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F 2004-582

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Ryan Golden v The State Of Oklahoma

F 2004-582

Filed: Jan. 10, 2006

For publication

Prevailing Party: Ryan Golden

Summary

# Ryan Golden appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder. Conviction and sentence were reversed and remanded for a new trial. Judge Lumpkin dissented. In this case, Ryan Golden was found guilty of First Degree Murder after a trial in Pottawatomie County. The jury decided that he should spend life in prison without a chance for parole. However, Golden believed there was a mistake during the process of picking the jury. Before picking the jury, the judge only allowed Golden five chances to excuse potential jurors, but according to law, he should have had nine chances. The court agreed this was an important mistake because it meant Golden did not get his full legal rights during his trial. This decision ended up being a serious error that affected the whole trial. As a result, the Court of Criminal Appeals decided to reverse Golden’s conviction and said he would get a new trial. Judge Lumpkin disagreed with this decision, believing the error should not automatically lead to a new trial since no one showed that it affected the fairness of the trial.

Decision

The Judgment and Sentence imposed in Pottawatomie County District Court, Case No. CF 2003-199, is hereby REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL consistent with this Opinion. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeal, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2006), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

  • Was there reversible error in the manner of jury selection due to denial of peremptory challenges?
  • Did the trial court deprive the appellant of his statutorily-prescribed number of peremptory challenges in a first degree murder trial?
  • Is the denial of the full number of peremptory challenges considered structural error that requires automatic reversal?
  • Was the appellant's constitutional right to due process violated due to the lack of provided peremptory challenges?
  • Must a defendant show prejudice resulting from the denial of peremptory challenges for the error to be deemed reversible?

Findings

  • the court erred
  • the trial court's denial of the statutorily prescribed number of peremptory challenges constituted structural error
  • prejudice must be presumed due to the structural error
  • the Judgment and Sentence imposed is reversed and remanded for a new trial

F 2004-582

Jan. 10, 2006

Ryan Golden

Appellant

v

The State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

C. JOHNSON, JUDGE:

1 Appellant, Ryan Golden, was convicted by a jury in Pottawatomie County District Court, Case No. CF 2003-199, of First Degree Murder, in violation of 21 O.S.2001, § 701. (A). Jury trial was held on March 9th – 11th, 2001, before the Honorable John Gardner, Associate District Judge. The jury set punishment at life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and Judge Gardner sentenced Appellant in accordance with the jury’s verdict on April 16, 2004. From the Judgment and Sentence imposed, Appellant filed this appeal.

12 Recitation of the facts surrounding the crime is not necessary because reversible error occurred in the manner of jury selection which requires this matter to be reversed and remanded for a new trial.

13 Prior to jury selection, the trial court announced it would call twenty-two (22) names and then the State and the Defendant would each have five (5) peremptory challenges. (Tr. 18) The trial court stated it would offer unlimited challenges for cause but the law grants both the state and the defendant five preemptory (sic) changes to excuse any prospective juror for any reason whatsoever. (Tr. 22) In his first claim of error, Mr. Golden argues he must be granted a new trial because he was not afforded the statutorily-prescribed number of peremptory challenges in his first degree murder trial. We agree.

14 Title 22, Section 655 provides that in prosecutions for first degree murder, a defendant is entitled to nine peremptory challenges. The statutory language is clear. The trial court erred when it did not allow Mr. Golden nine peremptory challenges. We agree with Mr. Golden that the trial court’s error deprived him of his statutory right to nine peremptory challenges and his constitutional right to due process of law. Marrerro v. State, 2001 OK CR 12, 11-12, 29 P.3d 580, 582; Spunaugle v. State, 1997 OK CR 47, 11 30-32, 946 P.2d 246, 252, overruled on other grounds by Long v. State, 2003 OK CR 14, 74 P.3d 105; Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 91, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2280, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988).

95 In Marrerro, a defendant charged with first degree murder was tried jointly with a co-defendant who was not charged with murder and the trial court required the defendants to share five peremptory challenges. There, we found reversible error and stated the denial of the full number of peremptory challenges allowed by state law amounted to a structural error that affected the entire trial. Id. We noted defense counsel objected at trial and said under the facts of this case the error could not be harmless. Id. While we found the error in Marrerro was structural and reversible, our reference to the facts of the case and to preservation of the error suggests this Court in fact applied a harmless error analysis and did not actually treat the error as structural error.

