Lori Pamela Crews v The Honorable Thomas C. Gillert

PR-2006-120

Filed: Apr. 18, 2006

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: Lori Pamela Crews

Summary

Lori Pamela Crews appealed her conviction for Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Drug (Methamphetamine) and Driving Without Seatbelts. The court decided to grant her request for relief in part, allowing her to enter a guilty plea to the possession charge. However, they denied her plea for the seatbelt charge. Judge Lumpkin dissented, stating that the trial court was correct to refuse her guilty plea, arguing that she didn’t have the right to force the court to accept it.

Decision

IT IS THEREFORE THE ORDER OF THIS COURT that the District Court of Tulsa County, the Honorable Tom Gillert, is directed to conduct a hearing on Petitioner's non-negotiated blind plea of guilty to the charged offense of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Drug in Case No. CF-2005-3056. The District Court is further directed to ACCEPT Petitioner's plea if it finds that the statutory rules and case law requirements established for entry of a proper guilty plea and proper waiver of her right to trial are met. Petitioner's request that the District Court be directed to accept her plea of nolo contendere to the charge of Driving Without a Seatbelt is DENIED. However, the District Court is directed to hear Petitioner's nolo contendere plea, on the record, and make its determination regarding the acceptance or rejection of that plea subject to the statutory rules and case law requirements established for entry of a plea of nolo contendere. The Stay of Proceedings in this matter is hereby LIFTED. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Issues

• whether the trial court has the authority to refuse to accept a defendant's guilty plea
• whether a defendant has the right to enter a non-negotiated, blind guilty plea
• whether the trial court's rejection of a nolo contendere plea was proper
• whether there are adequate grounds for issuing a writ of prohibition or mandamus
• whether the trial court's discretion allows it to consider the implications of a plea on a co-defendant's case
• whether sufficient legal requirements were met for the acceptance of a guilty plea

Findings

• the court erred in rejecting Petitioner's non-negotiated, blind plea to the Possession charge
• the trial court's rejection of Petitioner's nolo contendere plea to the Seatbelt violation was proper
• the trial court must conduct a hearing and may accept Petitioner's guilty plea if statutory requirements are met
• the stay of proceedings in this matter is lifted

PR-2006-120

Apr. 18, 2006

Lori Pamela Crews

Appellant

v

The Honorable Thomas C. Gillert

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR RELIEF IN PART, DENYING REQUEST FOR RELIEF IN PART, AND LIFTING STAY

On February 7, 2006, Petitioner, Lori Pamela Crews, by and through counsel, Terry P. Malloy, filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition and/or Writ of Mandamus, and Request for Emergency Protective Order Staying and Suspending Proceedings in Case No. CF-2005-3056 in the District Court of Tulsa County. Petitioner is charged with Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Drug (Methamphetamine) and Driving Without Seatbelts (a misdemeanor). Her case is assigned to the Respondent, the Honorable Thomas C. Gillert, District Judge, the District Court of Tulsa County, Case No. CF-2005-3056.

On January 31, 2006, Petitioner’s Motion to Quash Arrest and Suppress the Evidence was scheduled for hearing. Petitioner’s counsel and the State conferred and Petitioner agreed to enter a guilty plea to the felony possession charge and a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of Driving without a Seatbelt. In exchange, the State agreed to recommend that Petitioner be sentenced to two (2) years with a referral for a pre-sentence investigation for the Possession charge, and a $25.00 fine, plus costs, for the Seatbelt violation. The case was continued until Friday, February 3, 2006, for completion of the written plea statement, waiver of jury and non-jury trial, and entry of the pleas.

On February 3, 2006, Petitioner appeared with counsel and was advised by the State that unless she entered a plea accepting the State’s theory of the case (which apparently serves as the basis for the pending charge against Petitioner’s co-defendant, Mark McElroy), the State would withdraw its recommendation for disposition of the case. Petitioner refused to accede to the State’s demands, and decided to enter a non-negotiated, blind plea to the Possession charge. Judge Gillert was advised of the developments, including Petitioner’s refusal to enter her plea according to the State’s specifications, and her desire to enter a non-negotiated, blind plea to the Possession charge and a plea of nolo contendere to the Seatbelt charge. Petitioner appeared at the hearing prepared to enter her pleas, and with the appropriate form for entry of the pleas prepared for presentation to the court. Judge Gillert refused to accept Petitioner’s blind plea, advising her that she did not have a unilateral right to plead guilty, and ordered her to appear at trial on Monday, February 6, 2006.

Petitioner appeared with counsel at the assigned date and time, but the matter was passed until Tuesday, February 7, 2006, because counsel for Petitioner’s co-defendant was unable to appear. At the time Petitioner filed her writ with this Court, the District Court had not entered a written order commemorating its findings and rulings made February 3, 2006. Attached to Petitioner’s application filed with this Court is a transcript of the hearing held February 3, 2006 wherein Judge Gillert refused to allow Petitioner to tender her plea. Petitioner alleges that she has an unfettered right to enter a guilty plea to the Possession charge, and a plea of nolo contendere to the seatbelt charge. Petitioner alleges the trial court was without authority to refuse to accept her guilty plea, and requested this Court issue an order staying proceedings in this matter pending resolution of Petitioner’s request for a Writ of Prohibition and/or Mandamus.

