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C-2017-33

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Christopher Dewayne Banks v State Of Oklahoma

C-2017-33

Filed: May 24, 2018

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: Christopher Dewayne Banks

Summary

**Christopher Dewayne Banks appealed his conviction for First Degree Manslaughter. Conviction and sentence affirmed, modified to run concurrently. Lumpkin dissented.** In the case of Christopher Dewayne Banks, he entered a guilty plea to First Degree Manslaughter and was sentenced to twenty-three years in prison. Later, he tried to take back his plea, saying he didn’t fully understand what was happening and felt pressured to plead guilty. The court held several hearings, but in the end, they denied his request. Banks argued that his plea wasn’t fair because the state went back on their promise and revoked his suspended sentence in another case, which led to him serving more time. The Appeals Court agreed that even though his original plea was valid and voluntary, the state had breached the plea agreement by taking that action. As a result, the court decided to modify his sentence to run at the same time as his other sentence, lessening the time he would actually serve. In the opinion, the judges upheld Banks' plea as valid, but recognized the unfairness of the state breaching their agreement. They handled the situation by adjusting his sentences to avoid any extra punishment. However, one judge, Lumpkin, disagreed with parts of the decision, saying the legal reasoning used in some areas was unclear.

Decision

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari is GRANTED. The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court is AFFIRMED as MODIFIED to run concurrent with Banks' sentence in Carter County Case No. CF-2014-128. Banks' Application for Evidentiary Hearing on Sixth Amendment Claim is DENIED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2018), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

  • Was Mr. Banks' plea entered voluntarily or knowingly and intelligently?
  • Did the failure to adequately preserve issues for review result from ineffective assistance of counsel?

Findings

  • the court affirmed the judgment and sentence but modified the sentence to run concurrently with the other sentence
  • the court found that Banks' plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily
  • the court determined that the State breached the plea agreement
  • the court denied Banks' application for an evidentiary hearing on the Sixth Amendment claim
  • the court found that Banks did not show ineffective assistance of counsel

C-2017-33

May 24, 2018

Christopher Dewayne Banks

Appellant

v

State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

GRANTING CERTIORARI

HUDSON, JUDGE: On September 28, 2016, Petitioner Christopher Dewayne Banks entered a negotiated guilty plea in Carter County District Court, Case No. CF-2015-746A, before the Honorable Dennis R. Morris, District Judge, to First Degree Manslaughter, in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 711, After Former Conviction of a Felony. In accordance with the plea agreement, Banks was sentenced to twenty-three (23) years imprisonment. ^1 On October 11, 2016, Banks filed a motion to withdraw his plea. Three separate hearings were held before Judge Morris on Banks’ motion. At the conclusion of the third and final hearing, Judge Morris denied Banks’ motion. Banks now seeks a writ of certiorari alleging two propositions of error:

I. MR. BANKS’ PLEA WAS NOT ENTERED VOLUNTARILY OR KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY; and

II. ALTERNATIVELY, RELIEF IS REQUIRED BECAUSE ANY FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY PRESERVE ISSUES FOR REVIEW WAS THE RESULT OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

Banks also submits for consideration his Application for Evidentiary Hearing on Sixth Amendment Claim and Brief in Support.

After thorough consideration of the entire record before us on appeal, including the original record, transcripts, and the parties’ briefs, we find that relief is required under the law and evidence. Banks’ Petition for Writ of Certiorari is GRANTED. The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED to run Banks’ sentence in this case concurrently with his sentence in Carter County Case No. CF-2014-128. Banks’ Application for Evidentiary Hearing on Sixth Amendment Claim is DENIED.