96 In Spunaugle, we found the denial of three peremptory challenges in a murder prosecution to be error which pervaded the entire trial and which was not subject to harmless error analysis, but also stated the error was not waived and noted facts in the record sufficient to prove prejudice. Spunaugle, 1997 OK CR 47, I 32, 946 P.2d at 252. Like Marrerro, in Spunaugle, the language of our opinion suggests that this Court did not, in fact, treat the error as structural.

17 The State admits that depriving a defendant of his full complement of peremptory challenges is error, but suggests the error should be considered harmless because it was waived by the defendant. The State argues counsel’s failure to object waives review for all but plain error and further argues that Golden did not make a sufficient record to prove prejudice by claiming he was forced to keep objectionable jurors because of the trial court’s error on peremptory challenges.

98 This Court has reviewed only two other cases, besides Marrerro and Spunaugle, wherein the defendant alleged he was deprived of the full complement of statutorily prescribed peremptory challenges and in those cases, the Court required the defendant to prove prejudice. 1 In Landrum v. State, 1971 OK CR 235, 486 P.2d 757, the trial court denied the defendant his last five peremptory challenges after his counsel waived the fourth peremptory challenge. The Court cited the syllabus from Phelps v. State, 1965 OK CR 98, 404 P.2d 687, to state: It is not error alone that reverses judgments of conviction of crime in this State, but error plus injury, and the burden is upon the appellant to establish the fact that he was prejudiced in his substantial rights by the commission of the error. Landrum, 1971 OK CR 235, 9 13, 486 P.2d 757. In Landrum, voir dire was not transcribed and there was nothing in the appeal record for this Court to review. The Court held the defendant had failed to show error coupled with injury and how he might have been prejudiced. Id., 1971 OK CR 235, 18, 486 P.2d at 759.

99 In a murder prosecution in White v. State, 1986 OK CR 153, 726 P.2d 905, the trial court allowed the defendant only five peremptory challenges. Defense counsel did not object and did not request additional challenges. Citing Landrum, the Court said the burden was on the appellant to show that he was prejudiced in his substantial rights by the commission of the error and found the complaint was not sufficient to cause reversal. Id., 1986 OK CR 153, I 4, 726 P.2d at 907.

910 We take this opportunity to clarify whether the denial of the statutory number of peremptory challenges in a first degree murder case requires a showing of prejudice or requires automatic reversal. In other words, is it an error subject to harmless error analysis or is it a structural error?

1 This Court has reviewed numerous challenges under the applicable statute relating to co-defendants being required to share peremptory challenges.

q11 In Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2278, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988), the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury. Because peremptory challenges are a creature of statute and are not required by the Constitution, it is for the State to determine the number of peremptory challenges allowed and to define their purpose and the manner of their exercise. As such, the right to peremptory challenges is denied or impaired only if the defendant does not receive that which state law provides. (citations omitted) Id., 487 U.S. at 89, 108 S.Ct. at 2279.

12 Oklahoma law provides that [I]n all criminal cases the prosecution and the defendant are each entitled to the following peremptory challenges: First. In prosecutions for first degree murder, nine jurors each. 22 O.S.2001, § 655. Oklahoma has therefore determined the number of peremptory challenges allowed and has defined their purpose and the manner of their exercise. Id., 487 U.S. at 89, 108 S.Ct. at 2279. Golden was charged with and tried for the crime of First Degree Murder, and, under Oklahoma law, was entitled to nine peremptory challenges. The record reflects he only received five.

I 13 While the right of peremptory challenge is not protected under the federal constitution, it is specifically provided for and safeguarded by Oklahoma statute. Deprivation of the right to exercise nine peremptory challenges, which was statutorily due under Oklahoma law, constitutes a due process violation. This is not a case where the defendant claimed he was denied his full complement of peremptory challenges because he had to exercise one to remove a juror whom the trial court should have removed for cause. In this case, Golden was not afforded four challenges to which he was statutorily entitled. Golden did not receive all that was due him under Oklahoma law. See Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346, 100 S.Ct. 2227, 2229, 65 L.Ed.2d 175 (1980) (denial of petitioner’s statutory right to have jury determine punishment constituted a violation of due process).

