Saundra Kaye Medlin v The State Of Oklahoma

F-2001-558

Filed: Jun. 27, 2002

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: Saundra Kaye Medlin

Summary

Saundra Kaye Medlin appealed her conviction for Manslaughter in the First Degree. Conviction and sentence were reversed and the case was remanded for dismissal. One judge dissented. In this case, Saundra was found guilty of killing her husband after a long history of domestic abuse. She shot him multiple times while he was asleep, arguing that she acted in self-defense because she feared for her and her children's safety. The jury had initially been instructed on a lesser charge of manslaughter, but the appeals court decided that the evidence showed she intended to kill him, meaning the lesser charge should not have been given. The court's decision agreed that the trial judge made an error in letting the jury consider manslaughter, and therefore her conviction was overturned. One judge disagreed, believing the jury should have had the chance to consider the full context of the case, including the violent history they faced.

Decision

IT IS THEREFORE THE ORDER OF THIS COURT that Appellant's Judgment and Sentence in Canadian County District Court, Case No. CF-1999-155, is REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO DISMISS. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Issues

• Was there an error in instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of Manslaughter in the First Degree due to lack of supporting evidence?
• Did the trial court err by providing jury instructions despite no notice being given to the defense regarding lesser included instructions?
• Was there sufficient evidence to support a verdict for the offense of Manslaughter in the First Degree by Heat of Passion?
• Did the evidence presented require the trial court to give a jury instruction on a lesser included homicide charge?
• Was the jury's verdict of "not guilty" on the charge of First Degree Murder sufficient to bar retrial on that charge due to double jeopardy protections?

Findings

• The trial court erred in instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of Manslaughter in the First Degree because the instruction was not supported by the evidence.
• The jury's verdict specifically found Appellant "not guilty" of Murder in the First Degree, effectively acquitting Appellant of that charge.
• The trial court's error in giving the lesser manslaughter instruction requires reversal.
• The evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for Manslaughter in the First Degree by Heat of Passion.
• The appeal was reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the charges against the Appellant.

F-2001-558

Jun. 27, 2002

Saundra Kaye Medlin

Appellant

v

The State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

In the District Court of Canadian County, Case No. CF-1999-155, before the Honorable Edward C. Cunningham, District Judge, a jury found Appellant guilty of Manslaughter in the First Degree by Heat of Passion and assessed her punishment at four years imprisonment. On May 1, 2001, pursuant to this verdict, the District Court entered judgment and sentenced Appellant to a term of four years in the custody of the Department of Corrections. From her Judgment and Sentence, Appellant has brought this appeal.

Appellant made application for her appeal to be placed upon this Court’s Accelerated Docket under Section XI, Accelerated Docket Procedures, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2001). No objection being made by Appellee, the appeal was assigned to the Court’s Accelerated Docket. Oral argument was held on May 16, 2002, and the Court duly considered her single proposition of error raised on appeal:

1. On December 19, 2001, while her appeal was pending before this Court, the District Court, under the authority granted to it by 22 O.S.Supp.2000 § 982a(A), modified Appellant’s sentence. The modification order credited Appellant with all time served on her sentence and suspended execution of that portion of Appellant’s sentence that had yet to be served. (Dist. Ct. Order of Dec. 19, 2001.)

**Proposition**

The trial court erred in instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of Manslaughter in the First Degree because the instruction was not supported by the evidence, no notice was ever given to the defense, and Ms. Medlin waived lesser included instructions.

After hearing oral argument and after a thorough consideration of Appellant’s proposition of error and the entire record before us on appeal, by a vote of four (4) to one (1), the Court reverses Appellant’s Judgment and Sentence with instructions to dismiss.

Appellant was charged with Murder in the First Degree with Malice Aforethought for the shooting death of her husband, Jay Medlin. The evidence revealed that in the early morning hours of March 24, 1999, Appellant reached under her bed, retrieved a .38 caliber pistol, walked around to her husband’s side of the bed, and at point-blank range emptied her five-shot revolver into her husband’s body while he lay asleep. One shot pierced Jay Medlin’s skull by entering through the left temple, three shots pierced his heart, and one shot struck beneath the left collarbone. The medical examiner described all of these gunshots, except the one beneath the collarbone, as being very rapidly fatal and nonsurvivable. (Tr. VI 50.)

Appellant defended the Murder I charge with evidence that the homicide, by law, was justifiable because it had been committed in the defense of herself and her two minor children. Homicide is justifiable when it is committed by one in the lawful defense of [her] person, or [the person’s] child when there is a reasonable ground to apprehend a design to commit a felony, or to do some great personal injury, and imminent danger of such design being accomplished. 21 O.S.2001, § 733(2) (emphasis added). In *Bechtel U. State*, 1992 OK CR 55, 11 12-13, 840 P.2d 1, 6, the Court found that evidence a defendant suffered from Battered Woman Syndrome was admissible to show the reasonableness and imminence necessary to establish a homicide was committed in self-defense and hence justifiable.

