to threats made by the appellant at the scene?
  • Did the cumulative effect of alleged trial errors warrant reversal of the appellant's convictions or modification of his punishment?

Findings

  • The court erred in imposing life without parole sentences for Counts I and III and those sentences were modified to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.
  • The court found no error in the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences for Counts II and IV.
  • The court found that Appellant failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.
  • The court found that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of uncharged offenses.
  • The court denied Appellant's claim of cumulative error affecting the fairness of the trial.

F-2010-555

Oct. 24, 2011

Keighton Jon Budder

Appellant

v

State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

OPINION

MICHAEL S. RICHIE BLERK LUMPKIN, JUDGE: Appellant Keighton Jon Budder was tried by jury and convicted of First Degree Rape (Counts I and III) (21 O.S.Supp.2008, § 1114); Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon (Count II) (21 O.S.Supp.2007, § 652); and Forcible Oral Sodomy (Count IV) (21 O.S.Supp.2009, § 888), in the District Court of Delaware County, Case No. CF-2009-269. The jury recommended as punishment imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole in each of Counts I and III, life imprisonment in Count II, and twenty (20) years in Count IV. The trial court sentenced accordingly, ordering the sentences to run consecutively. It is from this judgment and sentence that Appellant appeals.

On August 10, 2009, 17-year-old K.J. held a party at her parent’s home in Colcord, Oklahoma. K.J. and her friends were celebrating the start of their senior year at Colcord High School. During the evening, the 16-year-old Appellant arrived at the party with three other male students, Anthony, Ben, and Dakota. Appellant was not a friend of K.J.’s and had not been invited to the party. Nevertheless, she let him stay as two of the young men in the group had been invited to the party and because they arrived with a thirty pack of beer. Most of the students at the party spent their time playing beer pong and sitting around talking. During the course of the party, Appellant made K.J. feel really uncomfortable. At one point, she sat down on a loveseat to send text messages on her cell phone. Appellant sat down beside her. K.J. tried to scoot away from him. Appellant told K.J. his name and asked K.J. her name. Appellant also asked if it would be too much to ask for her phone number? K.J. explained that it was too much to ask, explaining she had a boyfriend. When Appellant asked a second time for her phone number, K.J. offered to give her cell phone to Appellant so he could put his phone number in it. She did so in the hope that Appellant would then leave her alone, and with the intent of deleting the number later.

