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F-2004-427

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Emily Michelle Dowdy v The State Of Oklahoma

F-2004-427

Filed: Jan. 26, 2007

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: The State Of Oklahoma

Summary

Emily Michelle Dowdy appealed her conviction for First-Degree Manslaughter. Her conviction and sentence were modified to twenty-five years imprisonment. Judge Lumpkin dissented. In this case, Emily was found guilty of causing a fatal car accident while she was drunk. She had a blood alcohol level that was over the legal limit after a night out drinking at a bar. The jury decided to give her a longer sentence after her first trial was not allowed because she couldn't show evidence that she was unknowingly intoxicated. During her retrial, she claimed that she could have been involuntarily intoxicated by drugs, but there was not enough evidence to support this claim. The state presented evidence showing that her drinking was voluntary. There was also an issue with some of the evidence brought up by the prosecutor that some said was unfair. In the end, while the court upheld her guilty verdict, they thought her 40-year sentence was too long and changed it to 25 years instead.

Decision

The Judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The Sentence is MODIFIED to twenty-five years imprisonment. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.1 18, App. (2006), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

  • Was there double jeopardy in Appellant's retrial after a mistrial was declared?
  • Did the trial court err in admitting bad-character evidence regarding Appellant's past alcohol consumption?
  • Did the prosecutor's comments and questions violate Appellant's right to remain silent and presumption of innocence?
  • Was Appellant denied effective assistance of counsel for various acts and omissions during the trial?
  • Did improper communication with a juror affect the fairness of Appellant's trial?
  • Was the admission of hearsay evidence concerning a photograph of Appellant prejudicial to her case?
  • Did the accumulation of errors deny Appellant a fair trial and reliable sentence?

Findings

  • the court erred in denying the double jeopardy claim.
  • the admission of bad character evidence was not erroneous.
  • the prosecutor's comments did not violate Appellant's rights.
  • no ineffective assistance of counsel was established.
  • no improper communication with a juror was proven.
  • the court erred in admitting hearsay testimony from Scott Perry.
  • Appellant's sentence was modified to twenty-five years imprisonment.