Relevant Background

The record shows that in exchange for Banks’ guilty plea, the State agreed to (1) amend Banks’ original charge of murder in the second degree to first degree manslaughter; (2) dismiss its motion to revoke Banks’ suspended sentence in Carter County Case No. CF-2014-128; ^2 and (3) recommend to the trial court that Banks be sentenced to twenty-three (23) years imprisonment with credit for time served. The State’s motion to revoke Banks’ sentence in CF-2014-128 case was dismissed at the close of the plea proceedings. Banks alleged in his motion to withdraw his plea that his plea was not knowing and intelligent because he did not fully understand the nature and consequences of the plea proceedings. On the same date in which Banks filed ^2 Notably, both on the plea form and at the plea hearing, Banks’ prior conviction is erroneously referenced as CF-2014-746.

his withdrawal motion, the State re-filed its motion to revoke Banks’ suspended sentence in Case No. CF-2014-128. A hearing on the State’s motion to revoke was held on October 19, 2016, before the Honorable Thomas Baldwin, Associate District Judge. At that time, Judge Baldwin revoked the remaining twelve years of Banks’ suspended sentence. Later, during the hearings on Banks’ motion to withdraw his plea, Banks asserted that the State’s revocation of his suspended sentence in CF-2014-128 invalidated his plea and was grounds for granting his motion to withdraw. The District Court ultimately denied relief, finding that Banks’ plea was knowing and voluntary.

I. In his first proposition of error, Banks argues that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered because: 1) contrary to his plea agreement with the State the remainder of his fifteen-year sentence in Carter County Case No. CF-2014-128 was revoked; and 2) his plea was coerced. On certiorari review of a guilty plea, this Court’s review is limited to two inquiries: (1) whether the plea was made knowingly and voluntarily; and (2) whether the district court accepting the plea had jurisdiction. Lewis v. State, 2009 OK CR 30, I 4, 220 P.3d 1140, 1142. This Court reviews the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. Lewis, 2009 OK CR 30, I 5, 220 P.3d at 1142; Cox v. State, 2006 OK CR 51, I 18, 152 P.3d 244, 251, overruled on other grounds, State v. Vincent, 2016 OK CR 7, I 12, 371 P.3d 1127, 1130. An abuse of discretion is any unreasonable or arbitrary action taken without proper consideration of the facts and law pertaining to the issue; a clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment, clearly against the logic and effect of the facts. Neloms v. State, 2012 OK CR 7, I 35, 274 P.3d 161, 170. The burden is on the petitioner to show a defect in the plea process that entitles him to withdraw the plea. See Elmore v. State, 1981 OK CR 8, I 8, 624 P.2d 78, 80. We examine the entire record before us on appeal to determine the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea. Fields v. State, 1996 OK CR 35, I 28, 923 P.2d 624, 630.

Although Banks’ claim on appeal is presented under the label of unknowing and involuntary, his claim goes beyond this fundamental determination and encompasses a due process issue resulting from the breach of his plea agreement. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137-38, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1430, 173 L. Ed. 2d 266 (2009) (once a plea agreement has been reached and a valid plea made, the Government is obligated to uphold its side of the bargain); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S. Ct. 495, 499, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971) (due process mandates that plea negotiations be attended by adequate safeguards to ensure the defendant what is reasonably due (in) the circumstances); United States v. Van Thournout, 100 F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 1996) (Allowing the government to breach a promise that induced a guilty plea violates due process.). This substantive due process issue forms the basis of Banks’ claim. Before addressing this issue, however, we must first determine the knowing and voluntary nature of Banks’ plea. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 137-38, 129 S. Ct. at 1430 (the Government’s breach of a plea agreement does not retroactively cause the defendant’s plea to have been unknowing or involuntary; rather, it is because the defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary that the Government is obligated to uphold its side of the bargain).

A. Knowing and Voluntary Nature of Banks’ Plea

The standard for determining the validity of a guilty plea is whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among alternative courses of action open to the defendant. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970); Hopkins v. State, 1988 OK CR 257, I 2, 764 P.2d 215, 216. When a defendant claims their guilty plea was entered through inadvertence, ignorance, influence or without deliberation, they have the burden of showing that the plea was entered as a result of one of these reasons and that there is a defense that should be presented to the jury. Estell v. State, 1988 OK CR 287, I 7, 766 P.2d 1380, 1383. As noted above, a prosecutorial breach of a plea agreement does not ex post facto render a defendant’s plea unknowing and involuntary. Puckett, 556 U.S. at 137-38, 129 S. Ct. at 1430.

