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F-2018-563

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **OCT 17 2019** **JOHN D. HADDEN** **CLERK** --- **BOBBY DALE STOCKTON,** **Appellant,** **V.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Appellee.** **Case No. F-2018-563** --- **SUMMARY OPINION** **ROWLAND, JUDGE:** Appellant Bobby Dale Stockton appeals from the District Court of LeFlore County's order terminating him from Drug Court and sentencing him to seven years in prison, as per the Drug Court contract in Case No. CF-2016-380. On February 14, 2017, Appellant pled guilty to Count 1: Unlawful Possession of CDS - Methamphetamine after a former felony conviction, and Count 3: Resisting an Officer. He agreed to enter Drug Court with a conviction and sentencing of seven years on Count 1 and one year on Count 3, both running concurrently. Successful completion of Drug Court would lead to suspended sentences; failure would result in imprisonment. The State filed an application for termination on June 26, 2017, alleging Appellant's non-compliance—failing to report for intake, missing a urinalysis, and being absent without leave. During a hearing on September 26, 2017, evidence showed Appellant had not participated in the program. He explained his absence was due to caring for his ill mother. Although acknowledging he had not complied, he expressed a willingness to accept a strict ninety-day monitoring. However, Judge Fry found a violation of the Drug Court contract for non-appearance and initiated a no tolerance policy. Subsequently, on September 29, 2017, Appellant failed to attend Drug Court, resulting in an arrest warrant and bail revocation. The State filed a second termination application on April 30, 2018, citing similar violations. At the hearing on May 22, 2018, Appellant admitted to a third heart attack and acknowledged non-compliance without providing documentation on medical issues. Judge Fry noted past assurances of compliance had not been honored and ultimately terminated Appellant from the program, imposing the seven-year prison sentence. **PROPOSITION OF ERROR:** I. The trial court abused its discretion in terminating Mr. Stockton from Drug Court before he had the opportunity to work the program. **ANALYSIS:** Appellant contends hospitalization justified his failures to report. He further claims that, if drug issues were believed to have driven his failures, proper disciplinary measures should have been applied. The discretion to revoke or terminate participation in Drug Court rests with the trial court, and its decision will only be reversed upon a showing of abuse. Under Oklahoma law, judges may impose progressively increasing sanctions for relapses but can revoke participation if necessary. Appellant was given two opportunities to comply with the Program's requirements, both of which he failed. His second failure followed a promise to comply, and although medical conditions were noted, no evidence was presented to substantiate his claims. Therefore, termination was not an abuse of discretion. **DECISION:** The order of the District Court of LeFlore County, terminating Appellant from Drug Court and imposing a seven-year prison sentence, is AFFIRMED. **MANDATE:** Issued forthwith. --- **APPEARANCES:** **Matthew H. McBee** Counsel for Appellant P.O. Box 1303 Poteau, OK 74953 **Joe Watkins & Keeley L. Miller** Counsel for State Assistant District Attorney 100 S. Broadway St., Room 300 Poteau, OK 74953 Assistant Attorney General 313 N.E. 21st Street Oklahoma City, OK 73105 **OPINION BY:** ROWLAND, J. LEWIS, P.J.: Concur KUEHN, V.P.J.: Concur LUMPKIN, J.: Concur HUDSON, J.: Concur

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F-2018-780

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-780, Rawson appealed his conviction for lewd or indecent acts to a child under 16. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction and sentence. One judge dissented. Rawson was found guilty by a jury for multiple counts of lewd acts against a child. The jury recommended life imprisonment for each count, and the trial court imposed the sentences to run one after the other. Rawson challenged his conviction, claiming that the jury was not adequately instructed on the specific acts he allegedly committed. He did not argue that the law was incorrectly stated, just that the instructions should have outlined the acts in more detail. The court explained that instructions for juries are meant to accurately convey applicable law, and in this case, they properly followed the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions. The trial court had provided sufficient instructions, describing the necessary elements that the prosecution needed to prove for each count. Even though Rawson's defense wanted more specificity in the instructions, the court found that the jury was clearly informed about the nature of the charges against him. Since he did not dispute the proof of the allegations or claim that the law was wrongly applied, the court decided that there was no abuse of discretion and upheld the original decision. In conclusion, the court affirmed Rawson's conviction, and the case was officially closed with no errors found in the trial process.

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F-2018-915

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**Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma** **Case Summary: Trever Wayne Ford v. The State of Oklahoma** **Case No:** F-2018-915 **Filed:** October 13, 2019 **Summary:** Trever Wayne Ford was convicted of Assault and Battery by Means and Force Likely to Produce Death under 21 O.S.2011, § 652(C) in the District Court of Pontotoc County, Case No. CF-2017-20. Judge C. Steven Kessinger sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison. Ford appealed, arguing that his sentence was excessive. **Key Points:** 1. **Appellant's Argument**: Ford contends that his sentence is too harsh given the conflicting evidence about the incident, his injuries (possibly a concussion), lack of prior convictions, employment status, family responsibilities, and character in relation to this crime. 2. **Court’s Response**: The court reviewed the case and noted that the trial court had considered all the relevant information when imposing the sentence. The evidence indicated that Ford engaged in violent actions that caused severe injury to the victim. 3. **Conclusion**: The appellate court found that Ford's twenty-five-year sentence was within the statutory range and not excessive given the circumstances described. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment and sentence. **Decision**: The judgment and sentence from the District Court of Pontotoc County are upheld. **Counsel Information**: - **For Appellant**: Shelley Levisay, Ricki J. Walterscheid, Carlos Henry. - **For Appellee**: Mike Hunter (Attorney General), Keeley L. Miller (Assistant Attorney General), Tara Portillo (Assistant District Attorney). **Judges**: Opinion delivered by Vice Presiding Judge Kuehn; Judges Lewis, Lumpkin, Hudson, and Rowland concurred. For the full decision, please refer to the provided [PDF link](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-915_1735118232.pdf).

