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F-2007-346

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Shawn Dion Reid v The State Of Oklahoma

F-2007-346

Filed: Jun. 5, 2008

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: Shawn Dion Reid

Summary

Shawn Dion Reid appealed his conviction for drug possession and distribution. The court affirmed his conviction and imposed a 10-year sentence for possession of methamphetamine and a concurrent 20-year sentence for marijuana distribution. Judge John H. Scaggs dissented regarding the sentencing on counts that had originally been dismissed.

Decision

The February 7, 2007, final order terminating Appellant, SHAWN DION REID, from the Marshall County Drug Court Program in CF-2006-147 is AFFIRMED, but the judgments and sentences imposed on Counts III, IV, and V are hereby VACATED WITH INSTRUCTIONS to the District Court to enter an Amended Judgment and Sentence showing entry of a judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence on Counts I and II only. Additionally, the District Court shall file a journal entry reflecting its November 1, 2006, dismissal of Counts III, IV, and V. Judge Scaggs shall file a certified copy of that journal entry and a certified copy of the Amended Judgment and Sentence with the Clerk of this Court within forty-five (45) days from receipt of mandate. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2008), MANDATE IS ORDERED ISSUED on the filing of this decision.

Issues

  • Was there an error in accelerating sentence on Counts III, IV, and V because those Counts were dismissed?
  • Did the trial court abuse its discretion in terminating Reid from Drug Court rather than sanctioning him within the Drug Court Program?
  • Was the imposition of a twenty-year sentence for possessing drugs excessive?

Findings

  • The court erred in accelerating sentence on Counts III, IV, and V because those counts were dismissed.
  • The trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Reid from Drug Court rather than sanctioning him within the Drug Court Program.
  • The court did not err in imposing a twenty-year sentence for possessing drugs, as this issue falls outside the scope of the termination appeal.

F-2007-346

Jun. 5, 2008

Shawn Dion Reid

Appellant

v

The State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

CHAPEL, JUDGE:

On November 1, 2006, in Marshall County District Court, Case No. CF-2006-147, Appellant, Shawn Dion Reid, entered pleas of guilty to Count I, Possession of Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine) within 1,000 Feet of a School or Park; Count II, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute (Marijuana); Count III, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute (Methylenedioxy Methamphetamine); Count IV, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Drug with Intent to Distribute (Methamphetamine); and Count V, Possession of Firearms During Probation. The Honorable John H. Scaggs, District Judge, dismissed Counts III, IV, and V, and pursuant to a plea agreement, deferred sentencing conditioned on Reid’s successful completion of the Drug Court Program. On February 7, 2007, Judge Scaggs terminated Reid from the Drug Court Program and accelerated sentencing. On March 27, 2007, Judge Scaggs found Reid guilty on Counts I and II, and in accordance with the plea agreement for admission into Drug Court, imposed a term of (10) years imprisonment on Count I and a concurrent term of twenty (20) years imprisonment on Count II. Additionally, Judge Scaggs imposed judgments and sentences against Reid on Counts III, IV, and V. Reid now appeals the final order terminating him from Drug Court and raises three claims of error:

1. The trial court erred in accelerating sentence on Counts III, IV, and V because those Counts were dismissed.
2. The trial court abused its discretion in terminating Reid from Drug Court rather than sanctioning him within the Drug Court Program.
3. The trial court erred in imposing a twenty-year sentence for possessing drugs as such punishment is excessive.

We have reviewed each of Reid’s Proposition of Error, and find that only Proposition I merits relief within this appeal.
1. Because Judge Scaggs dismissed Counts III, IV, and V, prior to accepting Reid’s guilty pleas, deferring sentencing, and admitting Reid to Drug Court, he was without authority to order sentencing on those counts. Accordingly, the Judgments and Sentences imposed on Counts III, IV, and V must be vacated.
2. The Oklahoma Drug Court Act anticipates that offenders may experience relapse and that such is part of the rehabilitation and recovery process. Although the Act provides a means of addressing relapses and violations through progressively increasing sanctions, if a particular violation makes it apparent that further Drug Court participation would not be beneficial in accomplishing the desired change in behaviors and attitudes necessary for rehabilitation and recovery, then the trial court may remedy the violation through termination from the program rather than by sanction. The Act therefore contains an exception to the general rule favoring increasing sanctions and incentives when the offender’s conduct requires revocation from the program. 22 O.S.2001, § 471.7(E). In that instance, the statute will allow termination. The appellate standard of review of a Drug Court’s termination decision is for abuse of discretion in applying these principles. An [a]buse of discretion by a trial court is any unreasonable, unconscionable and arbitrary action taken without proper consideration of the facts and law pertaining to the matter submitted. Consequently, when a trial judge’s decision finds support within the record, no abuse of discretion occurs. There being circumstances within Reid’s case lending support to the trial court’s decision to terminate, we are prevented from finding that an abuse of discretion has occurred.
3. When a defendant pleads guilty to an offense and receives a deferral of sentencing conditioned on successful completion of probation or drug court, but then subsequently has his sentencing accelerated and a conviction imposed, he has three options concerning appeal. Provided that no prior appeal has been filed, those options are: (1) he may appeal the final order that accelerated his sentencing as a result of his termination from probation or drug court; (2) he may appeal the resulting conviction; or (3) he may appeal both the termination/acceleration order and the resulting conviction. If appealing both the termination/acceleration order and the conviction, then the appeal is by petition for writ of certiorari. Issues that concern the length of sentence imposed by the trial court, or whether the trial court erred in failing to suspend execution of sentence, are issues that run to a defendant’s conviction. They are of no concern as to the validity of a final order terminating probation or drug court participation. In order to appeal any conviction upon a plea of guilty (regardless of whether that conviction arises from the acceleration of a deferred sentence, termination from drug court, or otherwise), a defendant must file an application to withdraw the guilty plea, and if denied relief, file a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court. Although Judge Scaggs advised Reid at sentencing that he could move to withdraw his pleas of guilty, Reid did not do so and did not file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with this Court. Because Reid has not petitioned for certiorari, the scope of review is limited to the validity of the final order terminating Reid from Drug Court and accelerating his sentence. Therefore, Reid’s claim that his twenty-year sentence on Count II is excessive falls outside the scope of this termination appeal, it having no impact upon the validity of the final order terminating him from Drug Court.