Banks additionally argues, however, that the failure of his lawyers to communicate with him contributed to his overall lack of understanding of the situation he faced. Aplt. Br. at 13. Banks raised this assertion in his written motion to withdraw his plea. Banks further contends he was coerced into entering his plea. Banks orally raised this claim during the first hearing on his motion when he specifically contended, I feel like I was coerced and pressured into signing on that day. Conflict counsel also reasserted this claim at Banks’ third and final hearing on his motion. Thus, given the circumstances presented here, Banks’ oral amendment to his motion sufficiently preserved this issue for appellate review. Nonetheless, upon review of the record, we find Banks fully understood the consequences of entering his plea and entered his plea of his own free will. This is not a case where Banks entered his plea through inadvertence, ignorance or without deliberation. The trial court’s finding that Banks’ plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily was not an abuse of discretion.

B. Breach of Plea Agreement Terms

Having found Banks’ plea was both knowing and voluntary, we turn next to his substantive due process claim. Remarkably, this Court has not previously had the opportunity to address this specific issue. Plea bargaining has long been recognized as an essential component of the administration of justice. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260, 92 S. Ct. at 498; Jiminez v. State, 2006 OK CR 43, I 6, 144 P.3d 903, 905; Gray v. State, 1982 OK CR 137, I 13, 650 P.2d 880, 883. Plea agreements can result in the prompt disposition of criminal cases and eliminate the need for full-scale trials, saving the State time, money and other resources. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261, 92 S. Ct. at 498. They can also reduce the amount of time a defendant spends awaiting disposition of charges against him or her, id.; can reduce the risk of additional convictions when charges are dismissed; and reduce a defendant’s exposure to potentially higher penalties if their case went to trial. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407, 182 L. Ed. 2d 379 (2012) (recognizing that plea agreement can benefit both parties); United States v. Rodriguez-Rivera, 518 F.3d 1208, 1216 (10th Cir. 2008) (observing that the defendant benefited from his plea agreement by avoiding the possibility of a conviction on two counts versus one).

A plea agreement is analogous to a contract. Puckett, 556 U.S. at 137, 129 S. Ct. at 1430 (stating that, [a]lthough the analogy may not hold in all respects, plea bargains are essentially contracts); see also State v. Salathiel, 2013 OK CR 16, I 14, 313 P.3d 263, 268 (recognizing that [p]lea agreements involve a quid pro quo between a criminal defendant and the government). Plea agreements are unique, however, in that they involve a waiver of constitutional and statutory rights. Unlike a normal commercial contract, due process requires that the government adhere to the terms of any plea bargain. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 2547, 81 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1984), disapproved of by Puckett, 556 U.S. 129, 129 S. Ct. 1423. Hence, the application of ordinary contract principles must be tempered accordingly with special due process concerns for fairness and the adequacy of procedural safeguards. United States v. Woltmann, 610 F.3d 37, 39-40 (2d Cir. 2010).

We must remain mindful too that a plea agreement is not merely a contract between two parties, but [i]t necessarily implicates the integrity of the criminal justice system. United States v. Cvijanovich, 556 F.3d 857, 862 (8th Cir. 2009). Violations of plea agreements adversely impact the integrity of the prosecutorial office and the entire judicial system. Moreover, because a plea agreement requires a defendant to waive fundamental rights, prosecutors and courts must be held to meticulous standards to ensure that promises made are faithfully performed. Therefore, because of the important due process rights involved, plea negotiations must accord a defendant requisite fairness and be attended by adequate ‘safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably due (in) the circumstances. United States v. Calabrese, 645 F.2d 1379, 1390 (10th Cir. 1981) (quoting Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S. Ct. at 499). If a defendant enters a plea in expectation of some agreed sentence, or predicated on a particular agreed condition, that promise should be fulfilled. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S. Ct. at 499; see also Couch v. State, 1991 OK CR 67, T 6, 814 P.2d 1045, 1047 (defendant must be allowed to withdraw plea where trial court accepted plea agreement but imposed different sentence).