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F-2018-954

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **Case No. F-2018-954** --- **CHRISTIAN D. MOLINA-SOLORZANO, Appellant,** **v.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellee.** --- **SUMMARY OPINION** **ROWLAND, JUDGE:** Appellant Christian D. Molina-Solorzano appeals his Judgment and Sentence from the District Court of Beckham County, Case No. CF-2017-259, for Aggravated Trafficking in Illegal Drugs, in violation of 63 O.S.Supp.2015, § 2-415. The Honorable F. Douglas Haught presided over the non-jury trial, found Molina-Solorzano guilty, and sentenced him to fifteen years imprisonment, $1,000.00 fine, and one year of post-imprisonment supervision. Molina-Solorzano raises the following issues: 1. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to challenge the basis for the traffic stop. 2. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to inform him of his rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR). 3. Entitlement to retroactive application of recent changes in law regarding parole eligibility for aggravated trafficking convictions. **DECISION:** After review, we find relief is not warranted and affirm the district court's Judgment and Sentence. **1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Traffic Stop Challenge** Molina-Solorzano asserts that defense counsel was ineffective by not challenging the validity of the traffic stop, which he claims was based on race discrimination and an inadequate fog light infraction. To succeed on an ineffective assistance claim, Molina-Solorzano must demonstrate: - Counsel's performance was deficient. - The deficiency resulted in prejudice that affected the outcome of the trial. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, and a traffic stop is valid if the officer had probable cause or reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation. The record, including video evidence from the traffic stop, supports that the stop was justified due to a fog light infraction. The trooper's testimony confirmed that visibility was over a mile, and thus the use of fog lights constituted a violation under Oklahoma law. Since the stop was justified, Molina-Solorzano cannot establish that counsel's failure to challenge it affected the trial's outcome, denying his ineffective assistance claim. **2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: VCCR Rights** Molina-Solorzano also contends that defense counsel failed to inform him of his rights under the VCCR, which would have allowed him to contact the Mexican consulate for assistance. To evaluate this claim, we consider: - Whether he was unaware of his right to contact his consulate. - Whether he would have utilized that right had he known. - Whether the consulate's assistance would have likely aided his defense. The record lacks evidence that Molina-Solorzano was unaware of his rights or that assistance from the consulate would have changed the trial's outcome. Appellate counsel's assertions do not suffice to demonstrate these conditions. Therefore, this claim is also denied. **3. Retroactive Application of Parole Changes** Molina-Solorzano argues that he should benefit from recent legislative proposals reducing parole eligibility terms for aggravated trafficking convictions. However, as legislation is not retroactive unless explicitly stated, and the referenced Senate Bill was never enacted, his claim is moot. **CONCLUSION:** The Judgment and Sentence of the district court is AFFIRMED. The MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon filing of this decision. **APPEARANCES** - Kenny R. Goza, Counsel for Defendant - Debra K. Hampton, Counsel for Appellant - Gina R. Webb, Counsel for State - Mike Hunter, Attorney General of Oklahoma - Joshua R. Fanelli, Assistant Attorney General **OPINION BY:** ROWLAND, J. **Concur in Results:** KUEHN, V.P.J. **Concur:** LUMPKIN, J. **Concur:** HUDSON, J. --- For the full decision, click here: [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-954_1734874505.pdf)

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F-2018-690

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **DANIEL ROSS DAGE,** **Appellant,** **vs.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Appellee.** **No. F-2018-690** **SUMMARY OPINION** **KUEHN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:** Daniel Ross Dage was convicted of Possession of Juvenile Pornography in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 1021.2, in the District Court of Comanche County, under the Honorable Gerald Neuwirth. He was sentenced to twenty (20) years imprisonment, with eight (8) years suspended, and a fine of $5,000.00. Additionally, he is subject to sex offender registration and two years of post-imprisonment supervision during his suspended sentence. Dage appeals his conviction and sentence, raising three propositions of error. I. The record does not sufficiently demonstrate that Appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. II. The State's evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Dage knowingly possessed videos of juvenile pornography. III. A sentence of 20 years is excessive under the circumstances, violating the United States and Oklahoma constitutions. After thorough review of the record, including transcripts and briefs, we find that the case must be reversed and remanded for a jury trial. Proposition I is granted. The State concedes this issue. While defendants can waive their constitutional right to a jury trial, such a waiver must be competent, knowing, intelligent, and on the record, as established in *Hinsley v. State*, 2012 OK CR 11; *Valega v. City of Oklahoma City*, 1988 OK CR 101. Record evidence must show that both the State and the court consented to the waiver. The requirements for a valid waiver include an advisement of rights and a court minute reflecting the waiver, with signatures from the defendant and counsel. The record does not provide evidence of a waiver or party consent; there are no advisements regarding jury trial rights, nor discussions recorded in the trial transcript concerning the waiver. Thus, we conclude that the record fails to show Appellant validly waived his right to a jury trial. Proposition II, concerning the sufficiency of evidence, is briefly addressed. The State needed to demonstrate Dage knowingly possessed child pornography according to 21 O.S.2011, § 1021.2. Although Dage argues against the sufficiency of evidence, we find that the evidence reasonably infers Dage was aware of the prohibited nature of the material, and no other individual had reasonable access to the USB drives. Therefore, this proposition is denied. Given our decision regarding Proposition I, Proposition III concerning sentencing is rendered moot. **DECISION** The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Comanche County is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED for a jury trial. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision. **AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF COMANCHE COUNTY** **THE HONORABLE GERALD NEUWIRTH, DISTRICT JUDGE** **ATTORNEYS AT TRIAL** LARRY CORRALES P.O. BOX 2095 LAWTON, OK 73502 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT **ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL** NANCY WALKER-JOHNSON P.O. BOX 926 NORMAN, OK 73070 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT **COUNSEL FOR THE STATE** CHRISTINE GALBRAITH ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY COMANCHE CO. COURTHOUSE 315 SW 5TH ST., RM 502 LAWTON, OK 73501-4360 **MIKE HUNTER** ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLA. DIANE L. SLAYTON ASST. ATTORNEY GENERAL 313 NE 21 ST STREET OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73105 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE **OPINION BY KUEHN, V.P.J.** LEWIS, P.J.: CONCUR LUMPKIN, J.: CONCUR HUDSON, J.: CONCUR ROWLAND, J.: CONCUR [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-690_1735220870.pdf)

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F 2017-1055

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In OCCA case No. F 2017-1055, William Singleton Wall, III, appealed his conviction for Possession of Controlled Dangerous Substance (Oxycodone). In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the termination of Appellant from the Pontotoc County Drug Court Program. One judge dissented. William was charged in 2014 and entered a plea for the Drug Court program, where if he succeeded, his case would be dismissed. However, if he failed, he faced a ten-year prison sentence. In April 2017, the State filed to terminate him from the program because he tested positive for THC, which is a substance found in marijuana. During the termination hearing, the judge decided that the State had enough evidence to terminate William from the program. He was given a ten-year prison sentence with credit for time already served. William argued that he should not have been terminated because he did not receive proper notice of the program's rules and because the State filed its motion after the allowed time for his participation in the Drug Court expired. The court explained that the decision to terminate a participant from Drug Court is at the judge's discretion. William did not object when the evidence of his drug use was presented at the hearing. Furthermore, the records showed that William had understood the terms of the Drug Court when he entered. The court also found that although the approval for his Drug Court participation had a time limit, he was still under the court's jurisdiction until he was properly sentenced. The court ruled that they did not see any errors in how the trial court acted. They affirmed the decision to terminate William, meaning he would serve his ten-year sentence for not following the rules of the Drug Court program.