I 14 A constitutional error does not automatically require reversal if it is subject to a harmless error analysis. Phillips v. State, 1999 OK CR 38, I 67, 989 P.2d 1017, 1036; see Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1263, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). In Arizona v. Fulminante, when discussing the general rule pronounced in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), that a constitutional error does not automatically require reversal, the Supreme Court said: The common thread connecting these cases [those cases applying Chapman/harmless error analysis] is that each involved trial error – error which occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (emphasis added). Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-308, 111 S.Ct. at 1264. Harmless error analysis should be applied to an error which occurs in the presentation of the case to the jury and which can be measured against other evidence to determine whether it affected the factual determination of a defendant’s guilt or innocence.

I 15 Structural errors, which defy harmless error standards, are those defects in the trial itself which affect the framework in which the trial proceeds. Id., 499 U.S. at 310, 111 S.Ct. at 1265. Structural errors recognize that the violation of some constitutional rights may require reversal without regard to the evidence in the particular case. Structural errors are those which affect a trial from beginning to end, such as the absence of counsel for a defendant, a biased judge, the unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant’s race from a grand jury, the right to self-representation at trial, and the right to a public trial. Id., 499 U.S. at 309-310, 111 S.Ct. at 1265.

q16 A structural error is not subject to analysis based on prejudice. State v. D’Antonio, 877 A.2d 696, 737 (Conn. 2005)(Katz, J., dissenting). When a structural error analysis is undertaken and such an error exists, the proceeding is vitiated. Id.; see also State v. Cruz, 122 P.3d 543, 549 (Utah 2005)(a structural error analysis presumes prejudice); State v. Lamere, 112 P.3d 1005, 1013 (Mont. 2005)(errors in the jury selection process are structural errors; structural errors are presumptively prejudicial); Walker v. State, 868 A.2d 898, 913 (Md.App. 2005), cert. granted, 875 A.2d 767 (Md. 2005) (If a structural error is committed, prejudice is presumed.); State v. Langley, 896 So.2d 200, 210 (La.Ct.App. 2004)(judge who was absent from proceedings and failed to maintain proper courtroom decorum caused structural errors requiring reversal without showing of prejudice); U.S. v. McFerron, 163 F.3d 952, 956 (6th Cir. 1998)(denial of right to exercise peremptory challenges is structural and not subject to harmless error analysis); U.S. v. Serino, 163 F.3d 91, 93 (1st Cir. 1998)(finding Batson violation structural and reversing without applying harmless error analysis or proof of prejudice); U.S. v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 734 (10th Cir. 2005)(if, as a categorical matter, a court is capable of finding that the error caused prejudice upon reviewing the record, then that class of errors is not structural).

I [17 While this Court paid lip service to the concept of structural error in Marrero and Spunaugle when discussing the improper denial of peremptory challenges in capital cases, it did not fully consider the breadth of such defects because it applied either a harmless error analysis or implied a proof of prejudice requirement. As the cases cited above from across the country demonstrate, structural errors are not subject to harmless error analysis, do not require a showing of prejudice, and such an error is not measured against the other evidence admitted at trial. To the extent Marrero, Spunaugle, White, and Landrum are inconsistent with this Opinion, they are hereby overruled.

18 The purpose of voir dire in a criminal proceeding is to determine whether there are grounds to challenge prospective jurors and to permit the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. Dodd v. State, 2004 OK CR 31, 9 24, 100 P.3d 1017, 1029. The use of peremptory challenges in voir dire is the principle method of securing a defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. See Moore v. State, 1995 OK CR 39, I 13, 900 P.2d 996, 1000. Jury impartiality goes to the very integrity of our justice system, and the right to an impartial jury is so essential to our concept of a fair trial that its violation cannot be considered harmless error. State v. Herrman, 70 P.3d 738, 742 (Mont. 2003). Not all errors occurring during jury selection are structural; the denial or impairment of the right to peremptory challenges is, however, one of those errors that defy harmless error analysis.