As the Supreme Court in Puckett explained: When a defendant agrees to a plea bargain, the Government takes on certain obligations. If those obligations are not met, the defendant is entitled to seek a remedy, which might in some cases be rescission of the agreement, allowing him to take back the consideration he has furnished, i.e., to withdraw his plea. But rescission is not the only possible remedy; in Santobello we allowed for a resentencing at which the Government would fully comply with the agreement-in effect, specific performance of the contract. Id., 556 U.S. at 137, 129 S. Ct. at 1430 (internal citation omitted).

Not all plea agreement violations, however, require reversal or for that matter necessarily warrant relief. Id., 556 U.S. at 138 n.1, 129 S. Ct. at 1430 n.1; Hartjes v. Endicott, 456 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 2006). The defendant whose plea agreement has been broken by the Government will not always be able to show prejudice. Puckett, 556 U.S. at 141, 129 S. Ct. at 1432. If prejudice is shown and relief is warranted, it is important to recognize that the reason [for such relief] is not that the guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary. Id., 556 U.S. at 138 n.1, 129 S. Ct. at 1430 n.1. Rather, [i]t is precisely because the plea was knowing and voluntary (and hence valid) that the Government is obligated to uphold its side of the bargain. Id., 556 U.S. at 137-38, 129 S. Ct. at 1430.

In the present case, Banks knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea in reliance on his plea agreement with the State. In so doing, he waived fundamental rights. The plea agreement provided, among other things, that the State would dismiss its motion to revoke Banks’ suspended sentence in Carter County Case No. CF-2014-128. Banks did not receive the benefit of this promise. The State was and is ultimately responsible for the resulting breach. By prematurely re-filing its motion to revoke in Banks’ 2014 case, the State set into motion the events that led to the breach. Regardless of what the State’s underlying motivation may have been for re-filing its motion, one thing is clear–the State jumped the gun. Banks’ motion seeking to withdraw his guilty plea did not constitute a breach. Banks’ plea agreement with the State was not complex. Banks’ sole obligation under the agreement was fulfilled when he entered his plea of guilty. Unless and until the trial court granted his request to withdraw his plea, Banks remained in compliance with the parties’ agreement and the State remained bound by their promise not to seek revocation of Banks’ sentence in CF-2014-128. Thus, Banks was ultimately denied a key benefit for which he bargained, i.e., avoiding revocation of his sentence in his 2014 case. This breach violated Banks’ right to due process. Moreover, the resulting breach was undoubtedly prejudicial and warrants relief. The breach was both material and substantial. In other words, the breach violated the specific terms of the parties’ agreement, which in turn defeated a significant benefit Banks was to receive in exchange for his plea.

Because of the breach, the remaining twelve years of Banks’ sentence in CF-2014-128 was revoked. This was twelve additional years of imprisonment Banks’ plea agreement was specifically crafted to avoid. In Kernan v. Cuero, U.S. 138 S. Ct. 4, 9, 199 L. Ed. 2d 236 (2017), reh’g denied, 2018 WL 311875 (U.S. Jan. 8, 2018), the Supreme Court clarified that the ultimate relief to which a petitioner is entitled when the State materially breaches a plea agreement should be left to the discretion of the state court, which is in the better position to determine the type of relief required given the circumstances of the case. Banks asks this Court to vacate his negotiated plea agreement. This is certainly one potential remedy. However, reversal of Banks’ conviction is not without significant issues. While Banks would obtain the plea withdrawal he sought shortly after entering his plea, he would lose the full benefit of his original plea agreement that reduced his charge to first degree manslaughter and limited his exposure to a possible life sentence. Moreover, vacating Banks’ plea does nothing to rectify the sentence revocation that already occurred in his 2014 case. Thus, specific performance is not a viable remedy in this case as Banks cannot be placed back into the same position he was prior to his plea. Moreover, if Banks’ conviction was to be reversed, the State would undoubtedly be confronted by the risk and hardships that often accompany the retrial of a case. As the United States Supreme Court observed in United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72, 106 S. Ct. 938, 942-43, 89 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1986):