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F-2018-973

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In the case of Brian Scott Willess v. The State of Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals addressed an appeal concerning the acceleration of Willess' deferred sentence for the crime of Stalking. The appeal was brought forth after the District Court of Cleveland County, under Judge Thad Balkman, found that Willess had violated the terms of his probation by not taking mandated mental health medication and committing a new stalking offense. **Background:** - On May 23, 2018, Willess entered a no contest plea to stalking, with sentencing deferred for five years, under probation terms. - The State later filed an Application to Accelerate Judgment, alleging violations of probation terms. A hearing was held on September 5, 2018, leading to the acceleration of Willess' sentence to five years imprisonment. **Propositions of Error:** Willess raised multiple arguments in his appeal: 1. **Ineffective Assistance of Counsel**: Claimed his counsel failed to argue for credit for time served prior to his plea. 2. **Jurisdiction Issues**: Argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction because there was no preliminary hearing held. 3. **Insufficient Evidence**: Contended that the State did not provide adequate evidence to prove a violation of probation terms. 4. **Due Process Concerns**: Suggested that he was not given adequate notice of the allegations against him and that hearsay evidence was improperly considered. 5. **Premature Acceleration**: Argued that the court should have considered intermediate sanctions instead of incarceration. **Court Opinion:** - The court affirmed the acceleration of Willess' deferred sentence, stating that the issues raised about ineffective counsel and jurisdiction were not valid in an acceleration appeal context. Proper processes for addressing these claims require filing a writ of certiorari. - On the sufficiency of evidence claim, the court found that the State had met its burden of proving violations by a preponderance of evidence, and the hearsay evidence presented had sufficient reliability. - Regarding due process, the court held that Willess had been duly notified of the allegations against him, and his hearsay concerns were addressed previously. - Finally, the court reiterated that even a single violation of probation conditions could warrant acceleration of the sentence, which was upheld in this case. The court's decision highlighted that procedural safeguards were followed and determined there was no abuse of discretion by the district court in accelerating Willess' sentence. In conclusion, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ruled in favor of the State, affirming Willess' five-year sentence for the violations of probation.

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F-2018-814

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **Case No. F-2018-814** **MELINDA GAYLE HENRY,** Appellant, **v.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellee. --- **SUMMARY OPINION** **JOHN D. HADDEN, CLERK** **LUMPKIN, JUDGE:** Appellant, Melinda Gayle Henry, was convicted by jury of Embezzlement, in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2012, § 1451, in the District Court of Nowata County Case Number CF-2016-71. The jury recommended a punishment of five years imprisonment and a fine of $10,000.00, which the trial court imposed. Appellant now appeals this judgment and sentence. **Propositions of Error:** 1. **Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:** Appellant contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to secure necessary discovery. 2. **Failure to Request Continuance:** Appellant also asserts counsel was ineffective for not seeking a continuance for trial. 3. **Plain Error:** Lastly, Appellant claims the trial court committed plain error by proceeding to trial with unprepared counsel. **Analysis:** **Propositions One and Two (Ineffective Assistance of Counsel):** Under the Strickland v. Washington framework, Appellant must show (1) that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. There is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within a range of reasonable professional assistance. In Proposition One, Appellant argues that her counsel did not obtain critical records from the victim, The Woodshed convenience store, potentially impacting her defense. Counsel did request the records but believed they were destroyed. The trial court found that the State had offered access to the records, which the defense did not utilize. Appellant's assertion lacks evidence that obtaining these records would have changed the outcome of her trial; thus, this claim is speculative and fails to demonstrate prejudice. In Proposition Two, Appellant claims counsel was ineffective for not requesting a continuance due to the lack of records. However, the trial court's history with the case and previous findings suggested a request for a continuance would have been denied. Therefore, counsel would not be ineffective for abandoning a baseless motion. **Proposition Three (Plain Error):** Appellant's final claim of plain error regarding the trial being held without sufficient preparation fails under Rule 3.5(A)(5) of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, which requires specific citations to the record. This assertion is superficial and unsubstantiated, leading to its waiver from appellate review. **Decision:** The judgment and sentence are **AFFIRMED**. **Mandate Ordered.** --- **APPEARANCES:** **AT TRIAL:** - **Mark Kane, Counsel for Appellant** - **Mike Hunter, Attorney General of Oklahoma; Kevin Buchanan, Assistant District Attorney for the State** **ON APPEAL:** - **Kevin D. Adams, Counsel for Appellant** - **Katherine R. Morelli, Assistant Attorney General for the State** **OPINION BY:** **LUMPKIN, J.** **LEWIS, P.J., KUEHN, V.P.J., HUDSON, J., ROWLAND, J.:** Concur in Result [Download Full Opinion PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-814_1735213396.pdf)

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F-2018-624

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**Case Summary: Bryon Lynd Gordon v. The State of Oklahoma** **Court:** Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals **Case No.:** F-2018-624 **Date Filed:** October 3, 2019 **Judges:** Lumpkin (Majority Opinion), Lewis (Partial Concurrence and Dissent), Kuehn (Partial Concurrence and Dissent) **Background:** Bryon Lynd Gordon was convicted by a jury in the District Court of Bryan County for Forcible Oral Sodomy (Count 1), and the jury recommended a ten-year prison sentence. Gordon appealed the conviction, raising several points of error relating to the trial proceedings. **Key Propositions Raised on Appeal:** 1. **Competency of Witness:** Gordon argued the trial court abused its discretion by ruling the alleged victim, R.S., competent to testify without an inquiry into his ability to distinguish between truth and fiction. The court found that R.S. demonstrated competency and the ruling was not an abuse of discretion. 2. **Preliminary Hearing Testimony:** Gordon contended that the magistrate abused discretion by allowing R.S. to testify at the preliminary hearing without confirming his competency. However, the court ruled that the failure to file a motion to quash before trial waived this claim. 3. **Admission of Hearsay Evidence:** Gordon claimed that the trial court erred by admitting unreliable hearsay statements made by R.S. without a required reliability hearing. The court recognized the error but deemed it harmless, asserting that the statements were inherently trustworthy based on available evidence. 4. **Sufficiency of Evidence:** Gordon argued that R.S.’s testimony was inconsistent and required corroboration. The court ruled that the victim's testimony was sufficient to sustain the conviction without the need for corroboration as the testimony was clear and coherent regarding the acts committed. 5. **Jury Instructions:** Gordon contended that the jury should have been instructed on how to handle R.S.’s prior inconsistent statements. The court found this omission did not affect the outcome of the trial. 6. **Vouching for Credibility:** Gordon argued that a witness, Palmore, impermissibly vouched for R.S.’s credibility. The court acknowledged this was error but did not rise to the level of plain error as it did not affect the trial's outcome. 7. **Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:** Gordon claimed his counsel failed to request certain jury instructions and did not object to Palmore's testimony. The court found no basis for an ineffective assistance claim as Gordon failed to show a reasonable probability that the trial outcome would have been different with better representation. 8. **Cumulative Errors:** Gordon finally argued that the accumulation of errors deprived him of a fair trial. The court concluded that since the individual errors were found to be harmless, their cumulative effect did not warrant relief. **Decision:** The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment and sentence of the trial court, stating that after reviewing the entire record, no reversible errors were found that affected Gordon's substantial rights. **Outcome:** Judgment and sentence affirmed. **Dissenting Opinions:** Judges Lewis and Kuehn provided partial dissent regarding the handling of preliminary hearing procedures and the application of plain error review, suggesting that certain errors and the lack of timely objections should still be considered under principles of fairness and justice. For the full opinion, you can [download the PDF here](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-624_1735226692.pdf).

