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F-2009-1142

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Antonio Catalino Myrie, Jr. v The State Of Oklahoma

F-2009-1142

Filed: Sep. 1, 2011

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: Antonio Catalino Myrie, Jr.

Summary

Antonio Catalino Myrie, Jr. appealed his conviction for multiple offenses including five counts of Knowingly Concealing/Receiving Stolen Property, First-Degree Arson, and Second-Degree Burglary. His conviction and sentence included 30 years imprisonment and fines for the theft counts and life imprisonment with a $25,000 fine for arson. The court found issues with the trial, primarily that Myrie did not receive a copy of his preliminary hearing transcript before trial, which was a violation of his rights. The court reversed Myrie's convictions and stated the cases should be re-tried separately. Judge Lumpkin dissented, believing that the errors should not have led to automatic reversal.

Decision

Myrie's convictions in CF-2008-6029 are all REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Myrie's Motion to Remand for Evidentiary Hearing is DENIED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2011), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

  • Was there a denial of a copy of the preliminary hearing transcript at government expense prior to trial and did the refusal to grant a continuance constitute an abuse of discretion?
  • Did the state present other crimes evidence in violation of the Oklahoma Evidence Code, denying the appellant his right to a fair trial?
  • Was it improper to join the burglary and arson charges with the knowingly concealing stolen property charges?
  • Did the evidence support multiple violations of knowingly concealing stolen property when it constituted a single offense, violating the double punishment prohibition?
  • Did the appellant receive ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment?
  • Was there a failure to provide the jury with accomplice corroboration instructions for witness Eugene Tripke, constituting reversible error?
  • Did the combined effect of errors at the appellant's trial require a modification of his sentence?

Findings

  • the trial court's denial of Myrie's motion for continuance was an abuse of discretion
  • the trial court abused its discretion in admitting other crimes evidence
  • the trial court abused its discretion in improperly joining the burglary and arson charges
  • Myrie’s conviction for multiple counts of knowingly concealing stolen property did not violate double jeopardy
  • Myrie's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was moot
  • the issue of improper jury instructions regarding accomplice testimony was moot
  • the issue of cumulative error was moot
  • all of Myrie's convictions were reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings

F-2009-1142

Sep. 1, 2011

Antonio Catalino Myrie, Jr.

Appellant

v

The State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

SMITH, JUDGE:

Antonio Catalino Myrie, Jr., Appellant, was tried by jury and convicted of five counts of Knowingly Concealing/Receiving Stolen Property, under 21 O.S.2001, § 1713 (Counts I-V); First-Degree Arson, under 21 O.S.2001, § 1401 (Count VI); and Second-Degree Burglary, under 21 O.S.2001, § 1435 (Count VII),1 all After Former Conviction of Two or More Felonies, in the District Court of Tulsa County, Case No. CF-2008-6029.2 In accord with the jury verdict, the Honorable William C. Kellough, District Judge, sentenced Myrie to imprisonment for 30 years and a fine of $500 on each of Counts I-V, imprisonment for Life and a fine of $25,000 on Count VI, and imprisonment for 30 years and a fine of $10,000 on Count VII, with Counts I-V all to run concurrently, but consecutively to both Count VI and Count VII.³ Myrie is before this Court on direct appeal.

1 Although Myrie was clearly charged with second-degree burglary, and the jury was properly instructed upon and convicted him of this crime, the Second Amended Information and the Judgment & Sentence for Count VII both incorrectly cite 21 O.S., § 1431 (first-degree burglary), rather than § 1435 (second-degree burglary). This clear scrivener’s error is corrected herein.
2 The arson and burglary counts were originally filed in a separate Tulsa County case, CF-2008-6224. The State’s motion to join the two cases was filed on May 28, 2009, and granted on June 12, 2009. The joinder of the two cases is the basis for Myrie’s claim in Proposition III.
3 The Judgment & Sentence for Count III fails to include the $500 fine. Because the jury clearly indicated a $500 fine on this count, and the court listed it at the time of sentencing, this Court finds that this omission was a scrivener’s error. Myrie was also ordered to pay costs and fees. This Court notes that Count VI is subject to the 85% Rule, under 21 O.S. Supp.2007, § 13.1.