F-2004-427

Jan. 26, 2007

Emily Michelle Dowdy

Appellant

v

The State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

C. JOHNSON, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE: Appellant, Emily Michelle Dowdy, was charged in Oklahoma County District Court, Case No. CF-1999-3910, with First-Degree Manslaughter (21 O.S.1991, § 711(1)) in the commission of a misdemeanor, Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol (47 O.S.Supp. 1999, § 11-902). In February 2001, she was convicted by a jury and sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. On direct appeal, this Court reversed for a new trial because the trial court barred Appellant from presenting evidence supporting her claim of involuntary intoxication. Dowdy v. State, Case No. F-2001-171 (Okl.Cr. May 31, 2002) (not for publication). Retrial was held before the Honorable Susan P. Caswell, District Judge. The jury found Appellant guilty and recommended a sentence of forty years imprisonment. Formal sentencing was held April 16, 2004. Appellant’s conviction arises from a fatal motor vehicle accident in the early morning hours of Sunday, May 23, 1999. Appellant’s vehicle collided with a vehicle driven by Ryan Brewer on Interstate 240 in Oklahoma County. Brewer, the driver and only occupant of his vehicle, died in the collision. Appellant, the driver and only occupant of her vehicle, suffered serious trauma to her neck and back and was hospitalized. Brewer was driving eastbound when the wreck occurred; Appellant was driving westbound, but on the eastbound side of the divided highway when she struck Brewer’s car head-on. Witnesses testified that Appellant was driving at a normal highway speed, that her headlights were on, and that she never attempted to slow down or swerve before the accident. A sample of Appellant’s blood drawn about an hour after the accident showed Appellant had an alcohol concentration of approximately .17 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, well over the legal threshold for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. Further drug tests showed no evidence of other common intoxicants. The uncontradicted evidence showed that on the night of the accident, Appellant and her friend, Katherine Hillin, traveled in Appellant’s car to an Oklahoma City bar called the Crosswinds for drinking and dancing, arriving at approximately 11 p.m.; that the two women each ordered one mixed drink and one shot of liqueur and moved to the dance floor; that Hillin became very ill a short time later and vomited in the ladies room; that the bartender sold one more mixed drink to Appellant, but would not serve Hillin because she appeared to be intoxicated; and that Appellant escorted Hillin out to Appellant’s car where she (Hillin) passed out. The bartender testified that Appellant did not appear to be intoxicated the last time he saw her, which was at approximately midnight. No one saw Appellant return to the bar, and Appellant testified that she could not recall anything after taking Hillin to the car. At approximately 1:30 a.m., a police officer removed Hillin from Appellant’s car and took her to the city’s detox center. Appellant’s whereabouts during this time are unknown, but at some point during the next two hours, Appellant returned to her car. The fatal accident occurred several miles from where the Crosswinds bar was located. At trial, Appellant advanced a theory that she was involuntarily intoxicated. Although there was no direct evidence to support her claim, Appellant presented evidence, including several experts, to demonstrate that her symptoms were consistent with those of a person who has ingested GHB, rohypnol, or any of a number of related substances, commonly referred to as date-rape drugs because they have sometimes been used on unsuspecting persons to facilitate sexual assault. The defense attempted to show, through expert testimony, that Appellant’s claim of pristine memory loss (abrupt onset and cessation of amnesia) was consistent with GHB intoxication, and that GHB and its analogues can vanish from the bloodstream within a few hours, which could explain why no trace of these substances was found in the drug screens. In response, the State pointed out that if Appellant truly had GHB-induced amnesia until after she arrived at the hospital, as she claimed, then some trace of the drug should have shown up in the blood extracted at short time after her arrival; and that while a low dose of GHB might explain why Appellant was still able to drive her car, it was inconsistent with a claim of prolonged amnesia. One defense expert also noted that Hillin’s sudden feeling of nausea and vomiting after drinking at the bar was consistent with the possibility that she, too, had involuntarily ingested GHB. In response, the State elicited testimony from Hillin that she had not eaten since that morning, that she had several mixed drinks before she and Appellant drove to the bar, and that she was feeling intoxicated by the time Appellant arrived at her home. The defense elicited testimony that Appellant was not wearing underwear at the time of the collision, and argued that this supported the possibility that Appellant was drugged and sexually assaulted. Both parties presented testimony as to whether a small clot of blood, observed when hospital staff inserted a catheter into Appellant’s vagina, was indicative of recent sexual intercourse. The defense presented substantial expert testimony, including statistical and anecdotal evidence, about the date rape drug phenomenon. The defense even presented a confirmed victim of GHB intoxication from Tulsa to testify about her experiences. The State never denied that GHB existed, or that it is sometimes used as a date rape drug. Rather, the State attempted to show that the facts of this case were in fact more consistent with the voluntary consumption of alcohol. Appellant presents six propositions of error on appeal. Several propositions include claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We remanded the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on some of these claims, which are discussed below. In Proposition 1, Appellant claims her trial was barred by the Double Jeopardy clauses of the United States and Oklahoma Constitutions. Before Appellant’s first full trial, the district court granted Appellant’s request for a mistrial, after a police officer familiar with the case approached the trial judge ex parte and made a disparaging assessment of Appellant’s anticipated defense theory. Appellant claims the officer’s conduct is attributable to the prosecutor, and that the prosecutor deliberately goaded the defense into seeking a mistrial. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982). This issue was fully considered and rejected in Appellant’s first appeal. Appellant presents no new information or authority to justify reconsideration of the issue, much less a different result. Proposition 1 is therefore denied.