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F-2018-12

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-12, the appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree rape by instrumentation and misdemeanor assault and battery. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm his conviction and sentence of life imprisonment for the rape conviction. One judge dissented. The case involved Daniel Bryan Kelley, who was initially sentenced to twenty years for rape following a jury trial. He appealed that decision, and the Court agreed that there had been a mistake involving the use of a past out-of-state conviction for sentence enhancement. They sent the case back for a new sentencing trial. The second trial resulted in a life sentence. Kelley argued that he had ineffective assistance from his appellate lawyer because he was not informed about the risks of a longer sentence should he win the appeal. However, the court found no clear evidence that he would have chosen to do anything differently had he been fully informed beforehand. Kelley also wanted the court to limit his new sentence to twenty years, but the court explained that upon retrial or resentencing, the complete range of punishment is available. Therefore, they refused his request to cap the current sentence. Finally, Kelley claimed that the life sentence was excessive. The court considered the nature of his crime and his history, stating that the sentence was within the legal limit and justified based on the circumstances of the case. As a result, the court concluded that his life sentence did not shock the conscience and upheld the previous decisions regarding his case.

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F-2018-269

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-269, David Anthony Tofflemire appealed his conviction for Possession of Child Pornography. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his conviction. One member of the court dissented. Tofflemire was found guilty at a trial without a jury and received a sentence of sixteen years in prison, with eight of those years suspended. He argued that there was not enough evidence against him, that he did not understand his waiver of the jury trial, and that there was an error in taxing him with an attorney fee even though he had his own lawyer. The court reviewed the case carefully and found that the evidence presented was sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that Tofflemire knowingly possessed child pornography on his cell phone. They stated that the prosecution provided enough proof to support the conviction. Regarding the waiver of his jury trial, Tofflemire claimed he did not fully understand what he was doing. However, the court noted that he had signed a form waiving his right to a jury trial and that his lawyer acknowledged this waiver on the record. Since there was no evidence of coercion or misunderstanding, the court decided Tofflemire's waiver was valid. Finally, concerning the attorney fee, the court recognized that Tofflemire had hired his own lawyer but also that a fee for a court-appointed lawyer was mentioned in the court documents by mistake. Therefore, the court decided to remand the case back to the district court to correct this clerical error. In conclusion, Tofflemire's conviction was upheld, but the court took action to ensure the records reflected the correct information concerning the attorney fee.

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F-2018-964

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In the case of Robert Paul Lockner, Sr. v. The State of Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed Lockner's conviction for assault and battery against police officers. Lockner was sentenced to four years in prison for each of the two counts, to be served consecutively. He raised several arguments on appeal, which the court addressed. 1. **Self-Defense Instruction**: Lockner contended that the trial court erred by not providing a jury instruction on self-defense. However, the court upheld that the trial court acted within its discretion, asserting that Lockner did not demonstrate entitlement to such an instruction as per the law governing use of force by police officers in effecting an arrest. 2. **Other Crimes Evidence**: Lockner argued that the introduction of evidence showing methamphetamine in his system at the time of arrest was improper because the state failed to notify him beforehand. The court found that this evidence was part of the res gestae of the charged offense, meaning it was closely connected to the events of the crime. Therefore, it was not subject to the notice requirement. They ruled that the evidence’s probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect. 3. **Cumulative Error Doctrine**: Lockner claimed that the combined effect of multiple alleged errors warranted a new trial. The court determined that since no individual error was sustained, there was no basis for a cumulative error claim. Ultimately, the court affirmed the judgment and sentence of the district court, concluding that Lockner's rights had not been violated and he had not demonstrated any errors that would warrant reversal of his conviction. In a special concurrence, Judge Kuehn elaborated on the inadmissibility of the drug test results in the state’s case-in-chief, but agreed that their eventual admission did not affect Lockner’s substantial rights due to the potential for impeachment in his own testimony. The decision from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ensures that Lockner's conviction stands, as all claims for relief were denied.

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F-2018-893

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The case presented involves D'Angelo Landon Burgess, who appealed the acceleration of his deferred sentence stemming from a guilty plea to Grand Larceny. The Oklahoma County District Court had originally awarded him a five-year deferred sentence in 2013. However, in 2017, the State sought to accelerate this sentence due to new offenses, including a high-speed chase and the resulting charges. The appeal centers around a claim of a lack of diligent prosecution by the State, which Burgess argued deprived him of his due process rights. However, the court determined that there was no plain error, meaning that the proceedings followed legal protocols adequately and Burgess had not demonstrated harm from the timing of the acceleration hearing. The court affirmed the district court's decision, stating that accelerations of deferred sentences do not require the same level of due process protections as full criminal proceedings. The decision also referenced a related case in which Burgess faced serious charges, including first-degree murder, which is currently under appeal. The court's opinion concluded with affirming the order of the district court to accelerate Burgess's deferred sentence. In conclusion, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the acceleration of Burgess's sentence, ruling there was no violation of due process and that the district court acted within its discretion.

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F-2018-629

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS** **STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **BRIAN KEITH FULLERTON,** Appellant, vs. **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellee. **No. F-2018-629** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS** **STATE OF OKLAHOMA SEP 26 2019** **SUMMARY OPINION** **JOHN D. HADDEN, CLERK** **KUEHN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:** Appellant, Brian Keith Fullerton, was convicted by a jury in Oklahoma County District Court, Case No. CF-2016-4430, of four counts of Lewd Acts with a Child Under Sixteen. The Honorable Bill Graves, District Judge, sentenced him in accordance with the jury's recommendation to life imprisonment on each count, with the sentences to be served as follows: two pairs of life terms to run concurrently, with one pair served consecutively to the other. Appellant must serve 85% of each sentence before being considered for parole. Appellant raises four propositions of error in support of his appeal: **PROPOSITION I:** The evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction for both Count 1 and Count 2 Lewd Acts with a Child Under the Age of Sixteen because the State failed to prove Mr. Fullerton touched L.D. on the vagina more than once. **PROPOSITION II:** The information filed in this case was insufficient as it failed to apprize Mr. Fullerton of what he was charged with and was not specific enough to allow him to plead former jeopardy should the State seek to file other charges, in violation of the due process clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions. **PROPOSITION III:** The prosecutors invoked improper sympathy toward the victim, L.D., and appealed to the jury's emotions, violating Mr. Fullerton's right to a fair trial. **PROPOSITION IV:** Trial errors, when considered in an accumulative fashion, warrant a new trial. After thorough consideration of these propositions, the briefs of the parties, and the record on appeal, we affirm. **Analysis of Propositions:** 1. **Proposition I:** Appellant claims the victim's statements were too vague for the jury to reasonably find he committed the acts described in Counts 1 and 2 more than once. However, the Court found the victim's consistent statements to family, the forensic interviewer, and her anatomical drawing support the conviction on both counts. The evidence was deemed sufficient as per precedent. 2. **Proposition II:** The Court noted that since Appellant did not challenge the specificity of the Information at trial, this complaint was waived except for plain error. The factual allegations of the Information were sufficient for Appellant to prepare a defense and to advance a plea of former jeopardy for similar subsequent charges. No error was found. 3. **Proposition III:** Appellant argued that the prosecutor's closing remarks improperly invoked sympathy for the victim. With no objection raised at the time of the closing argument, the Court reviewed for plain error and found no basis for relief, as the comments were grounded in the evidence presented at trial. 4. **Proposition IV:** The Court determined that since no errors were identified in the prior propositions, there could not be cumulative error. **DECISION:** The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Oklahoma County is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. --- **APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY** **THE HONORABLE BILL GRAVES, DISTRICT JUDGE** **ATTORNEYS AT TRIAL** KENDA MCINTOSH MELTEM KARLA TANKUT ASST. PUBLIC DEFENDER OKLAHOMA COUNTY **ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL** HALLIE ELIZABETH BOVOS ASST. PUBLIC DEFENDER OKLAHOMA COUNTY **COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT** **COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE** MEREDITH EASTER MIKE HUNTER MCKENZIE MCMAHAN ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEYS OKLAHOMA COUNTY --- **OPINION BY KUEHN, V.P.J.** **LEWIS, P.J.: CONCUR** **LUMPKIN, J.: CONCUR IN RESULTS** **HUDSON, J.: CONCUR** **ROWLAND, J.: CONCUR**