Petitioner further requested this Court issue a Writ of Prohibition prohibiting and precluding Judge Gillert from forcing and requiring Petitioner to proceed to trial, and requested that this Court order Judge Gillert to accept Petitioner’s blind and nolo contendere pleas to the pending charges against her as set forth in the Information filed in the District Court of Tulsa County, Case No. CF-2005-3056.

On February 7, 2006, this Court entered an order directing a response from the Honorable Thomas C. Gillert, District Judge, or his designated representative and staying proceedings in this matter. The Respondent was directed to respond to the Petitioner’s writ filed with this Court, and was specifically directed to address Petitioner’s claim that the District Court cannot refuse to accept Petitioner’s guilty plea to the Possession charge and Petitioner’s plea of nolo contendere to the Seatbelt charge.

On February 17, 2006, the State of Oklahoma, by and through Assistant District Attorney Julie C. Doss, filed a response with this Court. We now address Petitioner’s request for relief. The response filed in this matter includes a recitation of facts outlining defense counsel’s role in representing both Petitioner and her co-defendant. The basic facts, as alleged in Petitioner’s application filed with this Court, are not contested. Petitioner agreed to enter a plea, with a sentencing recommendation from the State. The State withdrew its plea offer when, according to the State, Petitioner contested every material allegation [of the charges] except technical possession of methamphetamine. Petitioner then announced that she would enter her non-negotiated, blind guilty plea to the possession charge and a plea of nolo contendere to the seatbelt violation. The State agrees that the District Court would not accept Petitioner’s pleas.

On Monday, February 6, 2006, Petitioner again advised the District Court that she was prepared to proffer pleas by which she would accept all blame for the charged offenses, and, according to the State, contesting all other facts that point any guilt toward the co-defendant, Mark McElroy. There is nothing in the record presented to this Court showing that Petitioner’s plea was rejected for any reason other than the District Court determined she did not have the right to enter a guilty plea in this situation.

By way of argument, the State first claims Petitioner has failed to allege sufficient facts to allow this Court to assume jurisdiction of this matter because she is unable to show how she will be irreparably harmed if not allowed to enter a plea. In fact, Petitioner might benefit from a jury trial, in the event the jury finds her not guilty. The worst that could happen, the State argues, is a finding of guilt. For a writ of mandamus a petitioner has the burden of establishing (1) a clear legal right to the relief sought; (2) the respondent’s refusal to perform a plain legal duty not involving the exercise of discretion; and (3) the adequacy of mandamus and the inadequacy of other relief. For a writ of prohibition, Petitioner must establish (1) a court, officer or person has or is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power; (2) the exercise of said power is unauthorized by law; and (3) the exercise of said power will result in injury for which there is no other adequate remedy.

We find that Petitioner has met these burdens, in part, and her requests for relief are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Petitioner has established that she has a clear legal right to the relief requested, and that there is no other adequate relief available to her in this instance. The harm here is the trial court’s refusal to accept Petitioner’s plea, requiring her to proceed to trial when she has already confessed guilt, expressed her desire to enter a plea, and does not want to go to trial. Petitioner has a right to proceed to trial if she chooses, but she also has the right not to proceed to trial upon entry of a proper guilty plea and waiver of her right to trial. The State’s claim that there is no harm in requiring Petitioner to proceed to trial is disingenuous, at best. To claim that Petitioner might actually benefit from a trial in the event she is found not guilty begs the question presented here.

We find that forcing Petitioner to proceed to trial in this situation, regardless of the outcome, constitutes harm for which there is no other remedy. Pursuant to 22 O.S. § 513, there are four kinds of pleas available for a defendant to enter in response to an indictment or information: 1. Guilty 2. Not guilty 3. Nolo Contendere, subject to the approval of the court; and 4. A former judgment of conviction or acquittal of the offense charged, which must be specially pleaded, either with or without the plea of not guilty. Pursuant to this statute, the only plea which requires prior approval of the court is a plea of nolo contendere. Since such a plea can only be made with the approval of the district court, the trial court’s rejection of Petitioner’s nolo contendere plea was proper. Petitioner’s request that this Court order the District Court to accept her nolo contendere plea to the seatbelt violation is DENIED.

While we have addressed, on numerous occasions, defendants’ rights upon entering a negotiated plea, or a plea of nolo contendere, and the trial court’s duties and responsibilities in accepting the same, we find no Oklahoma cases addressing a defendant’s right, and the trial court’s corresponding duties and responsibilities, when a defendant enters a non-negotiated, blind plea.

We find it was error for the District Court to unilaterally reject Petitioner’s non-negotiated, blind, guilty plea. The only determination to be made by the trial court in evaluating a tendered, non-negotiated/blind plea for acceptance is whether the plea is voluntarily and intelligently entered, and whether a factual basis has been established to support the plea. If these criteria are met, the district court shall accept the plea. The district court has no discretion to unilaterally reject a non-negotiated, blind plea for any reason if the basic plea criteria set forth in King have been established.