19 In this case, the trial court caused structural error by denying Mr. Golden the complete array of peremptory challenges to which he was entitled by Oklahoma law. While defense counsel did not object, the trial court had an affirmative duty to inform the defendant of his right to challenge jurors, 22 O.S.2001, § 651, and its failure to inform the defendant of this statutory right and all that it encompassed constitutes clear, structural error. It is evident from the record that the trial court was not aware of the applicable law. The right to a trial before a fair and impartial jury is the hallmark of the American system of justice, and is guaranteed by both the Federal and Oklahoma constitutions. See U.S.Const. amend. VI, Okl.Const. art.II, §§ 19, 20. White, 1986 OK CR 153, I 1, 726 P.2d at 909 (Parks, J., dissenting). This Court cannot determine what effect Mr. Golden’s exercise of four additional peremptory challenges, or of the State’s for that matter, would have had upon the final make-up of the jury or whether that might have affected the ultimate outcome of this case. This is the type of error for which prejudice must be presumed because any inquiry into the resulting unfairness or prejudice is necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate and would be purely speculative.

920 Accordingly, because we find merit to the issue raised in Proposition One, the remaining propositions of error are rendered moot.

DECISION

The Judgment and Sentence imposed in Pottawatomie County District Court, Case No. CF 2003-199, is hereby REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL consistent with this Opinion. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeal, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2006), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

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Footnotes:

  1. 21 O.S.2001, § 701.
  2. 22 O.S.2001, § 655.
  3. 22 O.S.2001, § 651.
  4. Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346, 100 S.Ct. 2227, 2229, 65 L.Ed.2d 175 (1980).
  5. Phillips v. State, 1999 OK CR 38, I 67, 989 P.2d 1017, 1036.
  6. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1263, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991).
  7. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).
  8. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2278, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988).
  9. Marrero v. State, 2001 OK CR 12, 11-12, 29 P.3d 580, 582.
  10. Spunaugle v. State, 1997 OK CR 47, I 30-32, 946 P.2d 246, 252.
  11. Landrum v. State, 1971 OK CR 235, 486 P.2d 757.
  12. Phelps v. State, 1965 OK CR 98, 404 P.2d 687.
  13. White v. State, 1986 OK CR 153, 726 P.2d 905.
  14. Dodd v. State, 2004 OK CR 31, 9 24, 100 P.3d 1017, 1029.
  15. State v. Herrman, 70 P.3d 738, 742 (Mont. 2003).
  16. State v. D'Antonio, 877 A.2d 696, 737 (Conn. 2005).
  17. State v. Cruz, 122 P.3d 543, 549 (Utah 2005).
  18. U.S. v. McFerron, 163 F.3d 952, 956 (6th Cir. 1998).
  19. U.S. v. Serino, 163 F.3d 91, 93 (1st Cir. 1998).
  20. U.S. v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 734 (10th Cir. 2005).
  21. Lafevers v. State, 1991 OK CR 97, 819 P.2d 1362.

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701. (2001) - First Degree Murder
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 655. (2001) - Peremptory Challenges in First Degree Murder Cases
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 651. (2001) - Right to Challenge Jurors

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

  • 487 U.S. § 81 - Federal constitutional right to impartial jury
  • 386 U.S. § 18 - Harmless error analysis
  • 499 U.S. § 279 - Structural errors and trial errors

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

  • Ryan Golden v. The State of Oklahoma, 2006 OK CR 2
  • Marrerro v. State, 2001 OK CR 12, 29 P.3d 580
  • Spunaugle v. State, 1997 OK CR 47, 946 P.2d 246
  • Long v. State, 2003 OK CR 14, 74 P.3d 105
  • Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273
  • Landrum v. State, 1971 OK CR 235, 486 P.2d 757
  • Phelps v. State, 1965 OK CR 98, 404 P.2d 687
  • White v. State, 1986 OK CR 153, 726 P.2d 905
  • Dodd v. State, 2004 OK CR 31, 100 P.3d 1017
  • Moore v. State, 1995 OK CR 39, 900 P.2d 996
  • Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 100 S.Ct. 2227
  • Phillips v. State, 1999 OK CR 38, 989 P.2d 1017
  • Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246

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