Christian Satterfield v State Of Oklahoma

F-2002-106

Filed: Nov. 19, 2002

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: State Of Oklahoma

Summary

Christian Satterfield appealed his conviction for Attempted Manufacture of a Controlled Dangerous Substance, Possession of a Precursor, and Possession of a Firearm While Committing a Felony. Conviction and sentence included thirty years for Count I, five years for Count II, and seven years for Count III, to be served one after another. Judge Chapel dissented on the sentencing for Count I.

Decision

As to Proposition I, we find that Appellant's conviction for both Attempted Manufacture of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (Count I) and Possession of a Precursor (Count II) violates the statutory prohibition against multiple punishment. See 21 O.S.2001, § 11. Accordingly, Count II, Possession of a Precursor, must be reversed with instructions to dismiss. We find in Proposition II that Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics General Counsel's participation in Appellant's prosecution was authorized by statute and did not deny him a fair trial. See 63 O.S.Supp.2000, § 2-110. In Proposition III, we find that the jury was correctly instructed on the proper range of punishment. The statutory change in the range of punishment occurred after Appellant committed the crime in this case. As there is no express indication that the legislature intended the amendment changing the range of punishment to be applied retroactively, Appellant was entitled only to the law which was in effect at the time he committed the crime. See State v. Watkins, 837 P.2d 477, 478 (Okl.Cr.1992). Regarding Proposition IV, we find that the evidence about which Appellant complains was properly admitted at trial. This evidence was relevant and admissible to establish Appellant's attempt to manufacture methamphetamine. 12 O.S.2001, § 2401. Further, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the admissible evidence. Appellant's argument in Proposition V is moot as Count II must be reversed based upon error raised in Proposition I. We find in Proposition VI that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant's conviction for possession of a firearm while committing a felony. Spuehler v. State, 709 P.2d 202, 203-04 (Okl.Cr.1985). Appellant's argument in Proposition VII must fail as relief was granted upon the meritorious allegation of error. No other error, either singly or in combination, requires relief. Finally, we find in Proposition VIII, that the minimum fine mandated under the manufacturing statute bears a direct relationship to the offense and is neither excessive nor unconstitutional. Appellant's Judgment and Sentence on Counts I and III is AFFIRMED. Appellant's Judgment and Sentence on Count II is REVERSED with INSTRUCTIONS to DISMISS.

Issues

• was there a violation of Double Jeopardy due to simultaneous convictions for Attempted Manufacture and Possession of a Precursor?
• did the involvement of the General Counsel of the Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics amount to a violation of Appellant's right to Due Process?
• was the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the proper range of punishment a violation of Appellant's right to Due Process?
• was Appellant denied a fundamentally fair trial by the admission of inadmissible evidence invoking societal alarm?
• did the Information improperly instruct the jury leading to a violation of Due Process regarding Count II?
• was there insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Appellant's possession of a firearm was connected to the felony?
• did trial errors and prosecutorial misconduct cumulatively deny Appellant Due Process?
• is the $50,000 minimum fine mandated under the manufacturing statute unconstitutional for lacking a quantitative relationship to the offense?

Findings

• Count II must be reversed with instructions to dismiss due to violation of statutory prohibition against multiple punishment.
• Participation of the Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics General Counsel did not deny Appellant a fair trial.
• Jury was correctly instructed on the proper range of punishment for Count I.
• Evidentiary issues raised by Appellant were properly admitted and relevant to the case.
• Proposition V is moot as Count II is reversed; no action necessary.
• Evidence was sufficient to support conviction for Count III.
• No cumulative errors warrant further relief as Count II is dismissed.
• Minimum fine mandated under the manufacturing statute is neither excessive nor unconstitutional.

F-2002-106

Nov. 19, 2002

Christian Satterfield

Appellant

v

State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

STRUBHAR, JUDGE:

Appellant, Christian Satterfield, was convicted of Attempted Manufacture of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (Count I), Possession of a Precursor (Count II) and Possession of a Firearm While Committing a Felony (Count III), in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Case No. CF-2001-1842. The jury trial was held before the Honorable Susan P. Caswell. Following its return of a guilty verdict, the jury recommended that Appellant be sentenced to thirty years imprisonment and a $50,000.00 fine on Count I, five years imprisonment on Count II and seven years imprisonment on Count III. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly ordering the sentences be served consecutively.

After thorough consideration of the entire record before us on appeal, including the original record, transcripts, and briefs of the parties, we affirm Counts I and III and reverse Count II with instructions to dismiss. In reaching our decision, we considered the following propositions of error and determined this result to be required under the law and the evidence:

I. The simultaneous convictions for Count I, Attempted Manufacture of Methamphetamine, and Count II, Possession of a Precursor (Pseudoephedrine), violated Double Jeopardy and the Oklahoma statutory prohibition against multiple punishments.

II. The active advocacy of the General Counsel of the Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics placed him in the role of a special prosecutor in violation of Oklahoma law and Appellant’s right to Due Process and a fundamentally fair trial.

III. The trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the proper range of punishment, over Appellant’s objection, violated Appellant’s right to Due Process and a fundamentally fair trial.

IV. Appellant’s Due Process right to a fundamentally fair trial was violated by inadmissible evidence invoking societal alarm and improper opinion testimony.

V. Appellant’s conviction on Count II violated Due Process and must be dismissed because the Information charged a violation of 63 O.S.2001, § 2-328(E)(1), but the jury was instructed under 63 O.S.2001, § 2-328(E)(2), a crime not charged in the Information.