Myrie raises the following propositions of error:

I. APPELLANT WAS DENIED A COPY OF HIS PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE PRIOR TO TRIAL. THE DISTRICT COURT’S REFUSAL TO GRANT APPELLANT’S REQUEST FOR A CONTINUANCE OF THE TRIAL HEREIN IN ORDER TO SECURE A COPY OF THE TRANSCRIPT CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

II. THE STATE PRESENTED OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE OKLAHOMA EVIDENCE CODE. APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

III. IT WAS IMPROPER TO JOIN THE BURGLARY AND ARSON CHARGES IN CF-2008-6224 WITH THE KNOWINGLY CONCEALING STOLEN PROPERTY CHARGES IN CF-2008-6029. THE JOINDER VIOLATED BOTH OKLAHOMA LAW AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

IV. APPELLANT WAS CONVICTED OF MULTIPLE VIOLATIONS OF KNOWINGLY CONCEALING STOLEN PROPERTY WHEN THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED NO MORE THAN A SINGLE OFFENSE. APPELLANT’S MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS VIOLATE THE DOUBLE PUNISHMENT PROHIBITION OF BOTH THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND OKLAHOMA LAW.

V. APPELLANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT.

VI. THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE THE JURY WITH ACCOMPLICE CORROBORATION INSTRUCTIONS FOR WITNESS EUGENE TRIPKE CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR.