The reversal of a conviction entails substantial social costs: it forces jurors, witnesses, courts, the prosecution, and the defendants to expend further time, energy, and other resources to repeat a trial that has already once taken place; victims may be asked to relive their disturbing experiences. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14, 103 S. Ct. 1610, 1617, 75 L.Ed. 2d 610 (1983). The [p]assage of time, erosion of memory, and dispersion of witnesses may render retrial difficult, even impossible. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127-128, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1571-1572, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982). Thus, while reversal may, in theory, entitle the defendant only to retrial, in practice it may reward the accused with complete freedom from prosecution, id., at 128, 102 S. Ct., at 1572, and thereby cost society the right to punish admitted offenders. Id., at 127, 102 S. Ct., at 1572. Even if a defendant is convicted in a second trial, the intervening delay may compromise society’s interest in the prompt administration of justice, United States v. Hasting, supra, 461 U.S., at 509, 103 S. Ct., at 1981, and impede accomplishment of the objectives of deterrence and rehabilitation.

Compare Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1389, 182 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2012) (finding Sixth Amendment remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered by the defendant, i.e., neutralize the taint-but at the same time not grant a windfall to the defendant or needlessly squander the considerable resources [of] the State[.]). To appropriately tailor the relief warranted in this case to the injury suffered by Banks, we are mindful of two significant factors: (1) Banks’ guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily; and (2) the injury suffered by Banks because of the breach is the burden of serving twelve additional years of imprisonment.

While Banks’ 2014 case-CF-2014-128-is not presently before this Court, the harm caused by the State’s breach can be eliminated by running Banks’ sentences in the present case and CF-2014-128 concurrently. This is an equitable remedy that avoids the societal costs of reversal and effectively neutralizes the taint of the breach without granting Banks or the State a windfall. Thus, given the totality of the circumstances presented in this case, we affirm Banks’ conviction and sentence but order that his sentence in this case be run concurrently with his sentence in Carter County Case No. CF-2014-128.

II. Banks asserts he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to (1) allege coercion in Banks’ written motion to withdraw; and (2) make a sufficient record regarding the revocation of Banks’ sentence in CF-2014-128. Appellant has filed an accompanying Rule 3.11(B) application presenting non-record evidence in support of his challenge to defense counsel’s preservation of the record to support his due process claim arising from the sentence revocation in CF-2014-128.

Defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel during the plea-bargaining process. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 162, 132 S. Ct. at 1384; Frye, 566 U.S. at 143-44, 132 S. Ct. at 1407; Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010); Jimenez v. State, 2006 OK CR 43, I 6, 144 P.3d 903, 905. To succeed on his ineffectiveness claim, Banks must show that plea counsel’s conduct was outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). He must also show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, that the outcome of the plea process would have been different. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 163, 132 S. Ct. at 1384; Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985). Banks fails to meet this burden.

In Proposition I, we found Banks’ motion to withdraw his guilty plea was orally amended to include his claim of coercion. We accordingly addressed this issue and found Banks’ plea was entered both knowingly and voluntarily. Thus, Banks fails to show prejudice resulted from counsel’s failure to formally allege coercion in Banks’ written motion to withdraw. Banks’ failure to show prejudice is fatal to his claim. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S. Ct. at 370.

Banks’ second contention-asserting counsel failed to make a sufficient record regarding the revocation of Banks’ sentence in CF-2014-128-likewise fails. As is evident from the Court’s lengthy discussion in Proposition I, the record presented on appeal was sufficient to address the merits of Banks’ substantive due process claim. Banks has thus failed to affirmatively prove prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. He is therefore not entitled to relief for this sub-claim. Banks’ Proposition II is denied, and his request for an evidentiary hearing on this particular claim is likewise DENIED.

DECISION

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari is GRANTED. The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court is AFFIRMED as MODIFIED to run concurrent with Banks’ sentence in Carter County Case No. CF-2014-128. Banks’ Application for Evidentiary Hearing on Sixth Amendment Claim is DENIED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2018), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision.