In Proposition 2, Appellant alleges error in the admission of bad-character evidence – specifically, evidence concerning several past incidents of her voluntary alcohol intoxication, and evidence that she consumed alcohol pending trial, in violation of her bond conditions. Alternatively, Appellant claims that if defense counsel opened the door to such attacks on her character, then he rendered constitutionally deficient performance by doing so. We disagree on both counts. We find these subjects were legitimately opened by the theory of defense as applied to the available evidence. While cross-examining a police witness who investigated in this case, defense counsel established that Appellant had no record of alcohol-related traffic offenses or arrests. On redirect, the prosecutor responded by asking the officer if Appellant had any history of using alcohol. When defense counsel objected, the trial court limited the witness’s answer to any criminal violations the officer was aware of. The prosecutor then asked whether Appellant had criminally consumed alcohol since the accident, and the officer testified that she had. Appellant claims her trial counsel was unfairly forced to clear up the inference by having the officer specify, on re-cross-examination, that Appellant had a few drinks after charges were filed, in violation of her bond restrictions. By questioning the officer on any alcohol-related criminal conduct committed by Appellant, the State sought to rebut the inference, created by the defense, that Appellant was a responsible drinker. We need not decide whether the insinuation of post-offense criminal conduct related to alcohol consumption was error. Not only did defense counsel clear up any improper inference, but Appellant later admitted to violating her bond conditions in this manner when she testified. Once she took the witness stand, the matter became relevant not because it involved alcohol consumption per se, but because it bore on Appellant’s character for truthfulness: whether she kept a promise made to the court. 12 O.S.2001, § 2608. Appellant’s next complaint concerns the introduction of specific instances of her past conduct in consuming alcohol. One of the defense’s experts in GHB intoxication took information from Appellant while conducting her analysis of the case. According to this witness, Appellant reported that when she drank alcohol, she usually had only one or two drinks. In rebuttal, the State called witnesses who recounted specific instances of Appellant becoming intoxicated on alcohol. We believe the defense opened the door to this rebuttal evidence by suggesting that Appellant was unlikely to have willingly become too intoxicated to operate a motor vehicle. Having found these inquiries were permissible, given the defense strategy, we now turn to whether that strategy was reasonable. A defendant may present evidence of good character traits, with the aim of showing the jury that it is unlikely she committed the offense with which she is charged. That decision comes at a price, however, because the State is then entitled to rebut the insinuation with specific instances of contradictory conduct, through both cross-examination and rebuttal. 12 O.S.2001, §§ 2404(A)(1), 2405(B); Malicoat v. State, 2000 OK CR 1, 1 40, 992 P.2d 383, 403-04; Douglas v. State, 1997 OK CR 79, 11 24-25, 951 P.2d 651, 663.

In resolving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we consider two questions: (1) whether counsel’s performance was professionally unreasonable, and (2) whether that performance can reasonably be said to have affected the outcome of the trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). We must give strong deference to counsel’s strategic decisions, provided they are supported by reasonable investigation. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. If we can conscientiously conclude that no prejudice resulted from counsel’s conduct, we may resolve the issue on that question alone. Id. at 700, 104 S.Ct. at 2071. The defense theory of involuntary GHB intoxication depended on circumstantial inferences. The fact that Appellant was above the legal limit for alcohol intoxication at the time of the accident could not be disputed. In her effort to raise a reasonable doubt that her condition at the time of the accident was not her own doing, Appellant opened the door to some inquiry into her drinking habits. Defense counsel presented a substantial amount of expert testimony on the subject of GHB intoxication, including evidence which could explain why no trace of GHB was found in Appellant’s bloodstream after the accident. One defense expert conceded that Appellant’s symptoms could also be consistent with voluntary intoxication by alcohol. Given these challenges, defense counsel’s strategy of pointing out Appellant’s clean driving record was not unreasonable; and the fact that Appellant’s drinking habits were a routine part of the defense expert’s own evaluation could not legitimately be hidden from the jury. We conclude that trial counsel was not ineffective for pursuing a strategy that necessarily invited inquiry into Appellant’s drinking habits.