VII. THE COMBINED EFFECT OF ERROR AT APPELLANT’S TRIAL REQUIRES THE MODIFICATION OF HIS SENTENCE.

In Proposition I, Myrie challenges the trial court’s refusal to grant a continuance of his trial, based upon the fact that he was indigent and his trial attorneys did not yet have the transcripts from his preliminary hearings. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision regarding whether to grant a continuance for an abuse of discretion.4 This Court evaluates the trial court’s decision in the context of the specific factual context in which it was made. Because the charges in this case were originally filed as two separate cases, two preliminary hearings were held. The preliminary hearing for CF-2008-6224-involving the Name Brand Clothing burglary/arson (the NBC case)-was held first. The NBC preliminary hearing was held on February 2, 2009, and included seven witnesses.5 The preliminary hearing for CF-2008-6029-involving the five counts of Knowingly Concealing/Receiving Stolen Property (the KCSP case)-was held on February 19, 2009, and also included seven witnesses.6 Myrie was represented at both preliminary hearings by Assistant Public Defender Paula Moore. Moore remained Myrie’s counsel through at least November 2, 2009.7 During this entire time, she never requested a copy of the transcript of either preliminary hearing. Moore left the public defender’s office during early November of 2009 (sometime before November 12, 2009). According to the docket, a motion for continuance was denied on November 12, 2009, and an order for transcript was signed on this same date.9 The Court’s Order for Transcript, filed on November 13, 2009, finds that Myrie is entitled to transcripts of the preliminary hearings held on February 2 and 19, 2009, paid for by the State, and orders that the named court reporter prepare a complete transcript of the testimony of all witnesses at the Preliminary Hearing and that the transcript shall be prepared and served prior to the trial of the Defendant in District Court.10 The order does not, however, inform the court reporter of Myrie’s impending trial date: November 16, 2009. And the Court Reporter’s Certificate, filed on November 16, 2009, states that the transcript was ordered on November 12 and would be available on November 30, 2009. Myrie’s jury trial began on Monday, November 16, 2009. Myrie was represented by Assistant Public Defenders Lauren Chandler and Brian Rayl. The transcribed proceedings begin with Myrie asserting that he had just learned (the preceding Friday) that he had new attorneys and that he did not believe they were prepared to try his case. The court responded that if Myrie was seeking a continuance, the court was denying it. The court noted that Chandler had filed a motion for continuance based on the unavailability of transcripts and that the court denied it and determined that counsel should be, and would be, ready to go to trial. The court then asked Myrie’s attorneys if they were prepared to go forward, to which Chandler responded, Your Honor, we will stand on our previous motion for continuance.11 Myrie’s trial was conducted during the week of November 16-20, 2009.12 On the second day of trial, outside the presence of the jury, the trial judge stated that he wanted to more fully express his reasons for denying the defense motion for continuance.13 The court noted that it did not believe that the defendant’s rights would be materially impaired, because Moore was a very experienced defense counsel and that there could well have been a strategy for not requesting those transcripts. Chandler responded by noting that while Ms. Moore may have had a strategic reason for not requesting the transcripts, she (Ms. Chandler) was not present at the preliminary hearings and believed that the transcripts would have been very helpful in preparing to cross-examine the State’s witnesses at trial. The court responded by finding that its denial of the motion for continuance stands. This Court recognizes that an indigent defendant’s right to a free copy of the transcript of his preliminary hearing has been established since the Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in Roberts v. LaVallee.14 In McMillion v. State,15 this Court likewise recognized that [i]t is repugnant to the Constitution and a violation of equal protection to deny an indigent a free copy of the transcript of his preliminary hearing.16 This Court also found that because the denial of a free copy of a preliminary hearing transcript to an indigent is a substantial violation of a constitutional right, [20 O.S.,] Section 3001.1 does not apply and that the indigent’s right to a transcript of the preliminary hearing at public expense is not based on any consideration of whether the transcript of the preliminary hearing is beneficial to the defense.17 In Wilson v. State,18 this Court found that [a]n accused is entitled to a transcript of a preliminary hearing where: (1) defense counsel acted with due diligence to acquire the transcript; and (2) the transcript is necessary for cross-examination of witnesses at trial.19 McMillion likewise recognized this requirement,20 and both courts found that failure to provide a transcript when these conditions are met will result in reversal of any subsequent conviction.21 This Court notes that the defendant’s convictions were reversed in both Wilson and McMillion even though the attorney representing the defendant at trial was the same attorney who represented him at preliminary hearing.22 And none of these cases-which reversed the defendant’s convictions based upon denial of a free preliminary hearing transcript-suggest that the defendant has to establish precisely how he would have used the (non-available) transcript at trial, or that he must make a particular, fact-specific showing of necessity, in order to establish entitlement to the transcript and the need for a new trial. Myrie’s trial attorneys were not the same as his preliminary hearing counsel, nor were they present at his preliminary hearings, which made the necessity of the preliminary hearing transcripts for their trial preparations even more significant. Furthermore, the record supports Myrie’s claim that his trial attorneys did act with due diligence in attempting to acquire these transcripts, soon after they became involved with Myrie’s case. Under these circumstances, this Court finds that the trial court’s failure to grant the requested continuance, along with the court’s failure to ensure that Myrie’s attorneys were provided with these transcripts prior to his trial, resulted in an effective denial of these preliminary hearing transcripts to an indigent defendant who was constitutionally entitled to be provided them. Hence the trial court’s denial of Myrie’s motion for continuance was an abuse of discretion.23 And Myrie’s convictions must be reversed on this basis.

