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C-2003-1247

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Robert Hershal Perkis v The State Of Oklahoma

C-2003-1247

Filed: Dec. 6, 2004

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: Robert Hershal Perkis

Summary

Robert Hershal Perkis appealed his conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon, kidnapping, and burglary in the first degree. His convictions were affirmed for robbery and modified for burglary; however, the kidnapping charge was reversed and dismissed. Judge Lile dissented regarding the kidnapping ruling.

Decision

Perkis' petition for certiorari review is GRANTED. His conviction and sentence on COUNT I, Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon, are hereby AFFIRMED. Perkis' conviction on COUNT II, Kidnapping, is hereby REVERSED, and this count is hereby REMANDED to the district court, where it shall be DISMISSED. Perkis' conviction on COUNT III, Burglary in the First Degree, is hereby MODIFIED to a conviction for BURGLARY IN THE SECOND DEGREE, and his SENTENCE on this count is likewise MODIFIED to imprisonment for seven (7) years and a fine of $1,000. The remaining provisions of Perkis' sentence are AFFIRMED.

Issues

  • Was there a sufficient factual basis to support Mr. Perkis' no contest pleas?
  • Did the evidence support the charges against Mr. Perkis for excessive sentencing?
  • Did Mr. Perkis face double punishment due to both a victim compensation assessment and restitution?
  • Did the trial court adequately inform Mr. Perkis about the consequences of his pleas?
  • Should Mr. Perkis be allowed to withdraw his plea to Count III due to sentencing confusion?
  • Did Mr. Perkis receive effective assistance of counsel when entering his pleas?
  • Should a nunc pro tunc judgment and sentence be ordered to reflect the trial court's modification of Count III's sentence?

Findings

  • the court did not err in accepting Perkis' plea to robbery with a dangerous weapon
  • the trial court abused its discretion in accepting Perkis' nolo contendere plea to kidnapping, and this conviction must be reversed and remanded for dismissal
  • the trial court abused its discretion in accepting Perkis' plea to first-degree burglary, and this conviction is modified to second-degree burglary
  • Perkis' sentence for robbery with a dangerous weapon is affirmed
  • Perkis' sentence for second-degree burglary is modified to seven years imprisonment and a fine of $1,000
  • Perkis' claims regarding excessive sentences and double punishment are rejected
  • no plain error found in trial court's advisement regarding plea implications
  • Perkis' request to withdraw his nolo contendere pleas is denied

C-2003-1247

Dec. 6, 2004

Robert Hershal Perkis

Appellant

v

The State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

CHAPEL, JUDGE:

Robert Hershal Perkis was charged in the District Court of Caddo County, Case No. CF-2002-292A, by Amended Supplemental Felony Information, with Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon, under 21 O.S.2001, § 801 (Count I); Kidnapping, under 21 O.S.2001, § 741 (Count II); and Burglary in the First Degree, under 21 O.S.2001, § 1431 (Count III).¹ On August 15, 2003, Perkis entered a blind plea of nolo contendere to all three counts, before the Honorable David E. Powell. On October 9, 2003, the Honorable David E. Powell sentenced Perkis to imprisonment for twenty-five (25) years and a fine of $1,000 on Count I; imprisonment for ten (10) years and a fine of $1,000 on Count II; and imprisonment for twenty-five (25) years and a fine of $1,000 on Count III, with the imprisonment terms to be served consecutively. In addition, Perkis was ordered to pay actual court costs, a Victim Compensation Assessment of $1,000, and restitution in the amount of $3,436.47.² Perkis’ prison sentence on Count III was subsequently modified, at the request of the State, to imprisonment for twenty (20) years. Perkis is now properly before this Court on a petition for certiorari, seeking to withdraw his nolo contendere pleas or have his sentences modified.

Perkis raises the following propositions of error:

I. BECAUSE MR. PERKIS’ NOLO CONTENDERE PLEAS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY A SUFFICIENT FACTUAL BASIS, THE PLEAS CANNOT STAND; THEREFORE PETITIONER SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO WITHDRAW THE PLEAS AND PROCEED TO TRIAL.

II. BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE CHARGES, MR. PERKIS’ SENTENCES ARE EXCESSIVE.

III. MR. PERKIS’ SENTENCES ARE EXCESSIVE IN THAT HE HAS BEEN SUBJECTED TO DOUBLE PUNISHMENT BY IMPOSITION OF A VICTIM COMPENSATION ASSESSMENT ON EACH COUNT, IN ADDITION TO PAYMENT OF RESTITUTION FOR THE ACTUAL EXPENSES OF THE VICTIM ARISING FROM THE CONDUCT OF WHICH PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED.

