James Lyman Mahaffey v The State Of Oklahoma

F-2010-267

Filed: Jul. 19, 2011

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: The State Of Oklahoma

Summary

James Lyman Mahaffey appealed his conviction for Assault & Battery with a Deadly Weapon, Kidnapping, and Possession of a Firearm After a Conviction. He received a life sentence for the assault, 10 years for kidnapping, and 6 years for the firearm charge, and these sentences were ordered to be served one after the other. Mahaffey claimed that the trial court made mistakes, like letting him represent himself without properly assessing if he understood what that meant. He also argued that the prosecutor acted unfairly during the trial, making comments that might have influenced the jury. The court agreed that the prosecutor made mistakes in how she spoke during the trial, especially regarding his failure to testify and incorrectly explaining the meaning of a life sentence. However, the appellate court found that these issues did not affect his conviction, so his convictions were upheld. Still, because of the way the sentences were handled, the court decided to change his sentences to be served at the same time instead of one after another. Judge Lumpkin disagreed with this change and felt that the sentences should remain consecutive. In summary, Mahaffey's convictions were affirmed, and his sentences were modified to be served concurrently instead of consecutively. Judge Lumpkin dissented regarding the change in the sentences.

Decision

Mahaffey's CONVICTIONS on Counts I, II, and III are all AFFIRMED. His SENTENCES of imprisonment for Life, imprisonment for 10 years, and imprisonment for 6 years on these three counts, respectively, are likewise AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED, however, for the district court TO ISSUE A JUDGMENT & SENTENCE document reflecting these convictions and sentences and also, consistent with this opinion, that these counts will be SERVED CONCURRENTLY.

Issues

• was there an error in allowing Mahaffey to proceed as a pro se litigant?
• did prosecutorial misconduct, including material misstatements of law, deprive Mahaffey of a fair trial and fair sentencing procedure?
• was the prosecutor's comment on Mahaffey's failure to testify improper?
• did the prosecutor's references to Bible verses constitute new evidence during closing arguments?
• did the prosecutor misstate the meaning of a "life sentence" under the 85% Rule?
• was there prosecutorial misconduct in the repeated use of the victim's first name during trial?

Findings

• the court did not err in granting appellant's request to proceed as a pro se litigant
• the prosecutor's comments did not deprive appellant of a fair trial regarding his convictions
• the prosecutor's misconduct related to sentencing was deemed harmful
• the sentences were modified to be served concurrently

F-2010-267

Jul. 19, 2011

James Lyman Mahaffey

Appellant

v

The State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

SMITH, JUDGE:

James Lyman Mahaffey, Appellant, was tried by jury and convicted of Assault & Battery with a Deadly Weapon AFCF, under 21 O.S.Supp.2007, § 652(C) (Count I); Kidnapping AFCF, under 21 O.S.Supp.2007, § 741 (Count II); and Possession of Firearm After Conviction AFCF, under 21 O.S.Supp.2007, § 1283 (Count III), in the District Court of Grady County, Case No. CF-2009-45. In accord with the jury verdict, the Honorable Richard G. Van Dyck, District Judge, sentenced Mahaffey to imprisonment for Life on Count I, imprisonment for 10 years on Count II, and imprisonment for 6 years on Count III, all run consecutively. Mahaffey is before this Court on direct appeal. Mahaffey raises the following propositions of error:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED APPELLANT’S REQUEST TO PROCEED AS A PRO SE LITIGANT.

In Proposition I, Mahaffey asserts that the trial court erred in allowing him to represent himself. The Supreme Court and this Court have recognized that defendants have a constitutional right, under the Sixth Amendment, to represent themselves at trial if they choose to do so. Both Courts have also recognized that because the right to the assistance of counsel is likewise a fundamental constitutional right, a defendant who desires to represent himself/herself must first knowingly and intelligently waive the benefits of counsel, after being informed of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. And in order to validly waive the assistance of counsel and proceed pro se, a defendant must be competent to make this decision and must be clear and unequivocal in his/her desire to proceed pro se. Mahaffey asserts that his invocation of his right to represent himself was not unequivocal, that he may not have been competent to make a valid waiver, that he was not adequately warned of the disadvantages of self-representation, and therefore that his waiver of the assistance of counsel was invalid. The record does not support Mahaffey’s claims.