Appellant also complains in this proposition about police testimony concerning the frequency and common characteristics of alcohol-related vehicle accidents in Oklahoma. The defense had already used similar types of evidence concerning the frequency and characteristics of vehicle accidents. To support her ineffective-counsel claims, Appellant relies on Hooper v. Mullin, 314 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2002), which held that defense counsel’s failure to reasonably investigate a chosen strategy can amount to ineffective assistance of counsel, when that omission opens the door to prejudicial evidence rebutting the defense theory. In Hooper, defense counsel called an expert witness whom he knew would not be able to support the defense theory, in the sentencing phase of a capital murder case, that the defendant had brain damage and other mitigating psychological problems. Before trial, defense counsel asked this expert to prepare a summary report based solely on another expert’s evaluation. That summary suggested the defendant might have mental problems, but admitted the need for further information. Counsel did not bother to follow up with his expert until after the guilt stage of the trial, at which time the expert warned counsel that testimony about his cursory evaluation was likely to do more harm than good. Nevertheless, counsel called the expert in the punishment stage. This opened the door to rebuttal testimony from the expert who had conducted the original evaluation, confirming the absence of brain damage or special psychological problems. The appellate court found counsel’s conduct disastrous to the mitigation strategy. Hooper is distinguishable from this case. In Hooper, counsel did not bother to reasonably investigate the mitigation strategy he had chosen, opting instead to order an incomplete report based on second-hand information and leave it at that. Worse still, the damaging testimony of the expert who had actually evaluated the defendant would have been privileged and inadmissible if counsel had not opened the door to it by calling the author of the summary report. Here, Appellant does not claim that the experts retained by counsel could lend no credible evidence to support her defense theory. Rather, she claims that somehow counsel could have advanced that theory without allowing the State to rebut it. We disagree. A defense strategy is not unreasonable simply because it may be rebutted. Under the circumstances of this case, the only way to have kept Appellant’s drinking habits from the jury would have been to abandon the involuntary intoxication defense entirely. The Sixth Amendment does not confer the right to present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the adversarial system; one cannot invoke the Sixth Amendment as a justification for presenting what might have been a half-truth. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 2171, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975). See also Burden v. Filion, 421 F.Supp.2d 581, 587-88 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (counsel’s decision to have defendant charged with drug crimes testify in support of agency defense was reasonable, even though it opened the door to cross-examination about defendant’s prior drug conviction; defendant’s testimony was essential to the chosen defense theory, and counsel essentially had no other viable defense theories to choose from).

In Proposition 3, Appellant catalogs numerous questions and comments by the prosecutor which, she claims, violated her right to remain silent and her presumption of innocence. Many of these comments were not objected to. In reviewing claims of prosecutor misconduct, we are concerned with whether the cumulative effect of the conduct deprived the accused of a fair trial. First, Appellant complains that the prosecutor made unfair use of statements she made to Trooper King while she was confined to a hospital bed shortly after the accident. Because Appellant did not object to King’s testimony on this point, we review for plain error. Although Appellant was not ambulatory at the time of the interview, her condition was not due to police action. Appellant was not in custody when the statements were made, and therefore, no Miranda warnings were required. We find no evidence that Trooper King took unfair advantage of Appellant’s condition. The jury was well aware that any reticence on Appellant’s part could have been due to the fact that she had just been seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident. Trooper King admitted that Appellant did not appear to be hedging in her responses to his questions. Moreover, Appellant fails to explain how her statements to Trooper King unfairly prejudiced her. Appellant’s own testimony tracked the account she gave to Trooper King, and defense counsel used that consistency to argue that Appellant was telling the truth about events preceding the accident. We find no plain error here.

The remainder of Proposition 3 lists various ways in which the prosecutor attacked Appellant’s credibility. Appellant claims the prosecutor improperly commented on her right to silence by suggesting her defense theory was an after-the-fact fabrication. The prosecutor did take many opportunities to challenge the credibility of Appellant’s defense, but we believe these were fair comments on the evidence presented. By choosing to testify, Appellant subjected herself to the same kind of credibility tests applicable to other witnesses.