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F-2018-616

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **HEATHER SUZANNE BARBEE, Appellant,** **vs.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellee.** **No. F-2018-616** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA SEP 26, 2019** SUMMARY OPINION **JOHN D. HADDEN, CLERK** **KUEHN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:** Appellant, Heather Suzanne Barbee, was convicted by a jury in Muskogee County District Court, Case No. F-2017-190, of Sexual Exploitation of a Child. On June 14, 2018, the Honorable Michael Norman, District Judge, sentenced her to thirty-three years imprisonment, in accordance with the jury's recommendation. She must serve 85% of her sentence before parole consideration. Appellant raises six propositions of error in support of her appeal: **PROPOSITION I:** THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED BY HOLDING A TWO-STAGE TRIAL INSTEAD OF A ONE-STAGE TRIAL. **PROPOSITION II:** THE STATE'S DECISION TO PROCEED WITH A TWO-STAGE TRIAL WITHOUT ANY PROOF OF FORMER FELONIES CAUSED HARM TO Ms. BARBEE. **PROPOSITION III:** PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF A FAIR TRIAL. **PROPOSITION IV:** INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF A FAIR TRIAL. **PROPOSITION V:** THE SENTENCE WAS EXCESSIVE. **PROPOSITION VI:** CUMULATIVE ERROR DEPRIVED Ms. BARBEE OF A FAIR TRIAL. After thorough consideration of these propositions, the briefs of the parties, and the record on appeal, we affirm. Appellant was charged with sexually exploiting her minor sister for financial gain. The State charged two counts, but the jury found her guilty of only one. As to Propositions I and II, the record indicates that (1) Appellant had prior convictions used to enhance the sentence on one of the two charges she faced; (2) the trial was bifurcated as to both charges; but (3) the jury acquitted Appellant of the enhanced count. Thus, the jury sentenced Appellant as a first offender on the remaining charge, and never heard about the prior convictions. The procedure used was entirely proper, and Appellant fails to show any prejudice from it. *Wisdom v. State*, 1996 OK CR 22, 99 17-20, 918 P.2d 384, 390; *Marshall v. State*, 2010 OK CR 8, I 58, 232 P.3d 467, 481. Propositions I and II are denied. In Proposition III, Appellant alleges six instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Because she did not object to these comments below, we review them only for plain error - an actual error, that is plain or obvious, and that affects a defendant's substantial rights and the outcome of the trial. *Bosse v. State*, 2017 OK CR 10, 9 82, 400 P.3d 834, 863. We find no error. First, the prosecutor did not impermissibly comment on Appellant's failure to testify simply by arguing that the jury had received absolutely nothing to contradict the testimony of the State's primary witnesses. Such general comments about the totality of the evidence (and lack of controverting evidence) differ from directly suggesting that the defendant must be guilty because she did not take the stand. *Id.*, 2017 OK CR 10, I 85, 400 P.3d at 863. The prosecutor never shirked her burden to prove all elements of the crime. Second, the prosecutor did not vouch for the credibility of complaining witnesses by pointing to their demeanor and the consistency in their accounts; these comments were properly based on evidence presented to the jury. *Taylor v. State*, 2011 OK CR 8, I 57, 248 P.3d 362, 379; *Bland v. State*, 2000 OK CR 11, I 97, 4 P.3d 702, 728. Third, the prosecutor's assessment of the defense strategy as smoke and mirrors and intellectually disingenuous, and her statement, Ladies and gentlemen, she is guilty, were also fair inferences from the evidence presented. *Harris v. State*, 2000 OK CR 20, I 35, 13 P.3d 489, 498. Fourth, assertions of the defendant's guilt are not improper if they are made with reference to the evidence presented. *Williams v. State*, 2008 OK CR 19, I 107, 188 P.3d 208, 228. Fifth, asking the jury to consider the long-term effects of the defendant's conduct on the victim when assessing the sentence was not plainly erroneous. *Carol v. State*, 1988 OK CR 114, I 10, 756 P.2d 614, 617. We note that the jury recommended a sentence less than the 40-year sentence requested by the prosecutor. Finally, the prosecutor's reference in the punishment stage to acquitted conduct (Count 2, the charge on which the jury found Appellant not guilty in the first stage of the trial) was not improper. The jury was still free to consider that conduct, because it was not an element the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt with regard to sentencing on Count 1. *See Dowling v. United States*, 493 U.S. 342, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990). We find no error in the prosecutor's comments such as would warrant any relief. Proposition III is denied. In Proposition IV, Appellant faults trial counsel for not making objections to the issues raised in Propositions I, II, and III. To show trial counsel was ineffective, she must show both deficient performance and prejudice. *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); *White v. State*, 2019 OK CR 2, I 23, 437 P.3d 1061, 1070. Because we found no merit to these substantive complaints, trial counsel was not ineffective. *Jackson v. State*, 2016 OK CR 5, I 13, 371 P.3d 1120, 1123. Proposition IV is denied. As to Proposition V, given Appellant's conduct in this case, the sentence recommended by the jury (less than what the prosecutor requested) was not shocking to the conscience, and the trial court's order that the sentence be served consecutively to Appellant's sentence in an unrelated case was not an abuse of discretion. *White*, 2019 OK CR 2, I 29, 437 P.3d at 1072. As to Proposition VI, because no error has been identified above, there can be no relief for cumulative error. *Engles v. State*, 2015 OK CR 17, I 13, 366 P.3d 311, 315. Proposition VI is denied. **DECISION** The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Muskogee County is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF MUSKOGEE COUNTY THE HONORABLE MICHAEL NORMAN, DISTRICT JUDGE **ATTORNEYS AT TRIAL** DAN MEDLOCK MEDLOCK LAW 620 WEST BROADWAY MUSKOGEE, OK 74401 **COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT** **ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL** LISBETH L. MCCARTY INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM P.O. BOX 926 NORMAN, OK 73070 **COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT** NALANI CHING ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE KEELEY L. MILLER ASST. ATTORNEY GENERAL 220 STATE STREET MUSKOGEE, OK 74401 **COUNSEL FOR THE STATE** **OPINION BY KUEHN, V.P.J.** **LEWIS, P.J.: CONCUR** **LUMPKIN, J.: CONCUR** **HUDSON, J.: CONCUR** **ROWLAND, J.: CONCUR** [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-616_1735230080.pdf)