On May 14, 2009, the Honorable Timothy A. Brauer conducted a Faretta hearing on Mahaffey’s request to represent himself. During this hearing, the court reviewed the charges, the former convictions charged, and the punishment ranges potentially at issue. The court examined Mahaffey about his desire to represent himself, his age, his ability to read and write, his education, any determinations that he was incompetent, his understanding of the preliminary hearing, and anything that could possibly affect his ability to understand the proceedings at issue. The court advised Mahaffey regarding his right to the assistance of counsel, that counsel would be appointed for him if he was indigent, that attorneys with the Indigent Defense System represent their clients very well, and that he would be at a severe disadvantage if he chose self-representation, particularly since he would be facing experienced and knowledgeable prosecutors. The court also explained that if Mahaffey chose to represent himself, he would have to comply with the Rules of Evidence and other court rules, that State evidence could come in that would otherwise not be allowed, that he might fail to raise a defense that he otherwise could have raised, and that even a small error on his part could change the whole outcome of the trial or result in a life sentence. The court informed Mahaffey that if he chose to represent himself, the court would appoint standby counsel for him. The court also noted that it would allow Mahaffey to change his mind and still have appointed counsel, as long as he gave adequate notice of this desire.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that Mahaffey was competent, that he understood the nature of what was at stake, and that he had made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. Hence the court ruled that Mahaffey would be allowed to proceed pro se. Thereafter, Mahaffey never wavered in his desire to proceed pro se, and he represented himself at both the preliminary hearing and at trial. He also had standby counsel at both the preliminary hearing and at trial, namely, Marvin Quinn. Mahaffey asserts that his waiver of counsel was not unequivocal, because at one point during the hearing, he asked a question about how the appointment of counsel process worked. This Court finds, upon review of the entire hearing, that the single question asked by Mahaffey did not at all undermine the clear and unequivocal nature of his repeatedly expressed desire to represent himself. The trial court’s finding that Mahaffey was competent to choose self-representation was well supported by the record, and this finding was not undermined by the fact that he had prior convictions for drug-related offenses. Nor does the record in this case suggest that Mahaffey was mentally impaired, simply because he did not always represent himself in the manner that a competent attorney might have. This Court also finds that the court’s warnings to Mahaffey about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation were thorough and adequate. Mahaffey’s final Proposition I challenge is that his standby counsel was too active in representing him-thereby violating his right to represent himself.

In Proposition II, Mahaffey asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct during his trial that deprived him of a fair trial and a fair sentencing. Mahaffey raises five different instances of prosecutorial misconduct at his trial: (1) references to his indigency during voir dire, (2) commenting on his failure to testify, (3) quoting Bible verses as evidence during closing argument, (4) telling the jury that Life means 45 years, and (5) addressing the victim by her first name. This Court must determine whether the challenged remarks rendered Mahaffey’s trial so fundamentally unfair that the jury’s verdicts cannot be relied upon. Mahaffey seeks either a new trial or a modification of his sentences. Mahaffey cites two examples of the prosecutor allegedly drawing improper attention to his indigency. Since he raised no objection at trial, we review only for plain error.

Mahaffey’s second challenge is much more troubling. During her final, first-stage closing argument, the prosecutor stated as follows: Let’s talk about the reasons not to believe the defendant. The defendant, he told you that there’s two sides to every story. Did we hear that other side? I didn’t hear – I did not hear his side of the story. Immediately after this comment was made, the trial court interrupted and called the parties to the bench. The trial court sternly admonished the prosecutor that she could not comment on the defendant’s failure to testify, period.