IV. BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO FULLY ADVISE PETITIONER OF THE CERTAIN, POSSIBLE, AND/OR LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEAS, MR. PERKIS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO WITHDRAW HIS NOLO CONTENDERE PLEA TO EACH OF THE THREE COUNTS AND PROCEED TO TRIAL OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE SENTENCES SHOULD BE REDUCED AND/OR ORDERED TO RUN CONCURRENTLY.

V. MR PERKIS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO WITHDRAW THE NOLO CONTENDERE PLEA TO COUNT III – BURGLARY IN THE FIRST DEGREE, BECAUSE THERE WAS CONFUSION AS TO THE SENTENCING RANGE, THE ORIGINAL SENTENCE WAS VACATED, AND A DIFFERENT SENTENCE WAS IMPOSED WITHOUT GIVING PETITIONER AN OPPORTUNITY TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA.

VI. MR. PERKIS DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN ENTERING AND OR ATTEMPTING TO WITHDRAW HIS NOLO CONTENDERE PLEAS.

VII. IF MR. PERKIS IS NOT ALLOWED TO WITHDRAW THE NOLO CONTENDERE PLEA ON COUNT III – BURGLARY IN THE FIRST DEGREE, A JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE NUNC PRO TUNC SHOULD BE ORDERED TO REFLECT ACCURATELY THE SENTENCE IMPOSED BY THE DISTRICT COURT.

This Court notes that Perkis’ Application to Withdraw Plea, filed on October 15, 2003, asserted only a single reason that Perkis should be allowed to withdraw his pleas: 1. Sentence imposed was excessive. The application contained no further reasons or argument.³ The specific claims made in Propositions I through VI were not made in Perkis’ application to withdraw his pleas, in the evidentiary hearing regarding this application, or in his petition for certiorari. Hence these issues have been waived.⁴ And this Court will review these claims only for plain error.⁵

In Proposition I, Perkis claims that the record before the trial court, at the time of his nolo contendere pleas, was inadequate to provide a factual basis for each of the three charges upon which he was convicted.⁶ He asserts that the record before the court failed to establish one or more of the essential elements of each of these three crimes. Perkis recognizes that the transcript of his preliminary hearing, as well as his confession to Deputy Opitz, was before the court that took his pleas and that these materials can be looked to in establishing the factual basis for his convictions.

Nevertheless, as this Court noted in Berget v. State, a trial court accepting a plea is obligated to ensure that all the elements of the crimes to which the defendant is attempting to plea are factually supported by the record in the case—and that sometimes the record will establish that a particular necessary element is not factually supported. It is important to recognize that the court’s ability to consider the entire record when determining whether to accept a guilty plea is a double-edged sword. Just as the record may be used to establish the factual basis, it may also indicate to the trial court that some element of the crime is lacking. In such a situation, the trial court has an obligation not to accept the plea, notwithstanding the claims of the defendant during the actual plea proceedings, and refuse to sentence the defendant on the plea.⁷ Hence this Court must determine whether or not the elements of the crimes to which Perkis pled were indeed factually supported by the record in his case.⁸

A. Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon

In Count I, Perkis was convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon, under 21 O.S.2001, § 801. The elements of robbery with a dangerous weapon are: (1) wrongful, (2) taking, (3) and carrying away, (4) of personal property, (5) of another, (6) from the person or the immediate presence of the other, (7) by force or fear, (8) through the use of a dangerous weapon.⁹ Perkis asserts that the sixth element of this crime was not (and could not have been) supported by the record in this case. He has not raised this claim at any point previously.¹⁰

Perkis argues that because the property stolen from Wallis’ home and shop was not taken from his person or immediate presence, the crime of robbery with a dangerous weapon is not factually supported by the record in this case. In Fields v. State, this Court addressed a parallel challenge. The victim in that case was a convenience store employee. He had already placed the day’s receipts from that store (and other stores) in his car, when he went back into the store and was accosted by the defendant, with a gun. The defendant forced the employee to go into a refrigeration vault and to tell him where the money was. The employee was still locked in the vault when the defendant went outside and stole the money out of the car parked outside. While upholding the defendant’s conviction for robbery with firearms, this Court found that the key finding for robbery is that the property must be so in the possession or under the control of the individual robbed that violence or putting in fear was the means used whereby the robber took it.¹¹

In Lancaster v. State, we cited Fields for the proposition that in order for there to be a taking from the immediate presence of a victim it is not necessary that the victim see or hear the taking of the property.¹²

These cases establish that Perkis’ conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon was adequately supported by the record in his case. Although Wallis was not present in the same location as the property that was actually taken, Perkis and his co-defendants used force and fear, caused by their violence against Wallis and menacing him with a dangerous weapon (the hammer), in order to accomplish the theft of his personal property.

