Auntra Lawan Edmonds v State Of Oklahoma

C-2017-1044

Filed: Nov. 8, 2018

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: State Of Oklahoma

Summary

Auntra Lawan Edmonds appealed his conviction for First Degree Manslaughter. Conviction and sentence were for life imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently. Judge Rowland dissented.

Decision

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari is DENIED. The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2018), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

• was there error in denying Petitioner's motion to withdraw his plea based on the record not showing it was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily?
• was Petitioner denied effective assistance of counsel during his plea withdrawal hearing?
• were Petitioner’s life sentences excessive under the circumstances of the case?

Findings

• the court did not err in denying petitioner's motion to withdraw his plea
• the evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that petitioner received effective assistance of counsel
• the life sentences imposed were not excessive and did not shock the court's conscience

C-2017-1044

Nov. 8, 2018

Auntra Lawan Edmonds

Appellant

v

State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

DENYING CERTIORARI**

HUDSON, JUDGE: Petitioner, Auntra Lawan Edmonds, was charged in Greer County District Court Case No. CF-2016-37 with two counts of First Degree Manslaughter, in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 711, After Former Conviction of a Felony. On May 4, 2017, Edmonds entered a blind plea of no contest to these charges before the Honorable W. Mike Warren, Associate District Judge. Judge Warren accepted Edmonds’ plea, postponed sentencing, and ordered a pre-sentence investigation and report. On September 7, 2017, the trial court sentenced Edmonds to life imprisonment on each count and ordered the sentences run concurrently. Edmonds was additionally ordered to pay various fines, fees, and costs. Later that same day, Edmonds, through plea counsel, filed an application to withdraw his plea. Conflict counsel was subsequently appointed and on October 5, 2017, a hearing on Edmonds’ motion was held. After hearing testimony from Edmonds, Judge Warren denied Petitioner’s motion to withdraw his plea.

Edmonds now seeks a writ of certiorari alleging the following propositions of error:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEAS ON A RECORD WHICH FAILS TO SHOW THEY WERE ENTERED KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY, IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE II, § 7 OF THE OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION;

II. PETITIONER WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL TO WHICH HE WAS ENTITLED DURING HIS PLEA WITHDRAWAL HEARING, IN VIOLATION OF HIS SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE II, § 7 OF THE OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION; and

III. UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, PETITIONER’S LIFE SENTENCES ARE EXCESSIVE AND SHOULD BE MODIFIED.

After thorough consideration of the entire record before us on appeal, including the original record, transcripts, and Petitioner’s brief, we find that no relief is required under the law and evidence. Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari is DENIED.

Proposition I: Certiorari review is limited to whether the plea was entered voluntarily and intelligently before a court of competent jurisdiction. This Court reviews the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is any unreasonable or arbitrary action taken without proper consideration of the facts and law pertaining to the issue; a clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment, clearly against the logic and effect of the facts. The burden is on the petitioner to show a defect in the plea process that entitles him to withdraw the plea. We examine the entire record before us on appeal to determine the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea. The standard for determining the validity of a plea is whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among alternative courses of action open to the defendant. When a defendant claims that their plea was entered through inadvertence, ignorance, influence, or without deliberation, he has the burden of showing that the plea was entered as a result of one of these reasons and that there is a defense that should be presented to the jury.

In the present case, Petitioner’s written motion to withdraw his plea utilized boilerplate language. While Petitioner generically asserted in his written motion to withdraw that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered, at the hearing on his motion he solely challenged the length of his sentences. He neither asserted a lack of understanding regarding his trial rights nor a lack of notice and understanding of any element of the offenses. Because these claims were not specifically raised before the trial court, the trial judge had no opportunity to adjudicate these claims. Thus, this issue is not properly before this Court. Alternatively, we find the record contradicts Petitioner’s claim that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The totality of the circumstances reflected in the record sufficiently demonstrates that Petitioner was sufficiently apprised of his trial rights as well as the material elements of First Degree Manslaughter. This is not a case where Petitioner entered his plea through inadvertence, ignorance, or without deliberation. The mere fact Petitioner is unhappy with the sentences he received does not render his plea invalid. Thus, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s request to withdraw his plea. Proposition I is denied.

Proposition II: A criminal defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel at a hearing on a motion to withdraw. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Petitioner must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Petitioner fails to meet this burden as his argument on appeal is merely speculative and conclusory. Proposition II is denied.

Proposition III: This Court will not modify a sentence within the statutory range unless, considering all the facts and circumstances, it shocks our conscience. In judging whether a defendant’s sentence is excessive, we do not conduct a proportionality review on appeal. In the present case, Petitioner’s sentences fall within the specified statutory range. While Petitioner’s life sentences are substantial, his sentences are factually substantiated and justified under the facts of this case and do not shock the Court’s conscience. The record shows Petitioner had been instructed hours before the fatal event to go home and not to drive anymore. Yet, approximately 4 hours later, Petitioner with a .215 BAC drove recklessly down the victims’ street, crashing into a trailer, three parked vehicles, and a fire hydrant before violently striking Wanda Perry and A.P. as they stood in Perry’s front yard. Petitioner’s destructive path finally ended when his vehicle careened into a tree. Yet, despite the death and destruction he caused, Petitioner attempted to conceal the fact that he was the driver. Moreover, Petitioner was on probation for a crime involving violence committed in 2008 in Virginia at the time he made the fatal decision in this case to drink and drive. Petitioner’s life sentences are factually substantiated and justified under the facts of this case and do not shock the Court’s conscience. Petitioner’s final proposition of error is thus denied.

DECISION The Petition for Writ of Certiorari is DENIED. The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2018), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision.

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Footnotes:

1. Under 21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 13.1, Petitioner must serve 85% of the sentences imposed on both counts before he is eligible for parole.
2. Petitioner's testimony was the sum total of the evidence presented at the withdrawal hearing. Moreover, no argument was presented by counsel for either of the parties.
3. Weeks U. State, 2015 OK CR 16, II 27-29, 362 .3d 650, 657. See also Davis v. State, 1990 OK CR 20, II 6, 792 P.2d 76, 81.
4. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183, 125 S. Ct. 2398, 2405, 162 L. Ed. 2d 143 (2005).
5. May v. State, 1990 OK CR 14, I 7, 788 P.2d 408, 412.
6. Strickland U. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
7. Harrington U. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104-05, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787-88, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011).
8. Baird v. State, 2017 OK CR 16, IT 40, 400 P.3d 875, 886; Rea v. State, 2001 OK CR 28, IT 5, 34 P.3d 148, 149.
9. Rea, 2001 OK CR 28, I 5, 34 P.3d at 149.

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 711 - First Degree Manslaughter
• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 13.1 - Parole Eligibility for Sentences
• Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 3.15 - Mandate Issuance
• Okla. Stat. tit. 2 § 7 - Due Process under the Oklahoma Constitution
• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.8 - Sentencing and Imposition of Sentence

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

No case citations found.