The prosecutor’s statement I did not hear his side of the story was a clear comment on the defendant’s failure to testify. The jury was well aware that only Easter and Mahaffey were present at the time of the charged crimes, that Easter had testified and given her side of the story, and that Mahaffey had not testified. The prosecutor’s remarks, though not quite an explicit comment on his failure to testify, were clearly intended to persuade jurors that they should be suspicious of Mahaffey’s defense because he had failed to testify and present his side of the story. Hence the comment imposed an improper penalty on Mahaffey for his exercise of his Fifth Amendment right not to testify. Nevertheless, in the entire context of this case, this Court finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that this improper comment was harmless in terms of Mahaffey’s convictions. The testimony of Easter and the other witnesses, including the emergency room physician who treated her, along with the photographs of how battered Easter looked the next day, convincingly established the crimes alleged and how brutally Mahaffey had beaten his wife. This case was not one where the victim’s testimony was uncorroborated. Any potential impact on Mahaffey’s sentence will be further addressed infra.

Mahaffey’s third assertion of prosecutorial misconduct involves the State’s final closing argument in the first stage of trial. The State had introduced into evidence, without objection, two undated letters that Mahaffey had written to Easter from jail. The second letter introduced contained eight different references to Bible verses from the book of Proverbs. Although the prosecutor questioned Easter about some of the statements in both letters, she did not make any reference to the citations to Proverbs during questioning.

Mahaffey next challenges the prosecutor’s characterization of a life sentence, which was made later during her second-stage closing argument. While reviewing the jury’s sentencing instructions, the prosecutor stated: In that same instruction, you are told what life is. We always get these notes from the jury that say[], ‘What’s life? Does life mean life?’ Life means 45 years. That’s what life means. Mahaffey failed to object to these remarks, waiving all but plain error. The source of the instruction that the prosecutor was explaining to the jury is Anderson v. State, which held that juries should be informed regarding the impact of Oklahoma’s statutory 85 Percent Rule. The prosecutor’s quoted remarks misstate the meaning of the 85% Rule regarding a sentence of life and of OUJI-CR 10-13B.

This Court finds that the most appropriate remedy for the prosecutor’s misconduct in this case is to order that the three counts in this case be served concurrently, rather than consecutively.

DECISION

Mahaffey’s CONVICTIONS on Counts I, II, and III are all AFFIRMED. His SENTENCES of imprisonment for Life, imprisonment for 10 years, and imprisonment for 6 years on these three counts, respectively, are likewise AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED, however, for the district court TO ISSUE A JUDGMENT & SENTENCE document reflecting these convictions and sentences and also, consistent with this opinion, that these counts will be SERVED CONCURRENTLY.

Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2011), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

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Footnotes:

1. 21 O.S.Supp.2007, § 652(C)
2. 21 O.S.Supp.2007, § 741
3. 21 O.S.Supp.2007, § 1283
4. 21 O.S.Supp.2007, § 13.1
5. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)
6. Parker v. State, 1976 OK CR 293
7. Fitzgerald v. State, 1998 OK CR 68
8. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974)
9. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986)
10. Brown v. State, 2008 OK CR 3
11. Mehdipour v. State, 1998 OK CR 23
12. Harris v. State, 1982 OK CR 74
13. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)
14. Anderson v. State, 2006 OK CR 6
15. Florez v. State, 2010 OK CR 21
16. Glossip v. State, 2001 OK CR 21

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 652(C) (2011) - Assault & Battery with a Deadly Weapon
• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 741 (2011) - Kidnapping
• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1283 (2011) - Possession of Firearm After Conviction
• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 13.1 (2011) - 85% Rule
• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 61.1 (2011) - Consecutive Sentences

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

• Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)
• Parker v. State, 1976 OK CR 293, 556 P.2d 1298
• Fitzgerald v. State, 1998 OK CR 68, 972 P.2d 1157
• Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974)
• Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986)
• Brown v. State, 2008 OK CR 3, 177 P.3d 577
• Harris v. State, 1982 OK CR 74, 645 P.2d 1036
• Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965)
• Mehdipour v. State, 1998 OK CR 23, 956 P.2d 911
• Anderson v. State, 2006 OK CR 6, 130 P.3d 273
• Florez v. State, 2010 OK CR 21, 239 P.3d 156
• Glossip v. State, 2001 OK CR 21, 29 P.3d 597
• Bland v. State, 2000 OK CR 11, 4 P.3d 702