VI. The State presented insufficient evidence on Count III to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant’s possession of a .380 caliber handgun was connected to attempted manufacture of methamphetamine.

VII. Trial errors and prosecutorial misconduct, cumulatively, denied Appellant Due Process and require reversal or modification.

VIII. Under the facts of this case, the $50,000 minimum fine mandated under the manufacturing statute is unconstitutional because it does not bear a sufficient, if any quantitative relationship to the offense.

DECISION

As to Proposition I, we find that Appellant’s conviction for both Attempted Manufacture of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (Count I) and Possession of a Precursor (Count II) violates the statutory prohibition against multiple punishment. See 21 O.S.2001, § 11. Accordingly, Count II, Possession of a Precursor, must be reversed with instructions to dismiss.

We find in Proposition II that Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics General Counsel’s participation in Appellant’s prosecution was authorized by statute and did not deny him a fair trial. See 63 O.S.Supp.2000, § 2-110.

In Proposition III, we find that the jury was correctly instructed on the proper range of punishment. The statutory change in the range of punishment occurred after Appellant committed the crime in this case. As there is no express indication that the legislature intended the amendment changing the range of punishment to be applied retroactively, Appellant was entitled only to the law which was in effect at the time he committed the crime. See State v. Watkins, 837 P.2d 477, 478 (Okl.Cr.1992).

Regarding Proposition IV, we find that the evidence about which Appellant complains was properly admitted at trial. This evidence was relevant and admissible to establish Appellant’s attempt to manufacture methamphetamine.

Appellant’s argument in Proposition V is moot as Count II must be reversed based upon error raised in Proposition I. We find in Proposition VI that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction for possession a firearm while committing a felony. Spuehler v. State, 709 P.2d 202, 203-04 (Okl.Cr.1985).

Appellant’s argument in Proposition VII must fail as relief was granted upon the meritorious allegation of error. No other error, either singly or in combination, requires relief. Finally, we find in Proposition VIII, that the minimum fine mandated under the manufacturing statute bears a direct relationship to the offense and is neither excessive nor unconstitutional.

Appellant’s Judgment and Sentence on Counts I and III is AFFIRMED. Appellant’s Judgment and Sentence on Count II is REVERSED with INSTRUCTIONS to DISMISS.

APPEARANCES AT TRIAL

CYNTHIA TEDDER
320 ROBERT S. KERR, STE. 611
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA 73102
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

STEVE DEUTSCH
320 ROBERT S. KERR, STE. 505
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA 73102
ATTORNEY FOR THE STATE

APPEARANCES ON APPEAL

WENDELL B. SUTTON
320 ROBERT S. KERR, STE. 611
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA 73102
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

W.A. DREW EDMONDSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLAHOMA
OKLAHOMA 73102

BRANT M. ELMORE
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
112 STATE CAPITOL BUILDING
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA 73105

SCOTT ROWLAND
GENERAL COUNSEL
OKLAHOMA BUREAU OF NARCOTICS
4545 N. LINCOLN, STE. 11
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA 73105

OPINION BY: STRUBHAR, J.
LUMPKIN, P.J.: CONCUR
JOHNSON, V.P.J.: CONCUR
CHAPEL, J.: CONCUR IN PART/DISSENT IN PART
LILE, J.: CONCUR

CHAPEL, JUDGE CONCURRING IN PART/ DISSENTING IN PART:

I concur in affirming Satterfield’s convictions for Counts I and III and reversing with instructions to dismiss for Count II. However, I dissent to affirming his sentence for Count I because Satterfield’s jury was improperly instructed on the range of punishment for attempting to manufacture methamphetamine. The crime was committed on March 15, 2001, when the sentencing range for attempting to manufacture was twenty (20) years to life imprisonment. On July 1, 2001, the range of punishment was amended to seven (7) years to life imprisonment. When Satterfield was tried on January 7-9, 2002, his jury was instructed under the old sentencing guideline. The majority opinion applies the sentencing range in effect on the date of the crime. However, under the principle stated in Salazar v. State, I would apply the sentencing range in effect at trial because it is beneficial to the defendant for the reasons stated in my dissent in Williams v. State. In this case, Satterfield was tried after the amended statute became effective. The lowered range of punishment, clearly beneficial, should have been applied at his trial. Satterfield’s sentence should be modified to the minimum (7) years’ imprisonment, and Proposition III should be granted.

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Footnotes:

1. Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 11
2. Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 2-110
3. Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 2-328(E)(1)
4. Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 2-328(E)(2)
5. Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2401
6. Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 2-401(G)
7. Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 2-401(G)
8. Salazar v. State, 852 P.2d 729, 737 (Okl.Cr.1993)

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

• 21 O.S.2001 § 11 - Prohibition Against Multiple Punishments
• 63 O.S.Supp.2000 § 2-110 - Authority of Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics
• 63 O.S.2001 § 2-328 - Manufacture of Controlled Dangerous Substances
• 12 O.S.2001 § 2401 - Relevant Evidence
• 63 O.S.Supp.2000 § 2-401(G) - Sentencing Guidelines
• 63 O.S.Supp.2001 § 2-401(G) - Sentencing Guidelines

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

• State v. Watkins, 837 P.2d 477, 478 (Okl.Cr.1992)
• Spuehler v. State, 709 P.2d 202, 203-04 (Okl.Cr.1985)
• Salazar v. State, 852 P.2d 729, 737 (Okl.Cr.1993)