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F-2010-548

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Ronald Alvis Dinkins v The State Of Oklahoma

F-2010-548

Filed: May 23, 2012

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: The State Of Oklahoma

Summary

Ronald Alvis Dinkins appealed his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm and various drugs. Conviction and sentence were reversed, and a new trial was ordered. Judge Lumpkin dissented.

Decision

The Judgment and Sentence of the district court is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED to the District Court of Tulsa County for a new trial consistent with this opinion. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2012), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

  • was there error in the trial court's failure to warn Dinkins of the dangers of self-representation?
  • did the evidence sufficiently support the convictions with respect to the element of "possession"?
  • must Dinkins' convictions be reversed due to a violation of the United States Supreme Court's mandate in Batson v. Kentucky?
  • did the trial court err in refusing to hear Dinkins' motions?
  • was the search warrant based on an affidavit that failed to provide reliable and credible information requiring suppression of the evidence obtained?
  • was it error for the trial court to not require the State to disclose, in camera, the identity of the confidential informant?
  • was Dinkins' three separate convictions for possessing three drugs on a single occasion a violation of prohibitions against double jeopardy and double punishment?
  • did the trial court err in ordering Dinkins' sentences to be run consecutively?

Findings

  • the court erred
  • evidence was not sufficient
  • the court erred
  • the court erred
  • the court erred
  • the court did not err
  • the court erred
  • the court erred

F-2010-548

May 23, 2012

Ronald Alvis Dinkins

Appellant

v

The State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

A. JOHNSON, PRESIDING JUDGE:

Appellant Ronald Alvis Dinkins was tried by jury and convicted of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm After Former Conviction of a Felony, in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2007, § 1283 (Count 1), Unlawful Possession of Marijuana with Intent to Distribute, After Two or More Felony Convictions, in violation of 63 O.S.Supp.2005, § 2-401(A)(1)(Count 2), Unlawful Possession of Cocaine Base with Intent to Distribute, After Two or More Felony Convictions, in violation of 63 O.S.Supp.2005, § 2-401(A)(1)(Count 3), Unlawful Possession of PCP with Intent to Distribute, After Two or More Felony Convictions, in violation of 63 O.S.Supp.2005, § 2-401(A)(1)(Count 4), Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia in violation of 63 O.S.Supp.2004, § 2-405 (Count 8), and Failure to Affix a Drug Tax Stamp, After Two or More Felony Convictions, in violation of 68 O.S.2001 § 450 et. seq. (Count 10), in the District Court of Tulsa County, Case No. CF-2009-1042. The jury fixed punishment at three, fifteen, twenty-five, thirty, one, and eight years imprisonment, respectively. The Honorable Carlos Chappelle, who presided at trial, sentenced Dinkins accordingly and ordered that the sentences on Counts 2, 3, 4, and 8 run concurrently with one another, but consecutively to Counts 1 and 10.

From this Judgment and Sentence Dinkins appeals, raising the following issues: (1) whether the trial court’s failure to warn him of the dangers of self-representation was error; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions because the element of possession was not sufficiently proven by the State; (3) whether his convictions must be reversed because of a violation of the United States Supreme Court’s mandate in Batson v. Kentucky; (4) whether the trial court erred in refusing to hear his motions; (5) whether the search warrant that yielded all of the evidence in this case was based on an affidavit which failed to provide reliable and credible information that evidence of a crime would be found in the house thereby requiring suppression of the evidence gained through the execution of the warrant; (6) whether failure of the trial court to require the State to disclose, in camera, the identity of the confidential informant was error; (7) whether his three separate convictions for possessing three drugs on a single occasion was a violation of the prohibitions against double jeopardy and double punishment; and (8) whether the trial court erred in ordering his sentences to be run consecutively.

For the reasons set out below, we find that Dinkins was not properly warned by the district court of the dangers of self-representation. We, therefore, reverse and remand for a new trial. Because we reverse and remand, the remainder of Dinkins’ claims are rendered moot, with the exception of his claim in Proposition 6 concerning the identity of a confidential informant, which we also address below.

DISCUSSION

1. Self-Representation

Dinkins claims that he did not knowingly waive his right to counsel when he chose to represent himself because, among other things, the trial court judge did not advise him against the dangers of self-representation. The State argues that Dinkins’ decision to proceed pro se was knowing and intelligent because: (1) as a four-time arrested, and twice-convicted felon, Dinkins was well familiar with the criminal justice system; and (2) he had the assistance of court-appointed standby counsel. While it is true that Dinkins had previous experience as a criminal defendant in other cases and that he had court-appointed standby counsel available to assist him and, in fact, Dinkins’ representation of himself may have been adequate, these are not the tests for a valid waiver of the constitutional right to counsel. Nave v. State, 1991 OK CR 42, 15, 808 P.2d 991, 993-994. A waiver of counsel is valid only if it is done knowingly and voluntarily. Id. See also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must ‘knowingly and intelligently’ forgo those relinquished benefits) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-465, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). A record of the knowing and voluntary waiver is mandatory, and absent a sufficient record, waiver will not be found. Nave, 1991 OK CR 42, 15, 808 P.2d at 994 (citing Lineberry v. State, 1983 OK CR 115, 16, 668 P.2d 1144, 1145).