The trial court did not err in accepting Perkis’ plea to robbery with a dangerous weapon or in refusing to permit the withdrawal of this plea.

B. Kidnapping

In Count II, Perkis was convicted of kidnapping under 21 O.S.2001, § 741. The elements of kidnapping are: (1) unlawful, (2) forcible seizure and confinement, (3) of another, (4) with the intent to secretly confine or imprison, (5) against the person’s will.¹³ Perkis asserts that the fourth element of this crime, in particular, the secretly aspect of this element, was not (and could not have been) supported by the record in this case. He twice raised this claim at the trial court level.

In Vandiver v. State, this Court reviewed the history of Oklahoma’s § 741 kidnapping statute, focusing on the intent to secretly confine or imprison element.¹⁴ The court emphasized that the intent to secretly confine under § 741 is a specific intent requirement, and that, as with other specific intent crimes, that particular intent must be proved either by direct or circumstantial evidence, which would warrant the inference of the intent with which the act was done.¹⁵

The Vandiver court noted, approvingly, decisions from various other states whose kidnapping statutes contained similar secret confinement language, in which the states’ highest courts insisted that the intent alleged and proven must be not merely an intent to confine, but an intent to secretly confine or detain the person seized.¹⁶

The cases in which this Court has upheld kidnapping convictions against challenges regarding the defendant’s intent to secretly confine the victim(s) generally involve situations in which the defendant has either forced someone to move or be taken to some other place and/or the victim has been confined in some nonpublic place, such as inside a home or apartment, where he or she cannot be easily seen or heard by other persons.

The record in this case contains no evidence suggesting that Perkis or his co-defendants made any attempt to move Wallis from the spot in which he fell or to hide him or hinder viewing of his presence. Hence the record does not support the claim that Perkis or his comrades specifically intended to secretly confine Wallis. Because the record in this case does not provide a factual basis for one of the essential elements of kidnapping, the trial court should not have accepted Perkis’ nolo contendere plea to this charge, and the court abused its discretion in doing so. Hence Perkis’ conviction for kidnapping must be reversed. Furthermore, because the record does not suggest that evidence adequate to support the secretly confine element of kidnapping could be produced (and the State does not suggest that any such additional evidence exists), this charge against Perkis shall be remanded to the trial court with the instruction that it be dismissed.

C. Burglary in the First Degree

In Count III, Perkis was convicted of burglary in the first degree under 21 O.S.2001, § 1431. The elements of first-degree burglary are: (1) breaking, (2) entering, (3) a dwelling, (4) of another, (5) in which a human is present, (6) with intent to commit some crime therein.¹⁷ Perkis asserts that the factual record in his case was not adequate to support either the first element of breaking or the fifth element that a human was present in the home.

Perkis’ argument regarding the breaking element fails. Nothing in the record suggests either that the door to the Wallis home was standing wide open or that Perkis had any kind of consent to enter the home—nor does Perkis suggest that any such evidence exists. The trial court did not err in determining that Perkis or his co-defendant opened the door of the Wallis home in order to enter it.

Perkis’ argument regarding the presence of a human in the Wallis home, however, is not so easily dismissed. The State argues that although no one was actually present in the Wallis home at the time Perkis and Wilkerson entered it, Wallis was present in the curtilage of his home at the time of the robbery.

The State fails to establish that an open field, 200 yards distant from an individual’s home, constitutes part of the curtilage of that home, as that term is used in the Fourth Amendment context. More importantly, the State fails to establish that the personal safety and security interest at stake in the first-degree burglary context is analogous to the privacy interest at stake under the Fourth Amendment. The privacy protection of the home under the Fourth Amendment does not depend upon the presence of a human being in that home. Our first-degree burglary statute, on the other hand, explicitly depends upon the actual presence of a person in the home, since the personal security/safety interest at stake in the first-degree burglary context is one of the things that distinguishes first-degree burglary from second-degree burglary.