As the evening wore on, Appellant spent most of his time drinking beer. Whenever he walked past K.J., he would slap her on the leg. When the party ended, K.J. inquired if everyone had a ride home. While she was doing so, Appellant went to her bedroom. K.J. had Anthony get Appellant out of her room. This was the second time during the evening that K.J. had to have someone get Appellant out of her bedroom. Anthony, Ben, and Dakota indicated they did not have a ride home, so K.J. offered to take them in her mother’s Malibu. As it turned out, Dakota ended up getting a ride with someone else, so Appellant asked if he could take his place. However, when it came time for the group to leave, Appellant was nowhere to be found. As the others searched for him, K.J. went to her bedroom to put on her boots. As she did so, Appellant jumped out from behind the bedroom door. K.J. would later describe Appellant’s conduct as creepy. As K.J. drove, the boys continued to drink beer. Ben sat in the front passenger seat and was the first to be dropped off. K.J. then drove to the trailer park where Anthony lived. Appellant had initially indicated he would exit with Anthony and spend the night with him. However, when it came time for Appellant to get out of the car he refused. He eventually moved to the front seat and said he wanted K.J. to take him to his aunt’s house. Appellant directed K.J. where to drive. She ended up on an unfamiliar dirt road in the woods. There were no lights anywhere, either street lights or car lights. When K.J. asked Appellant how much further she had to drive, Appellant replied, fifty yards. Suddenly, Appellant reached over, placed K.J. in a headlock, and cut her throat. K.J. screamed. Appellant then stabbed her repeatedly on her stomach, arms, and legs. She tried, unsuccessfully, to get out of the still moving car. She was eventually able to dive out of the car onto her hands. Appellant grabbed one of her boots and followed her out of the car. The car ended up rolling into a ditch. Lying on her back in the middle of the dirt road, K.J. tried to send a text message for help. However, Appellant saw her, grabbed the phone, and threw it into the woods. Appellant got on top of K.J. and punched her in the face. He then grabbed her hair, wired it up in his hand and slammed K.J.’s head against the rocks in the road. K.J. later testified that everything went black. When she came to, she felt Appellant lying on top of her, removing her shorts and underwear. Appellant threw K.J.’s clothes into the woods and tried to rape her. Despite feeling weak from the loss of blood and afraid that she was going to die, K.J. fought Appellant, trying to push him off of her. Unsuccessful in his rape attempt, Appellant jerked K.J. up and pushed her toward the car. There he forced her to bend over the open driver’s door and raped her. Appellant then opened the driver’s side passenger door and pushed K.J. inside the car. She fell onto her back in the back seat. Appellant came in after her, lifting her shirt and bra and attempting to suck on K.J.’s breasts. K.J. put her arms in the way. Appellant told her to quit and she complied. He then pulled her out of the car and bent her over the rear fender. He pulled her shirt off over her head. K.J. pressed the shirt against her bleeding neck. Appellant then anally raped her. When he was finished, he pushed her back into the car. Apparently changing his mind, Appellant pulled her out of the car so he could lie down in the back seat. He then made K.J. get on top of him. Appellant raped K.J. again, telling her your pussy is so good. After some time, Appellant pulled out of K.J., grabbed her head, and shoved it onto his penis. K.J. bit down in an attempt to get Appellant to stop, but it had no effect. After forcing K.J. to sodomize him, Appellant told K.J. to stroke his penis. K.J. complied and at Appellant’s directions, began masturbating him. Eventually, K.J. heard Appellant snore and realized he had fallen asleep. K.J. took the opportunity to get away from the car and run down the road for help. With the exception of her boots, K.J. was naked. She eventually came to a house and went to the front door, shouting for help. No one came. Noticing a pickup parked out front, K.J. thought if the homeowner believed the truck was being stolen, she could get some attention and some help. She opened the driver’s door to the truck. As the inside light came on and the truck began dinging, Ms. Burton came out of the house and yelled at K.J. to get out of her truck. K.J. shouted to Ms. Burton that she needed help, that she had been attacked. Ms. Burton helped the bleeding K.J. into her home, gave her towels to cover up with and a drink of water. Ms. Burton let K.J. use her phone to call her mother. With the help of her grandson, Ms. Burton then called 911. K.J.’s mother, her 21-year-old brother, T.J., and his friend D.M. arrived at Ms. Burton’s home soon thereafter. K.J. told them what had happened. T.J. and D.M. went looking for Appellant. They found the Malibu parked in a ditch as K.J. described and Appellant passed out in the backseat. Appellant’s white t-shirt was covered in blood and his pants were around his ankles. The only lights in the area were the headlights of T.J.’s pickup truck. T.J. looked through the trunk of the Malibu and found a tire tool so he could keep Appellant where he was until law enforcement arrived. T.J. shouted at Appellant until he woke up. Despite T.J.’s warnings not to do so, Appellant attempted to get out of the car. T.J. hit him on the head with the tire tool. When Appellant refused to cooperate, T.J. hit him on the head again, a little harder. Appellant tried a third time to get out of the car, T.J. swung at him but missed. This was enough however to convince Appellant to lie back down. The Chief of Police soon arrived, ordered Appellant out of the car, and attempted to handcuff him. Appellant resisted, swinging at the officer, cussing at everyone telling them he was going to kill everyone. Chief Hunt eventually subdued Appellant and placed him under arrest. While the chief talked with T.J. and others on the scene, Appellant attempted to escape. Chief Hunt caught him in time and had Appellant sit on the ground until backup arrived. Appellant complied but remained angry and very vocal. He was eventually taken into town and booked into jail. Meanwhile, K.J. was transported to the hospital and taken immediately to surgery. In addition to the injuries associated with the violent sexual assaults and the slicing wound to her neck, K.J. suffered approximately seventeen stab wounds.