The court’s discretion only comes into play once the non-negotiated, blind plea has been accepted. The State argues that acceptance of the guilty plea is within the trial court’s discretion and claims that the circumstances of a particular case, to which the trial court is privy, require the trial court to be allowed to either accept or reject a defendant’s guilty plea. The State cites no authority for this position, claiming instead that the trial court is in a unique position to see the intricacies involved in cases at this stage and to understand the intentions of defendants in such circumstances and the likely ramifications.

However, both Oklahoma case law and statute specifically allow for entry of a non-negotiated, blind guilty plea. Such a plea does not require approval of the court. We find nothing in either of these statutes, or in the King guidelines, allowing for rejection of a tendered non-negotiated plea if the basic plea criteria are met. In short, a defendant has a unilateral right to enter a guilty plea, and to have that plea accepted if the appropriate statutory and case law requirements are met.

Here the District Court made no finding as to whether Petitioner’s plea was knowing and voluntary, and whether a factual basis existed for the plea. The court simply refused to hear Petitioner’s plea at all. The State argues that if Petitioner’s argument is to be accepted, it must be believed that the District Court has no discretion, and is forced to accept any plea that appears to be knowing and voluntary.

IT IS THEREFORE THE ORDER OF THIS COURT that the District Court of Tulsa County, the Honorable Tom Gillert, is directed to conduct a hearing on Petitioner’s non-negotiated blind plea of guilty to the charged offense of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Drug in Case No. CF-2005-3056. The District Court is further directed to ACCEPT Petitioner’s plea if it finds that the statutory rules and case law requirements established for entry of a proper guilty plea and proper waiver of her right to trial are met. Petitioner’s request that the District Court be directed to accept her plea of nolo contendere to the charge of Driving Without a Seatbelt is DENIED.

However, the District Court is directed to hear Petitioner’s nolo contendere plea, on the record, and make its determination regarding the acceptance or rejection of that plea subject to the statutory rules and case law requirements established for entry of a plea of nolo contendere. The Stay of Proceedings in this matter is hereby LIFTED. IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Footnotes:

1. Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 513
2. Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 515(1)
3. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971)
4. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 82 S.Ct. 1063, 8 L.Ed.2d 211 (1962)
5. King v. State, 1976 OK CR 103, 553 P.2d 529
6. Hagar v. State, 1999 OK CR 35, 990 P.2d 897
7. Wester v. State, 1988 OK CR 126, 764 P.2d 884
8. Ocampo v. State, 1989 OK CR 38, 778 P.2d 920
9. Castro v. State, 1994 OK CR 17, 871 P.2d 433
10. Marshall v. State, 1998 OK CR 30, 936 P.2d 1
11. Fields v. State, 1996 OK CR 35, 923 P.2d 624
12. Ryder v. State, 2004 OK CR 2, 83 P.3d 856
13. Ross v. State, 1986 OK CR 49, 717 P.2d 117
14. Gray v. State, 1982 OK CR 137, 650 P.2d 880
15. Stewart v. State, 1977 OK CR 265, 568 P.2d 1297
16. Mougell v. State, 97 Okla.Crim. 180, 260 P.2d 447
17. State v. McDonald, 10 Okl.Cr. 413, 137 P. 362
18. Cowden v. State

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.8 - Sentencing for crimes
• Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 513 - Pleas available for a defendant
• Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 515 - Pleas and waivers pertaining to criminal proceedings

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

• Bramlett v. State, 2018 OK CR 19, I 36, 422 P.3d 788, 799-800
• Woolen v. Coffman, 676 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Okl.Cr. 1984)
• King v. State, 1976 OK CR 103, 553 P.2d 529
• Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.ed.2d 274 (1969)
• Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971)
• Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 82 S.Ct. 1063, 8 L.Ed.2d 211 (1962)
• Hagar v. State, 1999 OK CR 35, 990 P.2d 897
• Wester v. State, 1988 OK CR 126, 764 P.2d 884
• Ocampo v. State, 1989 OK CR 38, 778 P.2d 920
• Castro v. State, 1994 OK CR 17, 871 P.2d 433
• Marshall v. State, 1998 OK CR 30, 936 P.2d 1
• Fields v. State, 1996 OK CR 35, 923 P.2d 624
• Ryder v. State, 2004 OK CR 2, 83 P.3d 856
• Ross v. State, 1986 OK CR 49, 717 P.2d 117
• Gray v. State, 1982 OK CR 137, 650 P.2d 880
• Stewart v. State, 1977 OK CR 265, 568 P.2d 1297
• State ex rel. Stout v. Craytor, 1988 OK CR 79, 753 P.2d 1365
• Mougell v. State, 97 Okla.Crim. 180, 260 P.2d 447
• Dalton v. State, 6 Okl.Cr. 85, 116 P. 954
• McDonald v. State, 10 Okl.Cr. 413, 137 P. 362
• Morrison v. State, 31 Okla.Crim. 11, 236 P. 901