In Proposition 4, Appellant alleges that her Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated by various acts and omissions on trial counsel’s part not already discussed in the preceding propositions. In Proposition 5, Appellant alleges that improper communication with a juror denied her a fair trial. Because Proposition 5 also involves a strategic decision on trial counsel’s part, we address it here as well. In support of her ineffective-counsel claims, Appellant filed a motion to supplement the appeal record and requested an evidentiary hearing. We granted that request as to some of Appellant’s claims, and the trial court held a hearing on these matters in March 2006. The trial court found these witnesses to be more credible than Appellant’s on the issue and concluded that no improper communication occurred. While we recognize that witnesses on both sides of this issue had strong motives to slant their testimony, we accept the trial court’s credibility choices. Yet even assuming that such a communication occurred, we find no grounds for relief. Because the alleged communication occurred before deliberations began, it is Appellant’s burden to demonstrate prejudice therefrom. Similarly, trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to report the incident absent a showing of prejudice. References, during trial, to appeals or other proceedings are only objectionable if they are deliberately calculated to diminish the gravity of the jury’s task.

Appellant also contends that trial counsel was ineffective for not more fully investigating the claims of two other women concerning involuntary GHB intoxication. During trial, defense counsel was contacted by a woman who believed that she and her female companion had been drugged some five months before Appellant, and noted that they had visited the same bar as Appellant. Trial counsel testified that after speaking with the first woman, he declined to pursue the matter further because he did not feel she was assertive enough in her claim. The trial court found this to be a strategic decision based on reasonable investigation, and considering the testimony at the hearing, we agree. Any claim of involuntary intoxication by these women was speculative. Appellant does not allege that a particular person was systematically drugging women at the Crosswinds bar. At trial, the State never denied that involuntary GHB intoxication was a real phenomenon; it simply argued that voluntarily alcohol intoxication was more likely under the facts presented. Moreover, at trial, defense counsel effectively gave the phenomenon a human face by presenting the testimony of a confirmed victim of GHB intoxication. Like the trial court, we find counsel’s investigation of the matter reasonable under the circumstances, and we discern no reasonable probability of a different outcome if the women had testified at trial.

Finally, we address Appellant’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not rebutting false and misleading testimony. As noted above, the State presented several witnesses in rebuttal to relate specific instances where Appellant became intoxicated. In our discussion of Proposition 2, we found most of this evidence proper under the circumstances. However, one witness, Scott Perry, was asked to testify about the contents of a newspaper photograph that he claimed to have seen, which allegedly depicted Appellant, holding a cup of beer, at a party. Although he was personally acquainted with Appellant, the purpose of Perry’s testimony went beyond a routine photo identification. Perry was asked to relate the content of the photo; to prove the truth of the matter asserted, even though Perry had no personal knowledge of whether Appellant was drinking beer at the event in question. We must now consider whether admission of this evidence unfairly prejudiced Appellant.

DECISION

The Judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The Sentence is MODIFIED to twenty-five years imprisonment.

Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.1 18, App. (2006), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.



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Footnotes:

  1. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982).
  2. Salazar v. State, 1998 OK CR 70, 11 5-7, 973 P.2d 315, 321.
  3. 12 O.S.2001, § 2608.
  4. 12 O.S.2001, §§ 2404(A)(1), 2405(B); Malicoat v. State, 2000 OK CR 1, 1 40, 992 P.2d 383, 403-04; Douglas v. State, 1997 OK CR 79, 11 24-25, 951 P.2d 651, 663.
  5. Hawkins v. State, 1986 OK CR 58, 11 7-8, 717 P.2d 1156, 1158-59.
  6. Barnhart v. State, 1956 OK CR 105, 1 9, 302 P.2d 793, 796.
  7. Walters v. State, 1993 OK CR 4, 1 8, 848 P.2d 20, 23.
  8. Quilliams v. State, 1989 OK CR 55, 1 10-12, 779 P.2d 990, 992.
  9. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
  10. 12 O.S.2001, § 2703.
  11. 12 O.S.2001, § 2705.
  12. 12 O.S.2001, § 2606(B).
  13. Campbell v. State, 1982 OK CR 164, 1 5, 652 P.2d 305, 306.
  14. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985).
  15. Dodd v. State, 2004 OK CR 31, 1 114, 100 P.3d 1050-51.
  16. In Re Porter's Estate, 1953 OK 155, 13, 257 P.2d 517.
  17. 12 O.S.2001, § 2602.
  18. Omalza v. State, 1995 OK CR 80, 1 29, 911 P.2d 286, 298-99.
  19. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Railway Co. v. Carlile, 1912 OK 819, 1 3, 128 P. 690, 691.
  20. Seay v. State, 93 Okl.Cr. 372, 375-77, 228 P.2d 665, 666-67.
  21. Jones v. State, 1987 OK CR 103, 1 18, 738 P.2d 525, 529.