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Footnotes:

  1. Under 21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 13.1, Banks must serve 85% of the sentence imposed before he is eligible for parole.
  2. Notably, both on the plea form and at the plea hearing, Banks' prior conviction is erroneously referenced as CF-2014-746.
  3. The record is conflicting as to whether Banks was represented by counsel at the hearing.
  4. Cox v. State, 2006 OK CR 51, I 18, 152 P.3d 244, 251, overruled on other grounds, State v. Vincent, 2016 OK CR 7, I 12, 371 P.3d 1127, 1130.
  5. See Elmore v. State, 1981 OK CR 8, I 8, 624 P.2d 78, 80.
  6. Fields v. State, 1996 OK CR 35, I 28, 923 P.2d 624, 630.
  7. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137-38, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1430, 173 L. Ed. 2d 266 (2009).
  8. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S. Ct. 495, 499, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971).
  9. United States v. Van Thournout, 100 F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 1996).
  10. Kernan v. Cuero, 138 S. Ct. 4, 9, 199 L. Ed. 2d 236 (2017), reh'g denied, 2018 WL 311875 (U.S. Jan. 8, 2018).
  11. United States v. Calabrese, 645 F.2d 1379, 1390 (10th Cir. 1981).
  12. Couch v. State, 1991 OK CR 67, T 6, 814 P.2d 1045, 1047.
  13. Jimenez v. State, 2006 OK CR 43, I 6, 144 P.3d 903, 905.
  14. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).
  15. Hopkins v. State, 1988 OK CR 257, I 2, 764 P.2d 215, 216.
  16. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
  17. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1389, 182 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2012).
  18. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985).
  19. See Johnson v. United States, U.S. 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2564, 192 L.Ed. 569 (2015).
  20. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39, 114 S.Ct. 2018, 2026, 129 L.Ed.2d 22 (1994).
  21. Marshall U. State, 1998 OK CR 30, 963 P. 2d 1.

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 711 (2011) - First Degree Manslaughter
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 13.1 (Supp. 2015) - Parole Eligibility
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 18, App. (2018) - Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 4.2 (2017) - Motion to Withdraw a Plea

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

  • Lewis v. State, 2009 OK CR 30, I 4, 220 P.3d 1140, 1142
  • Cox v. State, 2006 OK CR 51, I 18, 152 P.3d 244, 251
  • Neloms v. State, 2012 OK CR 7, I 35, 274 P.3d 161, 170
  • Elmore v. State, 1981 OK CR 8, I 8, 624 P.2d 78, 80
  • Fields v. State, 1996 OK CR 35, I 28, 923 P.2d 624, 630
  • Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137-38, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1430, 173 L. Ed. 2d 266 (2009)
  • Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S. Ct. 495, 499, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971)
  • United States v. Van Thournout, 100 F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 1996)
  • North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970)
  • Hopkins v. State, 1988 OK CR 257, I 2, 764 P.2d 215, 216
  • Estell v. State, 1988 OK CR 287, I 7, 766 P.2d 1380, 1383
  • Jimenez v. State, 2006 OK CR 43, I 6, 144 P.3d 903, 905
  • Gray v. State, 1982 OK CR 137, I 13, 650 P.2d 880, 883
  • Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407, 182 L. Ed. 2d 379 (2012)
  • United States v. Rodriguez-Rivera, 518 F.3d 1208, 1216 (10th Cir. 2008)
  • State v. Salathiel, 2013 OK CR 16, I 14, 313 P.3d 263, 268
  • Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 2547, 81 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1984)
  • United States v. Woltmann, 610 F.3d 37, 39-40 (2d Cir. 2010)
  • United States v. Cvijanovich, 556 F.3d 857, 862 (8th Cir. 2009)
  • United States v. Calabrese, 645 F.2d 1379, 1390 (10th Cir. 1981)
  • Kernan v. Cuero, U.S. 138 S. Ct. 4, 9, 199 L. Ed. 2d 236 (2017)
  • United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72, 106 S. Ct. 938, 942-43, 89 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1986)
  • Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1389, 182 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2012)
  • Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985)

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