Appellant testified in his own behalf. He admitted he had been to K.J.’s party and talked to her, although he did not know her well. He said that earlier that day, he had consumed a liter of Kentucky Deluxe with his cousin and drank more whiskey at the home of another cousin. At K.J.’s party, he drank a shot of Bacardi and approximately five beers before he passed out on the floor. Appellant said someone woke him up and told him to get on the bed so he did. When it was time to leave the party, Appellant’s friends had to wake him up and help him into K.J.’s car. Appellant testified he did not remember getting into the car and that he fell asleep while they were driving. Appellant said he woke up when Anthony was dropped off. He said that K.J. asked him to go somewhere with her. So, he moved into the front passenger seat; but while they were driving, he again passed out. Appellant denied asking K.J. to take him to his aunt’s home. Appellant testified that when he woke up, he was face down on the ground and did not see K.J. anywhere around. He said he heard people talking, a muffled scream, the sound of a loud truck, and someone saying, get him. Appellant said he thought someone had hit him in the head, but he could not remember anything after that. The next thing he remembered, he was being arrested and he did not know why. Appellant remembered threatening those at the scene because he was confused and angry. Appellant said someone went through his pockets and pushed his pants down. He said he fell asleep again and did not know how he ended up in the jail.

In his first proposition of error, Appellant contends his life without parole sentences in Counts I and III for First Degree Rape are excessive and must be modified in light of Graham v. Florida, U.S. , 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed. 2d 825 (2010). The State agrees. In Graham v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a sentence of life without parole violates the Eighth Amendment when applied to juvenile offenders who did not commit a homicide. The Court stated in part:

In sum, penological theory is not adequate to justify life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. This determination; the limited culpability of juvenile nonhomicide offenders; and the severity of life without parole sentences all lead to the conclusion that the sentencing practice under consideration is cruel and unusual. This Court now holds that for a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole. This clear line is necessary to prevent the possibility that life without parole sentences will be imposed on juvenile nonhomicide offenders who are not sufficiently culpable to merit that punishment. Because [t]he age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood, those who were below that age when the offense was committed may not be sentenced to life without parole for a non-homicide crime. 130 S.Ct. at 2030 (internal citations omitted).

Appellant clearly falls under Graham as he was 16 years when he committed the crimes charged in Counts I and III. When a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court results in a new rule, that rule applies to all criminal cases still pending on direct review. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-352, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 2522, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004) citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987).

Appellant was convicted in April 2010. Graham v. Florida was decided in May 2010. Under Schriro and Griffith, Graham plainly retroactively applies to Appellant’s case. Therefore, Appellant’s sentences in Count I and III are modified to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.

In his second proposition of error, Appellant asserts that not only is the sentence in each of the four counts excessive, but the aggregate sentence imposed by running the sentences consecutively should shock the conscience of this Court. He argues that due to his intoxication at the time of the crimes, his young age and the erroneous limitation on his presentation of mitigating evidence, his sentences should be reduced and modified to run concurrently, or in the alternative the case should be remanded for resentencing. The question of excessiveness of punishment must be determined by a study of all the facts and circumstances of each case. Rackley v. State, 1991 OK CR 70, T 7, 814 P.2d 1048, 1050; Rogers v. State, 1973 OK CR 111, 1 11, 507 P.2d 589, 590.

This Court has repeatedly held that if a sentence is within the statutory guidelines, we will not disturb that sentence unless, under the facts and circumstances of the case, it is so excessive as to shock the conscience of the Court. Rea v. State, 2001 OK CR 28, 1 5, 34 P.3d 148; Bartell v. State, 1994 OK CR 59, 1 33, 881 P.2d 92, 101. As addressed above in Proposition I, Appellant’s sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole in Counts I and III were illegal and his sentences have been modified to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.

The remaining sentences are also within statutory range. In Count II, Appellant was sentenced to life in prison for Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon. The statutory range of punishment is any term up to life in prison. 21 O.S.Supp.2007, § 653(C). In Count IV, Appellant was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment for Forcible Oral Sodomy, the maximum allowed by 21 O.S.Supp.2009, § 888(A).

Appellant asserts modification is due in part because at the time of the crimes he was only sixteen years old and was intoxicated to the extent he blacked out. Appellant admits that while intoxication is not a defense to the elements of the charges in this case, and that the level of his intoxication would not have supported a voluntary intoxication defense, his intoxication can be considered by this Court, along with his youth, in determining the appropriateness of sentence modification.

In cases relied upon by Appellant, the age of the defendant alone warranted modification of the sentence only in so far as the United States Supreme Court ruled that juveniles could not be sentenced to death. In all other cases, age was only one of many considerations in determining the appropriateness of a particular sentence. Likewise, intoxication alone has not been considered sufficient to warrant sentence modification, but can be considered along with other evidence. In Stanley v. State, 1971 OK CR 360, 1 12, 489 P.2d 495, relied upon by Appellant, this Court modified the sentence of one year in the county jail for pointing a dangerous weapon due to the defendant’s intoxication at the time of the crime and because there were serious evidentiary questions.

