Benjamin Harry Crider, II v The State Of Oklahoma

F-1999-1422

Filed: Oct. 11, 2001

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: Benjamin Harry Crider, II

Summary

# Benjamin Harry Crider, II appealed his conviction for Murder in the First Degree. Conviction and sentence reversed and remanded for a new trial. Johnson dissented.

Decision

The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court is REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial.

Issues

• Was the evidence produced at trial sufficient to prove the crime of murder beyond a reasonable doubt?
• Did improper, irrelevant, and purely speculative expert opinion deprive Crider of a fair trial?
• Did the trial court err in excluding evidence of an alternative suspect?
• Did the admission of derivative testimonial evidence arising from an illegal search violate Crider's constitutional rights?
• Was plain error committed when a detective insinuated to the jury that Crider had sexually molested the victim?
• Was extraneous evidence injected into the jury deliberations?
• Did misconduct during closing arguments irrevocably taint Crider's trial?
• Did the accumulation of errors in this case deprive Crider of due process?

Findings

• the court erred
• the court erred
• the court erred
• the court erred
• the court erred
• the court erred
• the court erred
• the court erred

F-1999-1422

Oct. 11, 2001

Benjamin Harry Crider, II

Appellant

v

The State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

CHAPEL, JUDGE:

Benjamin Harry Crider, II, was tried by jury and convicted of Murder in the First Degree in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.1999, § 701.7, in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Case No. CF-98-2944. In accordance with the jury’s recommendation, the Honorable Tammy Bass-Jones sentenced Crider to life imprisonment. Crider appeals from this conviction and sentence and raises nine propositions of error:

I. The evidence produced at trial was insufficient to prove the crime of murder beyond a reasonable doubt;

II. Crider’s trial was infected throughout with improper, irrelevant, and purely speculative expert opinion which, when considered as a whole, deprived Crider of a fair trial;

III. The trial court erred in excluding evidence of an alternative suspect;

IV. The admission of derivative testimonial evidence arising from the illegal search of Crider’s residence violated his constitutional rights;

V. Plain error was committed when Detective Neilson was allowed to insinuate to the jury that Crider had sexually molested Crystal Dittmeyer;

VI. Extraneous evidence, not admitted at trial, was injected into the jury deliberations;

VII. Misconduct during closing arguments irrevocably tainted Crider’s trial; and

VIII. The accumulation of error in this case deprived Crider of due process.

After thorough consideration of the entire record before us on appeal, including the original record, transcripts, briefs, and exhibits of the parties, we find error in Proposition II requires reversal. We do not address the issues raised in the remaining propositions.

We briefly set forth facts. Twelve-year-old Crystal Dittmeyer disappeared sometime after 1:00 p.m. on Thursday, June 13, 1996. Crider was Crystal’s stepfather. The State alleged Crider injured or killed Crystal at the family apartment, removed her body in a garment bag, transported it in his state-issued car, and disposed of it at an unknown location. The State presented circumstantial evidence, including: (1) a small pool of Crystal’s blood and a bloody towel found in the master bedroom; (2) disarray in the master bathroom, which Crystal was not allowed to use; (3) Crider’s inability to account for time discrepancies and excess mileage on his state-issued car, and inconsistencies in his explanations; (4) a patterned injury resembling a bite mark on Crider’s left forearm; (5) certain sections of the back seat in Crider’s state-issued car reacted positively to luminol, a presumptive test for blood, and one spot contained a mixture of human DNA from which Crystal could not be excluded; (6) areas where Crider had the opportunity to hide or dispose of Crystal’s body; and (7) Crider’s garment bag was missing and he purchased a new one after Crystal’s disappearance.

In Proposition II, Crider complains about three separate areas of expert opinion. In three subpropositions, he argues (a) that the State’s expert evidence regarding Crider’s patterned injury was not helpful to the trier of fact and should not have been admitted because it did not meet scientific standards of reliability; (b) the evidence of luminol tests conducted in Crider’s state car should not have been admitted because it was irrelevant and did not assist the trier of fact; and (c) Detective Bemo’s lengthy testimony and exhibits regarding a rural area of Yukon and discourse on general ways in which suspects might dispose of bodies was irrelevant, confusing, and misleading to the jury. Crider claims he was prejudiced by each of these areas of testimony. He preserved these issues exhaustively by repeated objections at trial.