Consequently, the trial court erred in accepting Perkis’ plea to first-degree burglary, and the court abused its discretion in doing so. Perkis’ conviction for burglary in the first degree should be modified to burglary in the second degree, under 21 O.S.2001, § 1435. The elements of second-degree burglary are amply supported by the factual record in this case; and the record leaves no doubt that Perkis would have voluntarily pled nolo contendere to second-degree burglary, rather than first-degree burglary, if his argument regarding the lack of a human in the Wallis home had been accepted at the trial court level.

Under these specific circumstances, it is appropriate to modify Perkis’ conviction on Count III from burglary in the first degree to burglary in the second degree. His sentence on Count III is likewise modified to imprisonment for seven (7) years and a fine of $1,000. His sentences on Counts I and III shall remain consecutive sentences, as the trial court ordered.

In Proposition II, Perkis recasts his Proposition I claim, arguing that because the factual record was insufficient to support his pleas to the counts upon which he was convicted, his sentences are excessive. Perkis also challenges the trial court’s decision to run his prison terms consecutively. This Court has already found that the factual record was adequate to support Perkis’ Count I conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon. Perkis admits that imprisonment for twenty-five (25) years and a fine of $1,000 on this count is within the permissible sentencing range; and this Court rejects any claim that this sentence is excessive. This Court has already reversed Perkis’ Count II kidnapping conviction and modified his Count III conviction from first-degree burglary to second-degree burglary.

In Proposition III, Perkis asserts that he has been subjected to prohibited double punishment, by the court’s assessment of victim-related fees against him under two separate statutes. This claim was not raised before the trial court. Hence the issue has been waived. And there is no plain error.

In Proposition IV, Perkis complains that the trial court failed to properly advise him regarding: (1) the correct maximum sentence for first-degree burglary; (2) that his three counts could be ordered to run consecutively; and (3) that he would be required to serve 85% of his sentence on the robbery and first-degree burglary counts, before being considered for parole. Again, Perkis waived these claims by failing to raise them at any point at the trial court level.

In Proposition V, Perkis argues that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea to first-degree burglary because there was confusion regarding the proper sentencing range for this crime. Again, this claim was waived for failure to raise it at any point previously.

In Proposition VI, Perkis argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the time of his plea, primarily because his counsel failed to re-raise the arguments regarding the insufficiency of the State’s evidence to establish all the elements for the kidnapping and first-degree burglary counts, which had been raised earlier in his case.

In Proposition VII, Perkis requests that if this Court does not allow him to withdraw his plea or modify the judgment on Count III, this Court order that the Judgment and Sentence document in his case be corrected to accurately reflect the trial court’s modification of his sentence on this count to twenty (20) years.

After thoroughly considering the entire record before us, we find that Perkis’ petition for certiorari should be granted, that he should not be allowed to withdraw any of his pleas, that his conviction and sentence for robbery with a dangerous weapon should be affirmed, that his conviction for kidnapping must be reversed and remanded for dismissal, and that his conviction for first-degree burglary should be modified to a conviction for second-degree burglary, with a sentence of imprisonment for seven (7) years and a fine of $1,000. Perkis’ other claims are all rejected.

Decision

Perkis’ petition for certiorari review is GRANTED. His conviction and sentence on COUNT I, Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon, are hereby AFFIRMED. Perkis’ conviction on COUNT II, Kidnapping, is hereby REVERSED, and this count is hereby REMANDED to the district court, where it shall be DISMISSED. Perkis’ conviction on COUNT III, Burglary in the First Degree, is hereby MODIFIED to a conviction for BURGLARY IN THE SECOND DEGREE, and his SENTENCE on this count is likewise MODIFIED to imprisonment for seven (7) years and a fine of $1,000. The remaining provisions of Perkis’ sentence are AFFIRMED.