To establish a record sufficient to support a valid waiver of counsel, this Court has repeatedly held that the trial court must advise the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. See Nave, 1991 OK CR 42, 16, 808 P.2d at 994 (citing other cases and stating [w]e reiterate our clear statements that under both the state and federal constitutions anything less than a record which shows that the defendant rejected the offer of counsel with knowledge and understanding of the perils of self-representation is not waiver). In this instance, the record shows that the trial court judge queried Dinkins several times about his intent to represent himself. At no time, however, did the judge conduct any inquiry into whether Dinkins had any appreciation of the dangers or disadvantages of self-representation and there is no record that the trial court provided Dinkins with any advisement about the risks. Furthermore, nothing in the record shows that the trial court judge knew if Dinkins was aware of the dangers of proceeding pro se. Because our cases hold unequivocally that an understanding of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation are an essential component of a knowing and voluntary waiver of the constitutional right to counsel, and because the record is silent on Dinkins’ understanding of the risks, we cannot conclude that Dinkins’ decision to represent himself was knowing and voluntary. The trial court judge abused his discretion by permitting Dinkins to represent himself.

2. Confidential Informant

We find no merit to Dinkins’ claim in Proposition 6 that the trial court erred by refusing to order disclosure of the identity of the confidential informant referred to in the search warrant’s probable cause affidavit. Title 12 O.S.Supp.2002, § 2510, provides the State with a privilege against disclosing the identity of a confidential informant, but it also provides an exception to the privilege if information from an informer is relied upon to establish the legality of a search warrant. In this instance, Section 2510’s exception did not apply because the credibility of the information upon which the warrant was obtained was provided by the affiant police officer who attested to his own observations surrounding the controlled purchase in which the confidential informant participated. McCoy v. State, 1985 OK CR 49, 7, 699 P.2d 663, 665.

DECISION

The Judgment and Sentence of the district court is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED to the District Court of Tulsa County for a new trial consistent with this opinion. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2012), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision.

2

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Footnotes:

  1. 21 O.S.Supp.2007, § 1283
  2. 63 O.S.Supp.2005, § 2-401(A)(1)
  3. 63 O.S.Supp.2005, § 2-401(A)(1)
  4. 63 O.S.Supp.2005, § 2-401(A)(1)
  5. 63 O.S.Supp.2004, § 2-405
  6. 68 O.S.2001 § 450 et. seq.
  7. 12 O.S.Supp.2002, § 2510
  8. McCoy v. State, 1985 OK CR 49, I 7, 699 P.2d 663, 665.
  9. Nave v. State, 1991 OK CR 42, I 15, 808 P.2d 991, 993-994.
  10. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975).
  11. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-465, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938).
  12. Lineberry v. State, 1983 OK CR 115, 16, 668 P.2d 1144, 1145.
  13. Braun v. State, 1995 OK CR 42, IT 12, 909 P.2d 783, 788.
  14. Johnson v. State, 1976 OK CR 292, IT 34, 556 P.2d 1285, 1294.
  15. United States v. Willie, 941 F.2d 1384, 1390 (10th Cir.1991).
  16. Murphy v. State, 2006 OK CR 3, I 1, 127 P.3d 1158.

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1283 (2007) - Unlawful Possession of a Firearm After Former Conviction of a Felony
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 2-401(A)(1) (2005) - Unlawful Possession of Marijuana with Intent to Distribute
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 2-401(A)(1) (2005) - Unlawful Possession of Cocaine Base with Intent to Distribute
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 2-401(A)(1) (2005) - Unlawful Possession of PCP with Intent to Distribute
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 2-405 (2004) - Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 68 § 450 (2001) - Failure to Affix a Drug Tax Stamp
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2510 (2002) - Privilege Against Disclosure of Confidential Informants
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22, Ch. 18, App. (2012) - Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

  • Nave v. State, 1991 OK CR 42, I 15, 808 P.2d 991, 993-994
  • Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)
  • Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-465, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)
  • Lineberry v. State, 1983 OK CR 115, 16, 668 P.2d 1144, 1145
  • McCoy v. State, 1985 OK CR 49, I 7, 699 P.2d 663, 665
  • Braun v. State, 1995 OK CR 42, IT 12, 909 P.2d 783, 788
  • Johnson v. State, 1976 OK CR 292, IT 34, 556 P.2d 1285, 1294
  • United States v. Willie, 941 F.2d 1384, 1390 (10th Cir.1991)
  • Murphy v. State, 2006 OK CR 3, I 1, 127 P.3d 1158

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