In Proposition II, Myrie challenges the trial court’s admission of other crimes evidence, based upon the court’s allowance of substantial evidence regarding the factual circumstances of the five church-related burglaries, none of which Myrie was actually charged with committing. In Proposition III, Myrie challenges the court’s decision to allow the joinder of the Name Brand Clothing burglary/arson case with the KCSP case involving the property stolen from the Tulsa area churches. This Court addresses these related claims together, beginning with the improper joinder claim. Myrie properly preserved his improper joinder claim in the trial court.24 We review improper joinder claims for abuse of discretion.25 In Glass v. State,26 this Court recognized that joinder of separate offenses in a single case is permissible, under 22 O.S., § 436, only if the separate offenses arise out of one criminal act or transaction, or are part of a series of criminal acts or transactions. The Glass Court further recognized that the test for such a series of properly joined offenses is whether the counts so joined refer to the same type of offenses, occurring over a relatively short period of time, in approximately the same location, and proof as to each transaction overlaps so as to evidence a common scheme or plan.28 This Court concludes that the NBC burglary/arson case, CF-2008-6224, was not properly joined with the church-related KCSP case, CF-2008-6029. The two cases did not involve the same type of offenses, since the KCSP case did not involve an allegation that Myrie actually committed any of the church burglaries; nor did the NBC case allege that Myrie actually took or kept any property from the store. Nor did the cases involve crimes committed during the same relatively short period of time. The NBC burglary/arson was committed on August 20, 2008. The church-related burglaries all occurred during November of 2008, beginning on November 6, 2008. Hence two and one-half months passed between the NBC burglary/arson and the time at which Myrie could have come into possession of the property stolen from the Tulsa churches. Regarding proximity, the State notes that the charged crimes all occurred in Tulsa County, but this Court does not agree that being within a county as large as Tulsa constitutes approximately the same location, especially when the type of crimes charged and the victims are not similar. Finally, this Court rejects the State’s claim that the proof in the two cases was overlapping to the extent that it established a common scheme or plan. There is no question that the five KCSP counts were properly joined in one case. This Court notes, however, that the apartment where the stolen church items were recovered did not contain anything stolen from the NBC store. And the scheme at issue in the NBC case (breaking into a commercial establishment in order to steal money, attempting to breach a safe, and then setting a fire) was not so similar to the scheme at issue in the KCSP case (re-selling sound equipment, instruments, computers, etc., stolen from church properties, for profit) so as to suggest a common scheme or plan. Hence the district court abused its discretion in joining the two cases. The State argues that the schemes at issue are similar because the crimes all involved the same people driving one another in the same vehicle to various places to commit burglary. This may, in fact, be true, but the State could not present any actual evidence that this was true. By joining the two cases together, however, the State was much more able to strongly suggest that Myrie was directly involved in the church burglaries, which leads to his Proposition II other crimes evidence challenge. This Court notes that by closing arguments of the first-stage of trial, the State was unabashedly claiming that the jury should hold Myrie accountable for the actual church burglaries.29 This Court finds that if the KCSP counts had been tried separately from the NBC burglary/arson counts-as they should have been-the State would not have been allowed to put on the amount of other crimes evidence that came in regarding the specific factual circumstances of the church burglaries. 30 This evidence was not necessary or appropriate to prove the simple fact at issue in the KCSP charges-that the defendant knew or should have known that the property was stolen-particularly since Myrie admitted that he knew the property was stolen. Hence this Court likewise finds that the joinder of the two cases-and the State’s attempts to prove that a common scheme was at work in both-resulted in the improper admission of unduly prejudicial other crimes evidence. 31 We likewise find that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence, which allowed the State to suggest and later specifically argue that Myrie was the Tulsa church burglar and that the jury should hold him accountable for these burglaries.

This Court recognizes that more than sufficient evidence was presented to convict Myrie on all seven counts that were charged against him. The evidence against him on all seven counts, including his direct admissions of guilt regarding the KCSP counts and his admission to assisting in the NBC burglary/arson, was quite damning. However, this Court cannot ignore the likely prejudicial impact of both the joinder and the improperly admitted evidence regarding the sentences given by the jury: life and a fine of $25,000 for the arson count, 30 years and a fine of $10,000 for the second-degree burglary count, and 30 years and a fine of $500 on each of the five KCSP counts. Even with Myrie’s extensive criminal history, this Court could not conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the joinder of the two cases and improperly admitted evidence did not prejudicially impact Myrie, particularly on the KCSP counts. This Court need not decide what relief to grant regarding Propositions II and III, however, since we have already concluded that Myrie is entitled to have the charges against him re-tried, based upon the trial court’s failure to ensure that his trial attorneys had access to the transcripts of his preliminary hearings. We here further find that the counts against him must be re-tried in two separate cases, just as they were originally charged in two separate cases.