In the present case, the record indicates the jury and judge were well aware of Appellant’s age and his level of intoxication at the time of the crimes. Appellant testified in some detail to the alcohol and beer he had consumed before the party and at the party, that he had become plain drunk and passed out, and that he had passed out or blacked out on previous occasions when drinking. However, the evidence also showed that Appellant voluntarily drank to excess and that his conduct during the crimes was not consistent with a person having passed out or blacked out. There is no indication the evidence of intoxication was in any way ignored by the judge or jury. Based upon this record, we see no reason for modification.

Appellant also contends his sentences were excessive because he was not allowed to present mitigating evidence in regard to sentencing at his jury trial and at formal sentencing. In Malone v. State, 2002 OK CR 34,11 6-7, 58 P.3d 208, 209-210, we held that under 22 O.S.2001, §§ 970-973, when the jury assesses punishment there simply is no provision allowing for mitigating evidence to be presented in the sentencing stage of the trial of a non-capital case. Appellant requests this Court reconsider our decision in Malone and adopt the reasoning from Judge Chapel’s dissent that this Court should adopt a second, sentencing, stage in non-capital felony proceedings, during which the jury may hear evidence in aggravation and mitigation of the crime, in order to assist in the determination of an appropriate individualized sentence.

In Malone we explained: Oklahoma’s criminal statutes allow non-capital defendants, at the time of formal sentencing, to explain to the trial judge any legal cause they have why judgment should not be pronounced against them citing 22 O.S.2001, § 970. But 22 O.S.2001, § 971 qualifies the phrase any legal cause by giving specific grounds for such a showing of cause, i.e., insanity and those grounds that would support a motion for new trial in 22 O.S.2001, § 952. This appears to be a purely legal matter-except where there is the discovery of new evidence-and the full extent of allocution provided under Oklahoma law, except as set forth below. 22 O.S.2001, § 973 allows either party at the sentencing stage to raise circumstances which may be properly taken into view, either in aggravation or mitigation of punishment, but only in those cases where the issue of punishment has been left to the judge. In all other cases, i.e., when the defendant has demanded the jury to assess punishment or the trial judge has allowed the jury to assess punishment, there simply is no provision allowing for mitigating evidence to be presented in the sentencing stage of the trial. This is a limitation enacted by our Legislature, and the limitation is undoubtedly constitutional.

We see no reason to depart from this reasoning and decline Appellant’s invitation to reconsider our decision. As Appellant was tried by jury for non-capital offenses, we find no error in the absence of any formal presentation of mitigating evidence. This statutory limitation on the formal presentation of mitigating evidence did not deny Appellant the opportunity to present his defense. Appellant, like all criminal defendants, had the opportunity to present to the trier of fact any evidence to mitigate or lessen culpability and/or punishment, limited only by relevancy concerns.

Appellant further argues that 22 O.S.2001, § 973 violates equal protection because he would have been able to present mitigating evidence if he had chosen to be sentenced by the judge. Appellant did not challenge the constitutionality of this statute before the trial court. Therefore, we review his claim only for plain error. State laws are presumed valid when analyzing an equal protection claim. Appellant has failed to meet his burden.

Having reviewed and rejected Appellant’s reasons for modifying his sentences, we find that under the facts and circumstances of this case, modification of the sentences in Counts II and IV is not warranted, and further modification of the sentences in Counts I and III to a sentence less than life imprisonment is not warranted. Finally, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in running the sentences consecutively. This proposition is denied.

In his third proposition of error, Appellant challenges the effectiveness of trial counsel. He argues counsel was ineffective for 1) failing to object to photographs admitted into evidence, to the prosecutor’s leading of the State’s witnesses and the prosecutor’s closing argument, and to irrelevant evidence and other crimes evidence; 2) waiving opening statement; 3) failing to sufficiently advocate for Appellant regarding sentencing; and 4) failing to present mitigating evidence.

An analysis of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim begins with the presumption that trial counsel was competent to provide the guiding hand that the accused needed, and therefore the burden is on the accused to demonstrate both a deficient performance and resulting prejudice.