If a homicide is determined to be justifiable, there is no murder or other lesser criminal homicide, and no criminal penalty attaches. At trial, Appellant produced substantive evidence that for most of their marriage of some fifteen years, she was repeatedly assaulted at the hands of the deceased, that she and her children had been physically and verbally abused by the deceased, that police assistance had proven unfruitful or had resulted in further violence against her by the deceased, that she and her children had repeatedly sought to escape from the deceased, and that the deceased successfully prevented Appellant or her children from establishing a life outside of his presence or control. Expert testimony confirmed Appellant met the criteria for one who suffered from the Battered Woman Syndrome. The deceased had undergone heart surgery approximately three weeks before the shooting. Appellant and the couple’s two children testified the deceased’s abusive behavior had gotten worse since his surgery. The evidence further revealed that on the night of the shooting the deceased became verbally abusive and threatening to Appellant and their two children, and that he had struck Appellant once on the top of the head with his fist.

The evidence, however, did not reveal that this behavior by the deceased on the night of the shooting was so peculiar or so extreme (especially in light of the couple’s history) that it would have invoked a heat of passion in Appellant that could render her incapable of forming an intent to kill. Instead, it was Appellant’s position that the deceased’s increasingly abusive verbal behavior was a sign recognized by Appellant from her previous experiences with him. Appellant contended this behavior signaled that the deceased would soon revert to violent and physically abusive behavior, and that the killing of her husband was a conscious decision made by her in self-defense to prevent that physical abuse that Appellant reasonably believed to be imminent.

For an offense of Manslaughter in the First Degree by Heat of Passion, there cannot be a design to effect death. The evidence before the jury revealed that Appellant used deadly force upon the deceased and did so with the intent to take his life. Because the evidence presented to Appellant’s jury was such that rational jurors could only conclude Appellant intended to kill, the trial court was not presented with circumstances that would permit it to give a jury instruction on Manslaughter in the First Degree by Heat of Passion.

This being so, the giving of a First Degree Manslaughter instruction over the objection of Appellant was error. Such error requires reversal. Moreover, the jury’s verdict specifically found Appellant not guilty of Murder in the First Degree. (O.R. 124.) For the purposes of double jeopardy, this verdict effectively acquits Appellant of the charge of First Degree Murder. The Constitution therefore mandates the State’s murder prosecution be dismissed.

IT IS THEREFORE THE ORDER OF THIS COURT that Appellant’s Judgment and Sentence in Canadian County District Court, Case No. CF-1999-155, is REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO DISMISS.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

WITNESS OUR HANDS AND THE SEAL OF THIS COURT this 27th day of June, 2002.

GARY L. LUMPKIN, Presiding Judge

DISSENTS

CHARLES A. JOHNSON, Vice Presiding Judge

CHARLES S. CHAPEL, Judge

RETA M. STRUBHAR, Judge

STEVE LILE, Judge

ATTEST:

I agree that the determination of law applies under the facts of this case. Generally, Johnson Clerk that the mandate does not survive Shrum in the absence of a specific finding of not guilty on the higher offense.

LUMPKIN, P.J.: DISSENT

The trial judge performed his duties here in a professional, meticulous fashion and attempted to follow this Court’s decision in *Shrum v. State*, 991 P.2d 1032 (Okl.Cr.1999), which is not a particularly easy task. When the prosecutor sought, pursuant to *Shrum*, an instruction for heat of passion manslaughter as a lesser-included offense to first degree murder, defense counsel objected, claiming a lack of notice and that the defense was not supported by the evidence. Defense Counsel is to be complimented for making an excellent record to present the issue for review on appeal. Thereafter, the trial judge gave the instruction, as *Shrum* specifically allows, after he found the instruction was warranted by the evidence and that it came as no surprise to the defense. The jury then convicted Appellant on the lesser charge. The Court now reverses the trial judge’s findings, which were supported by the jury’s verdict, and unnecessarily adds further confusion to the complex area of law dealing with lesser-included instructions. It is clear the jury did not accept Appellant’s theory of self-defense, a complete defense, for there was no not guilty verdict.

Regrettably, the Court’s order focuses only on the evidence that supports its decision and disregards the evidence supporting the trial judge’s decision. Using cases that address whether or not a trial judge abused his or her discretion by giving an instruction, the Court’s order fails to look at the entirety of the evidence to determine the sufficiency of the evidence for giving the instruction or determine if the instruction harmed or benefited the defendant. Moreover, it is readily apparent the jury reached its verdict based upon the available punishments. Had the jury not been instructed on Manslaughter in the First Degree, Heat of Passion, more likely than not the jury would have convicted Appellant of first degree murder, for the evidence supports that crime.

The real problem, however, is the catch twenty-two with which trial courts find themselves confronted as a result of *Shrum*, or at least cases like this where this Court rejects a reasonable attempt to apply its holding. In *Shrum*, the Court abandoned the elements test and instructed trial courts that all lesser forms of homicide should be administered if they are supported by the evidence. *Shrum*, 991 P.2d at 1036. If taken to its illogical conclusion, this language presents a conundrum. Malice aforethought murder, by definition, requires the crime to have been committed with a design to effect death, for malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a human being, which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof. 21 O.S.Supp. 1998, § 701.7. (Indeed, according to 21 O.S.1991, § 701.2, a design to effect death is inferred from the fact of killing.) However, misdemeanor manslaughter, heat of passion manslaughter, and second degree depraved mind murder, by definition, all require that the death be committed without a design to effect death, i.e., premeditation. See 21 O.S.1991, § 701.8 and 21 O.S.1991, § 711.