In Proposition IV, Myrie argues that it violated double jeopardy and 21 O.S.2001, § 11, to charge and convict him of five counts of Knowingly Concealing Stolen Property, rather than simply one count. In particular, Myrie asserts that the five KCSP counts actually involved a single offense and a single act of possession. In light of this Court’s resolution of Propositions I-III and Myrie’s failure to preserve this claim in the district court, we address it only summarily. This Court notes that Myrie’s recorded admissions establish that he was well aware that the stolen property he was acquiring came from separate church burglaries and also suggest that he came into possession of the stolen property from these separate burglaries at different times, i.e., shortly after each of the five church burglaries.32 Under these circumstances, Myrie has not established that it violated either the double jeopardy protection against double punishment or Section 11 to charge and convict him of five counts of this possession offense. This claim is rejected accordingly.

In Proposition V, Myrie argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that many of the ten prior felonies presented to his jury at the sentencing stage of his trial were transactional, such that they should not have been presented separately.33 On July 30, 2010, Myrie filed a Motion to Remand for Evidentiary Hearing based upon this same claim. In light of this Court’s resolution of Propositions I-III, we decline to address this issue herein. Myrie can raise his claim regarding the transactional nature of his prior felony offenses during the re-trial of the cases at issue herein. We likewise DENY his Motion to Remand for Evidentiary Hearing, because it is moot due to this Court’s decision to reverse his convictions.

In Proposition VI, Myrie challenges the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury regarding the accomplice testimony of Eugene Tripke, even though he failed to request such an instruction at trial. This Court agrees that the record clearly establishes that Tripke was an admitted accomplice to the five KCSP counts, for which instruction under Oklahoma’s uniform instructions for accomplice testimony would have been appropriate.34 On the other hand, there is no question that Tripke’s testimony was amply corroborated, in particular by Myrie’s admissions regarding commission of the KCSP offenses. In addition, the State admitted during argument at trial that Tripke was a liar and a thief and a drug dealer. In light of this Court’s resolution of Propositions I-III, this claim is moot and need not be further addressed herein. In Proposition VII, Myrie raises a cumulative error claim, arguing that his sentences should be modified. In light of this Court’s resolution of Propositions I-III, this claim is entirely moot.

DECISION

Myrie’s convictions in CF-2008-6029 are all REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Myrie’s Motion to Remand for Evidentiary Hearing is DENIED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2011), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

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Footnotes:

  1. Although Myrie was clearly charged with second-degree burglary, and the jury was properly instructed upon and convicted him of this crime, the Second Amended Information and the Judgment & Sentence for Count VII both incorrectly cite 21 O.S., § 1431 (first-degree burglary), rather than § 1435 (second-degree burglary). This clear scrivener's error is corrected herein.
  2. The arson and burglary counts were originally filed in a separate Tulsa County case, CF-2008-6224. The State's motion to join the two cases was filed on May 28, 2009, and granted on June 12, 2009. The joinder of the two cases is the basis for Myrie's claim in Proposition III.
  3. The Judgment & Sentence for Count III fails to include the $500 fine. Because the jury clearly indicated a $500 fine on this count, and the court listed it at the time of sentencing, this Court finds that this omission was a scrivener's error.
  4. This Court notes that Count VI is subject to the "85% Rule," under 21 O.S. Supp.2007, § 13.1.
  5. Four Tulsa police officers testified (Steve Shamburger, Bob Hickey, Robert McCoy, and Joshua Martin), along with Brent Dalley (the store manager), Mike Ross (the maintenance worker at the store when the fire was set), and Millard Latimer (Tulsa Fire Department fire marshal and investigator). The transcript of the NBC preliminary hearing is 45 pages long.
  6. Two Tulsa police officers testified (Robert McCoy and Joshua Martin), along with a representative from each of the five church organizations from which stolen items were recovered. The transcript of the KCSP preliminary hearing is 76 pages long.
  7. Moore represented Myrie at a combined Jackson-Denno and Allen hearing on November 2, 2009.
  8. At a September 18, 2009, hearing on pro se motions filed by Myrie, the district court noted that Myrie was seeking a copy of his preliminary hearing transcripts. Moore responded, "Tiger U. State prohibits [the public defender's office] from giving our one and only copy to our client." The court then told Myrie, "Your counsel needs that transcript, SO if you need an additional copy, then I'm afraid you're going to have to make arrangements to pay for it." Moore failed to "remind" the court, however, that she had not sought or obtained any preliminary hearing transcripts. Hence counsel's invocation of Tiger v. State, 1993 OK CR 43, 859 P.2d 1117, was quite inappropriate.
  9. The record, however, contains no written motion for continuance or any other indication of a hearing on this issue.
  10. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 1995 OK CR 81, I 7, 917 P.2d 976, 978.
  11. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 2007 OK CR 16, I 21, 157 P.3d 1155, 1164.
  12. Glass v. State, 1985 OK CR 65, 701 P.2d 765.
  13. Id. at I 9, 701 P.2d at 768; see also 22 O.S.2001, § 436.
  14. Id. at I 9, 701 P.2d at 768; see also Smith, 2007 OK CR 16, I 23, 157 P.3d at 1165.
  15. McMillion, 1987 OK CR 193, 742 P.2d 1158.
  16. Wilson, 1985 OK CR 67, 701 P.2d 1040.
  17. Id. at I 3, 701 P.2d at 1041 (citation omitted).
  18. Id. at I 9, 742 P.2d at 1161; see also Waters v. State, 1969 OK CR 174, I 7, 454 P.2d 325, 328 (same).
  19. Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 194, 19 L.Ed.2d 41 (1967) (per curiam).
  20. McMillion, 1987 OK CR 193, 742 P.2d 1158.
  21. Id. at I 6, 742 P.2d at 1160 (citing Roberts).
  22. Id. at I 8, 742 P.2d at 1160-61; see also Waters v. State, 1969 OK CR 174, I 7, 454 P.2d 325, 328 (same).
  23. Id. at I 9, 742 P.2d at 1161.
  24. Id. at I 9, 742 P.2d at 1161; 1985 OK CR 67, I 3, 701 P.2d at 1041.
  25. Id. at I 8, 742 P.2d at 1161 (citing Roberts and Waters).
  26. See, e.g., Grissom v. State, 2011 OK CR 3, I 25, 253 P.3d 969, 979.
  27. Wilson, 1985 OK CR 67, I 3, 701 P.2d at 1041 (citation omitted).
  28. Cardenas U. State, 1985 OK CR 21, II 10-11, 695 P.2d 876, 878-79.
  29. Bickerstaff U. State, 1983 OK CR 116, II 9-10, 669 P.2d 778, 780.

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1713 (2001) - Knowingly Concealing/Receiving Stolen Property
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1401 (2001) - First-Degree Arson
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1435 (2001) - Second-Degree Burglary
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 11 - Double jeopardy
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 436 (2001) - Joinder of offenses
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 20 § 3001.1 - Indigent defendant's right to transcript
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 51.1 (Supp. 2002) - Prior felonies presentation

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

  • 18 U.S.C. § 3432 - Rights of persons accused of capital offenses
  • 18 U.S.C. § 3731 - Appeal by the United States
  • 18 U.S.C. § 4241 - Determination of mental competency to stand trial
  • 18 U.S.C. § 4242 - Examination of defendant for insanity

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

  • Bramlett v. State, 2018 OK CR 19, I 36, 422 P.3d 788, 799-800
  • Jones v. State, 1995 OK CR 81, I 7, 917 P.2d 976, 978
  • McMillion v. State, 1987 OK CR 193, 742 P.2d 1158
  • Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 194, 19 L.Ed.2d 41 (1967)
  • Smith v. State, 2007 OK CR 16, I 21, 157 P.3d 1155, 1164
  • Waters v. State, 1969 OK CR 174, I 7, 454 P.2d 325, 328
  • Wilson v. State, 1985 OK CR 67, 701 P.2d 1040
  • Glass v. State, 1985 OK CR 65, 701 P.2d 765
  • Wall v. State, 1988 OK CR 125, 763 P.2d 103
  • Thomas v. State, 1980 OK CR 104, 620 P.2d 1321
  • Cardenas v. State, 1985 OK CR 21, II 10-11, 695 P.2d 876, 878-79
  • Bickerstaff v. State, 1983 OK CR 116, II 9-10, 669 P.2d 778, 780

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