DECISION

The February 7, 2007, final order terminating Appellant, SHAWN DION REID, from the Marshall County Drug Court Program in CF-2006-147 is AFFIRMED, but the judgments and sentences imposed on Counts III, IV, and V are hereby VACATED WITH INSTRUCTIONS to the District Court to enter an Amended Judgment and Sentence showing entry of a judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence on Counts I and II only. Additionally, the District Court shall file a journal entry reflecting its November 1, 2006, dismissal of Counts III, IV, and V. Judge Scaggs shall file a certified copy of that journal entry and a certified copy of the Amended Judgment and Sentence with the Clerk of this Court within forty-five (45) days from receipt of mandate. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2008), MANDATE IS ORDERED ISSUED on the filing of this decision.

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Footnotes:

  1. The State concedes this error.
  2. See 22 O.S.2001, § 471.7(E) ("The drug court judge shall recognize relapses and restarts in the program which are considered to be part of the rehabilitation and recovery process.").
  3. The Act therefore contains an exception to the general rule favoring increasing sanctions and incentives "when the offender's conduct requires revocation from the program." 22 O.S.2001, § 471.7(E).
  4. Alexander v. State, 2002 OK CR 23, 11-12, 48 P.3d 110, 113 (citations omitted).
  5. See id., 1 11, 48 P.3d at 113 ("The Drug Court judge is to recognize relapses and restarts in the program rather than removing an offender from the program when relapse occurs, except when the offender's conduct requires revocation from the program.") (emphasis added).
  6. Hagar U. State, 1999 OK CR 35, 1 11, 990 P.2d 894, 898 ("The decision to revoke or terminate from Drug Court lies within the discretion of the Drug Court judge.").
  7. Harvey U. State, 1969 OK CR 220, T 9, 458 P.2d 336; see also C.L.F. U. State, 1999 OK CR 12, 1 5, 989 P.2d 945, 946 (defining "abuse of discretion" as "a clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment, one that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts presented in support of and against the application"; and further holding that "[t]he trial court's decision must be determined by the evidence presented on the record, just as our review is limited to the record presented").
  8. See n.7, supra.
  9. See Rule 1.2(D)(5)(b) & (c), Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2008) (recognizing that upon acceleration, a defendant may challenge only errors in the acceleration proceeding or, in addition to appealing the validity of the acceleration order, he may seek to withdraw his guilty plea and appeal by certiorari, or he may do both).
  10. Looney v. State, 2002 OK CR 27, 1 9, 49 P.3d 761, 763-64 (citations omitted).
  11. When a trial court places a defendant under an order deferring imposition of judgment and sentence, the defendant may then appeal the terms of the probation imposed. Rules 1.2(D)(5)(a) (i) & (ii).
  12. Rule 1.2(D)(5)(c) also recognizes this waiver rule.
  13. See 22 O.S.2001, § 1051(a) ("all appeals taken from any conviction on a plea of guilty shall be taken by petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals"); Rule 4.2(A) ("In all cases, to appeal from any conviction on a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the defendant must have filed in the trial court clerk's office an application to withdraw the plea "); Rule 4.2(A) (in order to perfect a certiorari appeal in non-capital case, the defendant must file a petition for writ of certiorari "within ninety (90) days from the date the trial court ruled on the application to withdraw the plea").
  14. Cf. Burnham v. State, 2002 OK CR 6, 11 6-8, 43 P.3d 387, 389-90 (holding that an appeal from an order of revocation is by Petition in Error, and finding that attempted revocation appeal that defendant had tried to perfect through the filing of a Petition for Writ of Certiorari).

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 471.7 (2001) - Oklahoma Drug Court Act
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 1051(a) (2001) - Appeals from Convictions on Guilty Pleas
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 1.2(D)(5) - Rules of Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.8 (2011) - Sentencing Guidelines

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

  • Bramlett v. State, 2018 OK CR 19, I 36, 422 P.3d 788, 799-800
  • Alexander v. State, 2002 OK CR 23, 11-12, 48 P.3d 110, 113
  • Hagar v. State, 1999 OK CR 35, 1 11, 990 P.2d 894, 898
  • Harvey v. State, 1969 OK CR 220, T 9, 458 P.2d 336
  • C.L.F. v. State, 1999 OK CR 12, 1 5, 989 P.2d 945, 946
  • W.D.C. v. State, 1990 OK CR 71, 1 8, 799 P.2d 142, 145
  • Looney v. State, 2002 OK CR 27, 1 9, 49 P.3d 761, 763-64
  • Burnham v. State, 2002 OK CR 6, 11 6-8, 43 P.3d 387, 389-90

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