ATTORNEYS AT TRIAL
JEFFREY S. COE
ALBERT J. HOCH
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
P.O. BOX 926
NORMAN, OK 73070
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL
S. GAIL GUNNING
2200 N. CLASSEN BLVD., STE. 710
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA 73106
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT

S. WYATT HILL
W.A. DREW EDMONDSON
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLAHOMA
CADDO COUNTY COURTHOUSE
DIANE L. SLAYTON
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
201 W. OKLAHOMA ST.
ANADARKO, OKLAHOMA 73005
ATTORNEY FOR THE STATE

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Footnotes:

  1. 1 In the original Information filed in the case, Count III was for Burglary in the Second Degree, and restitution in the amount of $3,436.47.
  2. 2 The restitution was ordered as a joint and several liability with Perkis' co-defendants, Mark A. Wilkerson and James Leroy McCullough.
  3. 3 At the hearing on Perkis' application to withdraw his pleas, the State noted that although it had requested that Perkis be sentenced to imprisonment for 25 years on Count III, the maximum sentence for First-Degree Burglary, with no prior convictions, is 20 years. See 21 O.S.2001, § 1436.
  4. 4 The specific claims made in Propositions I through VI were not made in Perkis' application to withdraw his pleas, in the evidentiary hearing regarding this application, or in his petition for certiorari. Hence these issues have been waived.
  5. 5 See Rules 4.2 and 4.3(C), Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2003).
  6. 6 See Medlock v. State, 1994 OK CR 65, 887 P.2d 1333, 1342 (issues not raised within application to withdraw plea reviewed for plain error only), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 918, 116 S.Ct. 310, 133 L.Ed.2d 213 (1995).
  7. 7 See Wester v. State, 1988 OK CR 126, 764 P.2d 884, 887 (opinion on rehearing) (holding that "a factual basis is required before a trial court may accept a plea of nolo contendere").
  8. 8 1991 OK CR 121 824 P.2d 364, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 841, 113 S.Ct. 124, 121 L.Ed.2d 79 (1992).
  9. 9 Id. at 370.
  10. 10 Even if this Court could avoid this issue under the waiver doctrine, we would be faced with this same question within Perkis' Proposition VI ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
  11. 11 See 21 O.S.2001, §§ 791, 801; OUJI-CR (2d) 4-144 (Supp. 2003).
  12. 12 This is in contrast to the "missing element" claims regarding Perkis' other two convictions.
  13. 13 1961 OK CR 75, 364 P.2d 723.
  14. 14 Id. at 726 (quoting 46 Am.Jur. 142, Robbery § 7).
  15. 15 1976 OK CR 191, 554 P.2d 32.
  16. 16 Id. at 34 (relying on Fields).
  17. 17 This Court in Lancaster upheld a robbery with firearms conviction where the defendant forced his way into the victims' home, held them at gunpoint while demanding their money and their car keys, shot at them when they resisted, and then went outside and stole their car, which was parked outside and which had their money inside it, in a purse. See 364 P.2d at 724.
  18. 18 54 Okla. Crim. 219, 18 P.2d 281 (1932).
  19. 19 In Braley, this Court upheld a robbery with firearms conviction, where a couple was confronted by armed men when they returned home, and where one of these men held them at gunpoint, while the others stole property from their home and their car, which was in the garage. Id. at 281-82.
  20. 20 See 21 O.S.2001, § 741; OUJI-CR (2d) 4-110 (Supp. 2003).
  21. 21 Perkis first raised his "secretly confine" claim at his preliminary hearing, held before the Honorable John E. Herndon, Special Judge, on April 29, 2003.
  22. 22 97 Okla. Crim. 217, 261 P.2d 617 (1953), rev'd on other grounds, Parker v. State, 1996 OK CR 19, 917 P.2d 980, 986 n.4.
  23. 23 Id. at 622-24.
  24. 24 Id. at 625.
  25. 25 Id. at 622-23 (noting decisions from New York, Utah, and Alabama).
  26. 26 Id. at 625.
  27. 27 Id. at 620-22.
  28. 28 Id. at 624.
  29. 29 See, e.g., Jenkins v. State, 1973 OK CR 165, 508 P.2d 660, 661-62; Pittser v. State, 1969 OK CR 231, 461 P.2d 1015, 1016.
  30. 30 See 21 O.S.2001, § 1431; OUJI-CR (2d) 5-12 (Supp. 2003).
  31. 31 Perkis first raised these claims at his preliminary hearing, after the State sought to have him bound over on first-degree burglary, rather than second-degree burglary, as originally charged.
  32. 32 This Court notes that the State failed to address this argument in any manner.
  33. 33 See, e.g., Sanchez v. State, 1983 OK CR 93, 665 P.2d 1218, 1219; Lumpkin v. State, 25 Okla. Crim. 108, 219 P. 157, 158 (1923); Yeargin v. State, 54 Okla. Crim. 34, 14 P.2d 431, 432 (1932).
  34. 34 Compare 21 O.S.2001, § 1481 with U.S. CONST. Amend IV.
  35. 35 See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987).
  36. 36 See 21 O.S.2001, § 1435; OUJI-CR (2d) 5-13 (Supp. 2003).
  37. 37 The State's reliance upon an Illinois case in which the victim fled the home at the time it was being invaded is inapposite.
  38. 38 Perkis specifically requests in his brief that if this Court does not allow him to withdraw his pleas, that it modify his judgment and sentence to conform to the evidence in the case.
  39. 39 The trial court sentenced Perkis to the maximum term of imprisonment permitted for first-degree burglary. Thus there can be little doubt that the trial court would have likewise sentenced him to the maximum term permitted for second-degree burglary, i.e., seven (7) years, if it had concluded (correctly) that the first-degree burglary count did not apply.
  40. 40 Perkis' argument that convicting him of both robbery and kidnapping constitutes impermissible "double punishment" for a single act has been rendered moot by this Court's dismissal of the kidnapping count.
  41. 41 See 21 O.S.2001, § 11.
  42. 42 The Victim Compensation Assessment of $1,000 is a single assessment, not a per count assessment as Perkis asserts in his brief.
  43. 43 This Court notes that "restitution" for a victim is commonly recognized as having a different purpose than and being entirely distinct from the "punishment" of an offender.
  44. 44 See 21 O.S.2001, §§ 12.1, 13.1.
  45. 45 Within this section Perkis again argues that the trial court did not give him adequate credit for the mitigating factors in the case (that he turned himself in, helped them find his co-defendants, his remorse, etc.). This argument is irrelevant to the legal claims made in this section.
  46. 46 The fact that at the time of his sentencing, Perkis was initially sentenced to 25 years on the first-degree burglary count, and then this error was later corrected-at the urging of the State-to a permissible sentence of 20 years on this count, is irrelevant to the validity of Perkis' plea.
  47. 47 Perkis' counsel specifically referred to the impact of the 85% Rule in his argument and asked that Perkis' sentences not be run consecutively.
  48. 48 Cf. Robinson v. State, 1991 OK CR 23, ║║ 8-10, 806 P.2d 1128, 1130-31.
  49. 49 This Court's conclusion that the record did support Perkis' conviction for kidnapping demonstrates that Perkis could not have been prejudiced by his counsel's failure to further pursue this claim.
  50. 50 This Court herein orders that Count III be modified to reflect a conviction for second-degree burglary, with a sentence of imprisonment for seven (7) years and a fine of $1,000.