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F-2018-542

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-542, Charles Henry Tarver, Jr. appealed his conviction for Possession of Controlled Dangerous Substance with Intent to Distribute and Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. In an unpublished decision, the court decided that relief was required, and the case was remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss. One judge dissented. Charles Henry Tarver, Jr. was tried by a jury and convicted of having illegal drugs with the intent to sell them and for having drug paraphernalia. He was given a long prison sentence and a fine. Tarver appealed this decision because he believed that the evidence used against him was obtained illegally when a police officer stopped him for a minor traffic violation. The events leading to Tarver's arrest happened on May 23, 2016. A deputy police officer stopped Tarver because the light on his truck’s license plate wasn’t working. During this stop, the officer noticed that Tarver was very anxious and had trouble staying still. Instead of quickly giving him a ticket and letting him go, the officer waited for backup and a dog trained to detect drugs. While waiting, the officer searched Tarver's truck, finding illegal drugs. Tarver argued that this search was not allowed under the law because it happened without enough reason to keep him there longer than necessary for the traffic stop. Initially, the judge at Tarver’s trial ruled that the stop was legal, but he did not consider whether the stop went on too long without proper reasons. This was an important mistake because the law says that once the reason for a stop is handled, the police cannot keep someone for longer without having a good reason to think that person is doing something illegal. The appeals court reviewed the case and found that the trial judge had incorrectly placed the burden of proving that the police action was legal on Tarver instead of where it should have been on the state. The appeals court agreed that the stop was carried out longer than necessary, and the police officer did not have enough solid reasons to justify keeping Tarver there longer than the original traffic issue. The court decided to reverse Tarver's convictions and told the district court to dismiss the charges against him because the search that found the drugs was not properly justified. One judge disagreed with this outcome, arguing that the police acted reasonably based on their experiences and knowledge about Tarver. This dissenting opinion held that the evidence might still be good enough to uphold the conviction. In the end, the decision meant that Tarver would not have to serve time for these charges, as the evidence against him was deemed to have been collected improperly.

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F-2018-477

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-477, Gerald L. Taylor appealed his conviction for Robbery with a Firearm and Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his conviction. One judge dissented. Gerald L. Taylor was found guilty of serious crimes, including robbery using a firearm and having a firearm when he was not allowed to have one due to past convictions. The trial took place in Oklahoma County, where the judge sentenced Taylor to a total of thirty-five years in prison. Taylor raised several issues on appeal. First, he argued that his incriminating statements should not have been allowed in court because he wanted to remain silent. The court looked at whether he had clearly stated this right. It found that even though he initially said he didn’t want to talk, he later chose to answer questions. Therefore, the court believed he willingly spoke to police after being informed of his rights and upheld the decision to admit his statements. Second, Taylor claimed that the trial judge made a mistake by not allowing the removal of a juror who he thought could not understand English well enough to participate in the trial. However, the judge questioned the juror and decided she was competent. Since Taylor had not properly objected to the juror's presence and even invited the situation, this issue was not considered a strong point for his appeal. Third, Taylor stated that his lawyer did not help him effectively, especially concerning the juror issue. However, the court found that despite any possible mistakes, the evidence against Taylor was very strong. His lawyer’s actions did not cause him to lose a fair trial. Lastly, Taylor claimed that even if no single error was enough to change his conviction, the overall combination of issues should lead to a new trial. The court ruled that there were no errors significant enough to warrant a new trial or change in his sentence. In conclusion, the court upheld the original judgment and Taylor's sentences, indicating that he received a fair trial despite his complaints.

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F-2018-341

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-341, Anthony Kejuan Day appealed his conviction for several charges. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the judgment and sentence against him. One judge dissented. Mr. Day was convicted of assault and battery on a police officer, conspiracy to cause violence, possession of a firearm after a felony conviction, obstructing an officer, and resisting an officer. The trial court sentenced him to a total of twenty-five years for the first charge, with additional long sentences for the others. Mr. Day argued that the trial court made several mistakes. He claimed that the prosecution unfairly excluded African-American jurors, that changes to the charges against him were wrong, that he was punished too harshly for similar actions, and that his sentences should not have run one after the other but rather together. The court examined each argument. For the claim about jurors, it decided that the trial court acted properly and that there was no discrimination. Regarding the changes to the charges, the court found no clear mistakes that would have harmed Mr. Day's case. The court also rejected his argument about facing double punishment for similar offenses. Finally, it determined that the trial court was correct in allowing the sentences to be served consecutively. In conclusion, the court upheld the decision of the trial court and affirmed Mr. Day's convictions and sentences.

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F-2018-147

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-147, Marcus Dewayne Boyd appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder, Shooting with Intent to Kill, and Possession of a Firearm After Former Conviction of a Felony. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the judgment and sentences from the trial court. One judge dissented. Marcus Dewayne Boyd was found guilty by a jury of serious crimes, including murder and several counts of shooting at people. The jury decided that he should spend life in prison for the murder, twenty years for each shooting count, and two years for the weapon possession. The judge ordered that these sentences should be served one after the other, meaning Boyd would spend a long time in prison before having a chance for parole. During the appeal, Boyd argued several points, saying that his trial was unfair. He mentioned that it was wrong for the court to allow evidence about his gang affiliation. The court saw that this evidence helped explain why the crimes happened, so they disagreed with Boyd's claim. He also said it was unfair that the prosecutor questioned a witness about her relatives who had been prosecuted. The court agreed that this questioning was okay to show potential bias and did not cause an error. Boyd claimed that the way police showed the lineup of suspects was unfair and could influence witnesses. However, the court found the lineup was appropriate and did not break any rules about how police should conduct lineups. Boyd further argued that the prosecution did not share some evidence that could have helped him in his defense, but the court decided that he did not prove this claim. Boyd also objected to how one of the witnesses, who had a prior conviction, was treated in court. The court stated that having a history of misdemeanors is generally allowed as it can show a witness's credibility. Furthermore, Boyd said he was made to wear a ankle restraint during the trial without a good reason. The court recognized that this was not justified but ultimately decided it did not affect the outcome of the trial significantly. On the point of his lawyer's performance, Boyd claimed his lawyer did not defend him properly and raised many issues that could have been objected to but were not. However, the court noted that there were no errors in the trial that would change the outcome, so the attorney’s actions were acceptable. Finally, Boyd argued that the combination of all these issues made the trial unfair. The court agreed that there was only one area where there was an error, but this alone was not enough to convince them that it affected the jury's decision. In summary, the court found no reason to change the conviction or sentence, agreeing that the trial was mostly fair and that Boyd received appropriate legal representation, despite a few concerns about courtroom procedures.