The burden rests with Appellant to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for any unprofessional errors by counsel, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Appellant first complains that counsel failed to raise any objections to the photographs despite the trial court’s reservations and warning to the prosecutor concerning the prejudicial and cumulative nature of the photographs.

The admissibility of photographs is a matter within the trial court’s discretion and absent an abuse of that discretion; this Court will not reverse the trial court’s ruling. Photographs are admissible if their content is relevant and their probative value is not substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect.

Counsel’s failure to object to two photographs of the victim’s belt and bra was likewise not indicative of ineffective assistance.

With respect to photos of the car, 41 were admitted. Thirteen of those showed the car at the crime scene. Of those, four photos showed the interior while nine depicted the exterior of the car. Twenty-eight photos of the car parked in a garage were admitted, with eleven photos showing the exterior and seventeen showing the interior of the car.

Counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise an objection to this relevant evidence.

Appellant further finds counsel ineffective for failing to object to inflammatory and irrelevant other crimes evidence.

Appellant further finds counsel ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument.

Appellant also claims counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s vouching for the victim.

Appellant next finds counsel ineffective for failing to give an opening statement.

Appellant next argues counsel failed to present a complete defense by failing to offer admissible mitigating evidence and argument in regards to the guilt/innocence determination.

As addressed in Proposition II, since this is a non-capital case, Appellant was not legally entitled to present mitigating evidence.

Based upon the record before us, counsel’s decision not to call an expert on the possible side effects of alcohol consumption was reasonable trial strategy which we will not second guess.

Appellant has failed to show that if counsel had presented any expert testimony, that the result of the trial would have been different.

Counsel’s closing argument does not warrant a finding of ineffectiveness.

Appellant next argues counsel was ineffective for failing to make a plea of mercy before the jury.

Appellant next asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence and argument to the court at formal sentencing.

As addressed in Proposition II, the parameters of formal sentencing are very limited.

Appellant has failed to show that any evidence he now offers would have had any impact at formal sentencing.

Having thoroughly reviewed the evidence contained in the affidavits attached to the Application for Evidentiary Hearing, we find Appellant has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that there is a strong possibility trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence he was not legally able to present at formal sentencing.

Therefore, we will not find counsel ineffective for failing to present evidence he was not legally able to present.

Finally, Appellant finds counsel ineffective for failing to argue that the sentences should be run concurrently.

Having thoroughly reviewed Appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we find Appellant has failed to carry his burden to show either deficient performance by counsel, or prejudice from the omission of this specific evidence. This proposition is denied.

In his fourth proposition, Appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of uncharged offenses.

The record reflects Appellant’s statements were made while he was being arrested.

This conduct continued through his arrest.

The evidence in this case was not introduced as evidence of other crimes, but as evidence of the charged crimes and the surrounding circumstances.

Therefore, we find Appellant was not prejudiced by the evidence. Therefore, no relief is warranted and this proposition is denied.

In his final proposition of error, Appellant contends the accumulation of error warrants reversal of his convictions and at the very least modification of his punishment.

In the present case, we found that Appellant’s sentences of life without the possibility of parole in Counts I and III for First Degree Rape were illegal and those sentences have been appropriately modified. No further errors have been found to warrant relief.

Accordingly, this proposition of error is denied.

DECISION

The Judgments in Counts I – IV are AFFIRMED. The Sentences in Counts II and IV are AFFIRMED, and the Sentences in Counts I and III are MODIFIED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE. The Application to Supplement Appeal Record In Regard To Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel and Application for Evidentiary Hearing is DENIED.

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Footnotes:

  1. Pursuant to 21 O.S.2001, § 13.1, Appellant must serve 85% of the sentences for First Degree Rape and Forcible Oral Sodomy before being considered for parole.
  2. Graham v. Florida, U.S. , 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed. 2d 825 (2010).
  3. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-352, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 2522, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004) citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987).
  4. Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, 2006 OK CR 27, 139 P.3d 907, 919.
  5. 21 O.S.Supp.2009, § 1115 (First Degree Rape is punishable by death or imprisonment for five years to life without parole).
  6. 21 O.S.Supp.2007, § 653(C).
  7. 21 O.S.Supp.2009, § 888(A).
  8. Malone v. State, 2002 OK CR 34, 11 6-7, 58 P.3d 208, 209-210.
  9. 22 O.S.2001, §§ 970-973.
  10. 22 O.S.2001, § 971.
  11. 22 O.S.2001, § 973.
  12. Love v. State, 2009 OK CR 20, 1 6, 217 P.3d 116, 118.
  13. State v. Howerton, 2002 OK CR 17, 1 16, 46 P.3d 154, 157.
  14. Rackley v. State, 1991 OK CR 70, T 7, 814 P.2d 1048, 1050; Rogers v. State, 1973 OK CR 111, 1 11, 507 P.2d 589, 590.
  15. Rea v. State, 2001 OK CR 28, 1 5, 34 P.3d 148; Bartell v. State, 1994 OK CR 59, 1 33, 881 P.2d 92, 101.
  16. Stanley v. State, 1971 OK CR 360, 1 12, 489 P.2d 495.
  17. 22 O.S.2001, § 976.
  18. 21 O.S.2001, § 61.1.
  19. Riley v. State, 1997 OK CR 51, 1 1, 947 P.2d 530, 535 (Lumpkin, J., concur in results); Pickens v. State, 1993 OK CR 15, 1 41, 850 P.2d 328, 338.
  20. Eizember, 2007 OK CR 29, 1 151-152, 164 P.3d at 244, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
  21. Jones v. State, 1976 OK CR 261, 9 13, 555 P.2d 261.
  22. Pickens v. State, 2001 OK CR 3, 1 42, 19 P.3d 866, 880.
  23. Murphy v. State, 2002 OK CR 24, 1 54, 47 P.3d 876, 886-887.
  24. Short v. State, 1999 OK CR 15, 1 93, 980 P.2d 1081, 1108-1109.
  25. Simpson v. State, 2010 OK CR 6, 230 P.3d 888.
  26. United States v. Martinez, 413 F.3d 239, 242-243 (2ⁿᵈ Cir. 2005) citing Williams v. Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 576, 584, 79 S.Ct. 421, 426, 3 L.Ed. 516 (1959).

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1114 (2011) - First Degree Rape
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 652 (2011) - Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 888 (2011) - Forcible Oral Sodomy
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 13.1 (2011) - Sentencing Guidelines
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.8 (2011) - Sentencing of Juvenile Offenders
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 970 (2011) - Allocution at Sentencing
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 971 (2011) - Grounds for Showing Cause at Sentencing
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 973 (2011) - Presentation of Mitigating Evidence at Sentencing
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 976 (2011) - Consecutive Sentences
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2404(B) (2011) - Other Crimes Evidence

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

  • Graham v. Florida, U.S. , 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed. 2d 825 (2010)
  • Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-352, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 2522, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004)
  • Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987)
  • Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, 2006 OK CR 27, 139 P.3d 907, 919
  • Rackley v. State, 1991 OK CR 70, T 7, 814 P.2d 1048, 1050
  • Rogers v. State, 1973 OK CR 111, 1 11, 507 P.2d 589, 590
  • Rea v. State, 2001 OK CR 28, 1 5, 34 P.3d 148
  • Bartell v. State, 1994 OK CR 59, 1 33, 881 P.2d 92, 101
  • Stanley v. State, 1971 OK CR 360, 1 12, 489 P.2d 495
  • Malone v. State, 2002 OK CR 34,11 6-7, 58 P.3d 208, 209-210
  • Love v. State, 2009 OK CR 20, 1 6, 217 P.3d 116, 118
  • State v. Howerton, 2002 OK CR 17, 1 16, 46 P.3d 154, 157
  • Head v. State, 2006 OK CR 44, 1 9, 146 P.3d 1141, 1144
  • Williams v. State, 2001 OK CR 9, T 127, 22 P.3d 702, 732
  • Fontenot v. State, 1994 OK CR 42, 1 47, 881 P.2d 69, 83
  • McElmurry v. State, 2002 OK CR 40, 1 63, 60 P.3d 4
  • Pickens v. State, 2001 OK CR 3, 1 42, 19 P.3d 866, 880
  • Eizember v. State, 2007 OK CR 29, 11 75, 164 P.3d 208, 230
  • Cruse v. State, 2003 OK CR 8, 1 11, 67 P.3d 920, 923
  • Jones v. State, 1982 OK CR 112, 1 13, 648 P.2d 1251, 1255
  • Lott v. State, 2004 OK CR 27, 1 103, 98 P.3d 318, 345
  • Simpson v. State, 1994 OK CR 40, 1 11, 876 P.2d 690, 695

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