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 711 (1991) - First-Degree Manslaughter
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 47 § 11-902 (Supp. 1999) - Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2608 (2001) - Character Evidence
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2404(A)(1) (2001) - Character Evidence; Exclusions
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2405(B) (2001) - Character Evidence; Specific Instances
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2602 (2001) - Personal Knowledge
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 3002 (2001) - Hearsay
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 3004 (2001) - Hearsay; Contents of Writings
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2703 (2001) - Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2705 (2001) - Disclosure of Information Underlying Expert's Opinion

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found

Case citations:

  • Dowdy v. State, Case No. F-2001-171 (Okl.Cr. May 31, 2002)
  • Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982)
  • Salazar v. State, 1998 OK CR 70, 11 5-7, 973 P.2d 315, 321
  • Hawkins v. State, 1986 OK CR 58, 11 7-8, 717 P.2d 1156, 1158-59
  • Barnhart v. State, 1956 OK CR 105, 1 9, 302 P.2d 793, 796
  • Walters v. State, 1993 OK CR 4, 1 8, 848 P.2d 20, 23
  • Quilliams v. State, 1989 OK CR 55, 1 10-12, 779 P.2d 990, 992
  • Malicoat v. State, 2000 OK CR 1, 1 40, 992 P.2d 383, 403-04
  • Douglas v. State, 1997 OK CR 79, 11 24-25, 951 P.2d 651, 663
  • Dodd v. State, 2004 OK CR 31, 1 90, 100 P.3d 1017, 1043
  • Wilson v. State, 1998 OK CR 73, 1 64, 983 P.2d 448, 464
  • Bryan v. State, 1997 OK CR 15, 1 15, 935 P.2d 338, 351
  • Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164, 107 S.Ct. 515, 520, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986)
  • Short v. State, 1999 OK CR 15, 1 80, 980 P.2d 1081, 1105
  • Robinson v. State, 1995 OK CR 25, 1 10, 900 P.2d 389, 395-96
  • Ray v. State, 1990 OK CR 15, 1 7, 788 P.2d 1384, 1386
  • Hickerson v. State, 1977 OK CR 197, 11 10-11, 565 P.2d 684, 686
  • Jones v. State, 1987 OK CR 103, 1 18, 738 P.2d 525, 529
  • Campbell v. State, 1982 OK CR 164, "I 5, 652 P.2d 305, 306
  • McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 35 S.Ct. 783, 59 L.Ed. 1300 (1915)
  • Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 13 S.Ct. 50, 36 L.Ed. 917 (1892)
  • Oxley v. City of Tulsa, 1989 OK 166, 11 24-26, 794 P.2d 742, 747-48
  • Chatham v. State, 1986 OK CR 2, 11 7-8, 712 P.2d 69, 71
  • Dodd v. State, 2004 OK CR 31, 1 114, 100 P.3d 1050-51
  • Omalza v. State, 1995 OK CR 80, 1 29, 911 P.2d 286, 298-99
  • St. Louis, I. M. & S. Railway Co. v. Carlile, 1912 OK 819, 1 3, 128 P. 690, 691
  • Cook v. State, 6 Okl.Cr. 477, 479-482, 120 P. 1038, 1039-1040

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