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F-2018-36

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-36, Robert Eugene Brewer appealed his conviction for Sexual Abuse of a Child Under 12. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm Brewer's conviction. One judge dissented. Brewer was tried in Tulsa County for sexually abusing a child under the age of 12. He was convicted by a jury and sentenced to seven years in prison. He was also ordered to serve three years of supervision after his prison term. Brewer appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court made a mistake by allowing evidence related to other crimes that he believed had not been proven. The court reviewed the evidence and arguments presented. The main issue was whether the trial court had the right to let in evidence that showed Brewer had a pattern of behavior related to sexual abuse. This type of evidence is sometimes called propensity evidence. Brewer argued that the trial court should have held a special hearing before allowing this evidence and should have required witnesses to testify in person. However, the court found that the trial judge had done a thorough job. The judge had held multiple hearings and considered the evidence carefully. The judge did not make a mistake by allowing the evidence because they had enough information to decide it was relevant and necessary for the case. Even though Brewer did not object to the evidence when it was presented during the trial, the court considered whether there was a serious mistake that affected the fairness of the trial. After reviewing everything, the court concluded that the trial judge acted correctly. In summary, the court believed that the evidence presented was acceptable and did not harm Brewer's case. Therefore, Brewer’s conviction was upheld, but the court also instructed the district court to make some corrections to its legal documents regarding the correct law that applied to Brewer's actions at the time of the crime. The decision was to keep Brewer's sentence in place while correcting the legal documentation properly.

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F-2018-940

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In the case of LeJeanna Sue Chronister v. State of Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals addressed several appeals raised by the appellant following her conviction for Aggravated Manufacture of a Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine) and her subsequent sentencing to twenty years in prison. The appellant raised three primary propositions of error: 1. **Violation of Rights Regarding the 85% Rule**: The appellant contended that her sentence was unconstitutional because she was not informed that the 85% Rule (requiring her to serve 85% of her sentence before becoming eligible for parole) applied to her case. The court concluded that this argument did not hold merit in a non-jury trial setting, stating that the judge, not a jury, was responsible for sentencing and presumed to know the law. The court found no plain error as the sentence was within the statutory range and was the minimum allowed. 2. **Ineffective Assistance of Counsel**: The appellant claimed her counsel was ineffective for not informing her about the 85% Rule, impacting her decision-making during her trial. The court applied the Strickland standard to evaluate the ineffectiveness claim, concluding that the appellant did not demonstrate how the alleged deficiency in counsel's performance prejudiced her case or altered the outcome. 3. **Cumulative Error**: The appellant argued that the combination of errors denied her a fair trial. The court determined that since none of the individual claims of error warranted relief, the cumulative error argument also lacked merit. Ultimately, the court affirmed the judgment and sentence imposed by the District Court of LeFlore County, stating that the appellant had not demonstrated any error that would necessitate modifying the sentence or overturning the conviction. The ruling emphasizes the distinction between non-jury trials and jury trials concerning informing defendants about parole-related laws and the importance of counsel's performance under the criteria established by the Strickland case.

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F-2018-867

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **BILLIE WAYNE BYRD,** Appellant, vs. **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellee. **No. F-2018-867** **Not for Publication** **FILED** **IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS** **STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **SEP 19 2019** **JOHN D. HADDEN, CLERK** --- **SUMMARY OPINION** **KUEHN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:** Billie Wayne Byrd was tried by jury and convicted of Child Sexual Abuse - Under 12 in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2014, § 843.5(F), in the District Court of Muskogee County, Case No. CF-2017-621. Following the jury's recommendation, the Honorable Norman D. Thygesen sentenced Appellant to twenty-five (25) years imprisonment, with a three-year term of post-imprisonment supervision. Appellant appeals this conviction and sentence. **Propositions of Error:** 1. Plain error occurred when the jury sought to see the judge but was directed to submit any question in writing. 2. Prosecutorial misconduct deprived Appellant of a fair trial. **Analysis:** After thorough consideration of the entire record, including the original record, transcripts, exhibits, and briefs, we find that the law and evidence do not require relief. **Proposition I: Jury Communication** We find that the trial court's failure to follow the mandatory procedure set forth in 22 O.S.2011, § 894 did not prejudice Appellant. He did not object to the use of written communication, so we review for plain error. Plain error must be an actual error that is evident and affects the defendant's substantial rights (Thompson v. State, 2018 OK CR 5). Jurors seeking information during deliberations must require the officer to conduct them into court, and answers must be given in the presence of, or after notice to, counsel and the defendant. The written response to a juror question is a plain violation of the statute (Nicholson v. State, 2018 OK CR 10). While we presume prejudice due to this error, it can be rebutted by demonstrating there was no actual prejudice. Here, the jury's questions were addressed accurately and appropriately. The judge's written response to the jurors' first inquiry did not prejudice Appellant. The second question resulted in a prompt indication for further written inquiries, which indicates communication continued rather than being foreclosed. Ultimately, no actual prejudice against the Appellant is evident on the face of the record. The minimum sentence imposed and lack of indications of serious jury concerns further support no shown prejudice. Thus, we find no error requiring reversal. **Proposition II: Prosecutorial Misconduct** The arguments presented in closing did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct. Attorneys have latitude in arguing evidence and its inferences unless such arguments negatively affect trial fairness (Barnes v. State, 2017 OK CR 26). Appellant did not object to the statements raised on appeal, so we review for plain error (Mathis v. State, 2012 OK CR 1). One contested statement asserted the victim's trustworthiness, which was in response to defense claims of inconsistency. While prosecutors should refrain from personal endorsements of credibility, the context mitigated the impact of this statement. In analyzing the comments regarding the victim's emotional struggles, the remarks were reasonable inferences drawn from evidence presented in trial. The overall context did not compromise the trial's fairness. **Decision:** The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Muskogee County is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ordered issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. **AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF MUSKOGEE COUNTY** **THE HONORABLE NORMAN D. THYGESEN** --- **Attorneys on Appeal:** **Counsel for Defendant:** Dan Medlock **Counsel for Appellant:** Jeremy Stillwell **Counsel for the State:** Morgan Muzljakovich, Mike Hunter (Assistant District Attorney), Julie Pittman (Assistant Attorney General) --- **OPINION BY KUEHN, V.P.J.** **LEWIS, P.J.:** CONCUR **LUMPKIN, J.:** CONCUR **HUDSON, J.:** CONCUR **ROWLAND, J.:** CONCUR