We begin our analysis of all three claims with the statutes governing admissibility of evidence and expert opinion testimony. Relevant evidence is that which has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by law, but irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, needless presentation of cumulative evidence, or unfair and harmful surprise. Any evidence which did not tend to make more or less probable a fact of consequence to the question of whether Crider killed Crystal should not have been admitted.

In Subproposition A, Crider complains the State’s forensic odontologist, Dr. Coury, should not have been allowed to present his opinion on the nature and source of Crider’s patterned injury. Dr. Chrz also gave an opinion based on the same evidence. This evidence derived from a novel application of scientific techniques.

We conclude that the trial court erred in admitting all expert opinion as to whether Crystal could be included or excluded as the source of Crider’s patterned injury. We find this error is not harmless, and in conjunction with other evidentiary errors warrants relief.

We further find that the trial court properly admitted Drs. Coury and Glass’s opinions on the nature of the patterned injury itself and whether or not the car part was its source.

In summary, we first conclude that the trial court erred in admitting all expert opinion as to whether Crystal could be included or excluded as the source of Crider’s patterned injury. We find this error is not harmless, and in conjunction with other evidentiary errors warrants relief.

Decision

The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court is REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial.

Click Here To Download PDF

Footnotes:

1. Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.7
2. Jackson v. State, 1988 OK CR 236, 763 P.2d 388
3. Wilson v. State, 1998 OK CR 73, 983 P.2d 448
4. Martinez v. State, 1999 OK CR 33, 984 P.2d 813
5. 12 O.S. 1991, § 2401
6. 12 O.S. 1991, § 2402
7. 12 O.S.1991, § 2403
8. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993)
9. Taylor v. State, 1995 OK CR 10, 889 P.2d 319
10. Young v. State, 1998 OK CR 62, 992 P.2d 332
11. Gilson v. State, 2000 OK CR 14, 8 P.3d 883
12. Robedeaux v. State, 1993 OK CR 57, 866 P.2d 417
13. 12 O.S.1991, § 2403
14. Morris v. State, 1979 OK CR 136, 603 P.2d 1157
15. Bitemark Guidelines & Standards, American Board of Forensic Odontology, Inc.

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.7 (1999) - Murder in the First Degree
• Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2401 (1991) - Relevant Evidence
• Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2402 (1991) - Exclusion of Relevant Evidence
• Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2403 (1991) - Exclusion of Relevant Evidence for Prejudice
• Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2702 (1991) - Expert Testimony
• Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2703 (1991) - Expert Opinions

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

• Jackson v. State, 1988 OK CR 236, 763 P.2d 388, 390
• Wilson v. State, 1998 OK CR 73, 983 P.2d 448, 470, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 904, 120 S.Ct. 244, 145 L.Ed.2d 205 (1999)
• Martinez v. State, 1999 OK CR 33, 984 P.2d 813, cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1102, 120 S.Ct. 1840, 146 L.Ed.2d 782 (2000)
• Kennedy v. State, 1982 OK CR 11, 640 P.2d 971, 978
• Wilhoit v. State, 1991 OK CR 50, 816 P.2d 545
• Young v. State, 1998 OK CR 62, 992 P.2d 332, 340, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 837, 120 S.Ct. 100, 145 L.Ed.2d 84 (1999)
• Malicoat v. State, 2000 OK CR 1, 992 P.2d 383, 398, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 888, 121 S.Ct. 208, 148 L.Ed.2d 146
• Gabus v. Harvey, 1984 OK 4, 678 P.2d 253, 256
• Gilson v. State, 2000 OK CR 14, 8 P.3d 883, 908
• Slaughter v. State, 1997 OK CR 78, 950 P.2d 839, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 886, 119 S.Ct. 199, 142 L.Ed.2d 163 (1998)
• Robedeaux v. State, 1993 OK CR 57, 866 P.2d 417, 425, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 833, 115 S.Ct. 110, 130 L.Ed.2d 57 (1994)
• Morris v. State, 1979 OK CR 136, 603 P.2d 1157, 1159
• White v. State, 900 P.2d 982 (Okl.Cr.1995)