And so, in cases where the defendant seems to have clearly intended death, with an opportunity for at least some deliberation, *Shrum* could be read to say give the manslaughter instruction because it is a lesser-related offense, or don’t give it because there is no evidence to support it. Here, a heat of passion manslaughter instruction was warranted by the evidence, for the elements of heat of passion are: 1) adequate provocation; 2) a passion or emotion such as fear, terror, anger, rage or resentment; 3) homicide occurred while the passion still existed and before a reasonable opportunity for the passion to cool; and 4) a causal connection between the provocation, passion, and homicide. *Powell v. State*, 995 P.2d 510, 534 (Okl.Cr.2000); *Charm v. State*, 924 P.2d 754, 760, cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1200, 117 S.Ct. 1560, 137 L.Ed.2d 707 (1997). The word reasonable suggests an objective test for determining whether or not there was an opportunity for the passion to cool.

The trial evidence revealed long-standing domestic violence by the deceased against Appellant and her children. On the day in question, Jay Medlin had repeatedly threatened to kill everyone in the house. He struck Appellant with his fist and threatened to shoot his sixteen-year-old son. He brought three rifles and two pistols to the couple’s bedside and repeatedly loaded and unloaded them in front of Appellant. At times, he fell asleep, but he would then wake up every two to five minutes screaming threats. Appellant thought she was going to have a heart attack, but her husband would not allow her to go to the hospital. Later, Appellant found him standing over the couple’s daughter with a gun and making lewd comments at the daughter as she slept. Appellant stated her belief that her husband was going to kill everyone in the house, including his own mother. Further, she said, And I was so scared that he was going to kill my kids, I’ve been afraid before, but never in my life have I been this afraid. And I got up and closed my eyes and I shot him. I don’t even know when the gun stopped firing.

The simple question is whether the homicide occurred while Appellant’s passion still existed and before a reasonable opportunity for that passion to cool. This was a jury question under this evidence, for there was surely adequate provocation here, coupled with fear. Just because the victim was asleep when the shooting occurred does not mean she did not act under a heat of passion or that her passion had cooled. See, e.g., *Jackson v. State*, 964 P.2d 875, 899 (Okl.Cr.1998) (Lumpkin, J.: Concur in Result) (I submit that the concept of heat of passion is fairly embraced and included within the element of premeditation A defendant in his defense could present evidence that he killed the person, knew what he was doing, but had a sudden heat of passion and that passion is what caused the homicide.) Otherwise, using the analysis set out in this opinion, in any murder case where the evidence shows premeditation, the defendant is not eligible for any lesser included offense instruction.

Yes, we have a sympathetic victim here. The jury knew that, and it was a part of their consideration in reaching their decision under the law. Therefore, I can find no basis in law or fact for overturning this verdict.

**

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Footnotes:

1. Okla. Stat. tit. 22, Ch. 18, App. § XI.
2. 22 O.S.Supp.2000 § 982a(A).
3. 21 O.S.2001, § 733(2).
4. 21 O.S.2001, § 711(2).
5. Charm v. State, 1996 OK CR 40, 924 P.2d 754, 760.
6. Walker v. State, 1986 OK CR 116, 723 P.2d 273, 284.
7. Hawkins v. State, 2002 OK CR 12, 73 OBJ 918.
8. Frederick v. State, 2001 OK CR 34, 37 P.3d 908, 943-44.
9. Malone v. State, 1994 OK CR 43, 876 P.2d 707, 711.
10. Nickelberry v. State, 1974 OK CR 81, 521 P.2d 879.
11. Powell v. State, 995 P.2d 510, 534.
12. Jackson v. State, 964 P.2d 875, 899.

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 733 - Justifiable Homicide
• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 711 - Manslaughter in the First Degree
• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.8 - Second Degree Murder
• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.7 - Malice Aforethought
• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.2 - Design to Effect Death
• Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 982a - Modification of Sentence

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

• Bechtel v. State, 1992 OK CR 55, I 12-13, 840 P.2d 1, 6
• Charm v. State, 1996 OK CR 40, I 8, 924 P.2d 754, 760
• Walker v. State, 1986 OK CR 116, I 38, 723 P.2d 273, 284
• Hawkins v. State, 2002 OK CR 12, 73 OBJ 918, P.3d
• Frederick v. State, 2001 OK CR 34, I 37, 37 P.3d 908, 943-44
• Malone v. State, 1994 OK CR 43, I 8, 876 P.2d 707, 711
• Shrum v. State, 1999 OK CR 41, I 10-11, 991 P.2d 1032, 1036-37
• Nickelberry v. State, 1974 OK CR 81, 521 P.2d 879
• Powell v. State, 995 P.2d 510, 534
• Jackson v. State, 964 P.2d 875, 899