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F-2018-749

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **RALPH WILLIAM SISCO, JR.,** ) Appellant, ) vs. ) **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** ) Appellee. ) **Case No. F-2018-749** ) **FILED** ) **IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS** STATE OF OKLAHOMA ) **SEP 19 2019** ) **SUMMARY OPINION** JOHN D. HADDEN CLERK ROWLAND, JUDGE: Appellant Ralph William Sisco, Jr. appeals his Judgment and Sentence from the District Court of Nowata County, Case No. CF-2017-123, for Lewd Molestation (Counts 1 and 2), in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 1123. The Honorable Curtis L. DeLapp, District Judge, presided over Sisco's jury trial and sentenced him, in accordance with the jury's verdict, to twenty-five years imprisonment on each count, ordered to be served consecutively. The trial court also imposed three years of post-imprisonment supervision. Sisco raises several issues on appeal: 1. **Sufficiency of Evidence**: He questions whether the evidence presented was sufficient to convict him beyond a reasonable doubt for Lewd Molestation in Count 2. The court holds that the State proved each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 2. **Preliminary Hearing**: Sisco challenges his binding over at the preliminary hearing due to the introduction of hearsay evidence. The court finds he waived his right to challenge this by failing to object during the hearing. 3. **Admission of Other Crimes Evidence**: He contends that the trial court erred by allowing evidence of other crimes and bad acts. The court concludes that the evidence was part of the res gestae of the charged offenses and was properly admissible. 4. **Jury Instructions**: Sisco claims the court erred in not instructing the jury on lesser offenses, including child abuse. The court finds no error; the lack of evidence to support such an instruction means it was not warranted. 5. **Effective Assistance of Counsel**: He argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel for various reasons, including failure to object to hearsay and other crimes evidence. The court holds that there were no deficiencies in counsel’s performance affecting the trial's outcome. 6. **Consecutive Sentences**: He contends the trial court abused its discretion in ordering his sentences to be served consecutively. The court finds no abuse of discretion in this decision. 7. **Cumulative Errors**: Sisco asserts cumulative errors warrant a new trial. The court finds no individual errors that, taken together, deprived him of a fair trial. **DECISION**: The Judgment and Sentence of the district court is **AFFIRMED**. **OPINION BY**: ROWLAND, J. **LEWIS, P.J.**: Concur **KUEHN, V.P.J.**: Specially Concur **LUMPKIN, J.**: Concur in Results **HUDSON, J.**: Concur **KUEHN, V.P.J., SPECIALLY CONCUR**: I agree that the convictions should be affirmed but note that as to Count II, the evidence does not support an instruction on a lesser offense due to the nature of the charge and the evidence presented. --- **[Full Text Document PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-749_1735218036.pdf)**

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F-2018-664

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **KEYUNA CRYSTAL MOSLEY,** Appellant, vs. **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellee. **No. F-2018-664** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA SEP 19 2019** **SUMMARY OPINION** JOHN D. HADDEN CLERK **KUEHN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:** Keyuna Crystal Mosley was tried by jury and convicted of Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 801, after being previously convicted of two or more felonies, in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Case No. CF-2017-1853. Following the jury's recommendation, the Honorable Ray C. Elliott sentenced Appellant to twenty (20) years imprisonment, requiring her to serve 85% of her sentence before becoming eligible for parole consideration per 21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 13.1. Appellant appeals this conviction and sentence. **Proposition of Error:** Appellant raises one proposition of error: that the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove her guilt of conjointly committing robbery with a dangerous weapon beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus due process mandates her case be reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss. **Decision:** After thorough consideration of the complete record, including original records, transcripts, exhibits, and briefs, we find the law and evidence do not necessitate relief. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed robbery with a dangerous weapon (Easlick v. State, 2004 OK CR 21, ¶ 15, 90 P.3d 556, 559). To establish robbery with a dangerous weapon, the State must demonstrate that the wrongful taking and carrying away of personal property from another's person or immediate presence occurred by force or fear, specifically involving a knife (21 O.S.2011, § 801; OUJI-CR 2d 4-144). The term “principal” in a crime includes anyone who either directly and actively commits the acts constituting the offense or knowingly and with intent aids and abets in its commission (Hackney v. State, 1994 OK CR 29, ¶ 9, 874 P.2d 810, 814; OUJI-CR 2d 2-5, 2-6). Appellant contends the State failed to prove that she acted conjointly with her boyfriend in committing the robbery. She argues that the victim Seale's testimony was incredible and contradicted by her own statement, and that the State should have corroborated Seale's testimony with additional evidence such as forensic evidence, text records, or records of their online communications. This assertion is incorrect. While the State could have provided such corroborative evidence, it was not required to do so. Seale was both an eyewitness and the victim, and the jury determines the credibility of witnesses and the weight of their testimony (Mason v. State, 2018 OK CR 37, ¶ 13, 433 P.3d 1264, 1269). The jury is entitled to make reasonable inferences supporting their verdict. Even in cases of sharply conflicting evidence, we will not disturb a properly supported verdict (Robinson v. State, 2011 OK CR 15, ¶ 17, 255 P.3d 425, 432). The evidence established that Appellant lured victim Seale to the crime scene, called her accomplice, and directly took and carried away Seale’s property while her accomplice threatened the victim with a knife. We will not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the jury (White v. State, 2019 OK CR 2, ¶ 9, 437 P.3d 1061, 1065). Thus, this proposition is denied. **Conclusion:** The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Oklahoma County is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. **AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY** THE HONORABLE RAY C. ELLIOTT, DISTRICT JUDGE **ATTORNEYS AT TRIAL** TIMOTHY M. WILSON ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY 320 ROBERT S. KERR, STE. 611 OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102 **ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL** ANDREA DIGILIO MILLER PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE 611 COUNTY OFFICE BLDG. 320 ROBERT S. KERR AVE. OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102 **COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT** DAN POND KATHERINE BRANDON ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLA. ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEYS TESSA L. HENRY 320 ROBERT S. KERR, STE. 505 OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102 **COUNSEL FOR THE STATE** **OPINION BY KUEHN, V.P.J.** LEWIS, P.J.: CONCUR LUMPKIN, J.: CONCUR HUDSON, J.: CONCUR ROWLAND, J.: CONCUR **[Download PDF Version Here](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-664_1735223763.pdf)**

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F-2018-622

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The opinion you provided appears to be a detailed court ruling from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals regarding the case of Jasmine Michelle Irvin, who was convicted of First Degree Murder. Below is a summary of the key points from the opinion: ### Case Summary - **Appellant**: Jasmine Michelle Irvin - **Appellee**: State of Oklahoma - **Case Number**: F-2018-622 - **Court**: Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals - **Judge**: Cynthia Ferrell Ashwood - **Verdict**: Convicted of First Degree Murder - **Sentence**: Life in prison without the possibility of parole ### Facts of the Case - The victim, Robert Godwin, was found shot to death in a secluded area. - Evidence indicated that Appellant had expressed a desire to have the victim killed and had made attempts to recruit others to help. - Appellant contacted the victim, leading him to the location where he was killed. - The victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds to the back, and information from cell phone data supported the timeline of events leading to the murder. ### Legal Propositions 1. **Waiver of Jury Trial**: Appellant challenged whether she knowingly and intelligently waived her right to a jury trial. The court found that the waiver was clear and the trial court had adequately assessed her understanding of the waiver. 2. **Victim Impact Testimony**: Appellant contended that her due process rights were violated due to the admission of victim impact testimony from a non-family member. The court acknowledged the error but did not find it sufficient to warrant relief since the trial judge was presumed to consider only competent evidence in sentencing. 3. **Ineffective Assistance of Counsel**: Appellant alleged her counsel was ineffective for not ensuring her waiver of the jury trial was valid and for failing to object to the victim impact testimony. The court found no deficiency in counsel's performance. 4. **Accumulation of Errors**: The court addressed Appellant's claim that the cumulative errors denied her a fair trial. It was determined that since no reversible errors were found, the cumulative error claim lacked merit. ### Conclusion - The court affirmed the judgment and sentence of the district court, concluding there were no reversible errors present. - An additional concurrence discussed the standard of review for the waiver of jury trial but ultimately supported the affirmation of the conviction. For more details or to read the full opinion, you may refer to the link provided in your original text.

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