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 801 (2001) - Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 741 (2001) - Kidnapping
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1431 (2001) - Burglary in the First Degree
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1435 (2001) - Burglary in the Second Degree
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1436 (2001) - Penalty for Burglary in the First Degree
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 11 (2001) - Restitution
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 142.18(A) (2001) - Victim Compensation Fund
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 12.1 (2001) - Sentencing
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 13.1 (2001) - Sentences Running Consecutively

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

  • Bramlett v. State, 2018 OK CR 19, I 36, 422 P.3d 788, 799-800
  • Medlock v. State, 1994 OK CR 65, 887 P.2d 1333, 1342
  • Berget v. State, 1991 OK CR 121, 824 P.2d 364, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 841, 113 S.Ct. 124, 121 L.Ed.2d 79 (1992)
  • Wester v. State, 1988 OK CR 126, 764 P.2d 884, 887
  • Fields v. State, 1961 OK CR 75, 364 P.2d 723
  • Lancaster v. State, 1976 OK CR 191, 554 P.2d 32
  • Braley v. State, 54 Okla. Crim. 219, 18 P.2d 281 (1932)
  • Vandiver v. State, 97 Okla. Crim. 217, 261 P.2d 617 (1953), rev'd on other grounds, Parker v. State, 1996 OK CR 7, 917 P.2d 980, 986 n.4
  • Jenkins v. State, 1973 OK CR 165, 508 P.2d 660, 661-62
  • Pittser v. State, 1969 OK CR 231, 461 P.2d 1015, 1016
  • Sanchez v. State, 1983 OK CR 93, 665 P.2d 1218, 1219
  • Yeargin v. State, 54 Okla. Crim. 34, 14 P.2d 431, 432

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