Candy Mae Easton v State Of Oklahoma

F-2004-729

Filed: Sep. 26, 2005

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: State Of Oklahoma

Summary

# Candy Mae Easton appealed her conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine and unlawful possession of a controlled drug. Conviction and sentence were reversed for manufacturing methamphetamine, but affirmed for unlawful possession with an eight-year sentence and a fine. Vice President Judge Lumpkin dissented regarding the manufacturing charge.

Decision

The Judgment and Sentence of the district court on Count I is REVERSED with INSTRUCTIONS to DISMISS. The Judgment and Sentence of the district court on Count II is AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED, however, for correction of the Judgment and Sentence document through an order nunc pro tunc by the district court to reflect that Easton's conviction in Count II is for Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Drug pursuant to 63 O.S.2001, § 2-402. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2005), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

• Was there sufficient evidence to prove that Easton aided and abetted her co-defendant in the manufacturing of methamphetamine?
• Did the trial court properly impose Easton's sentence for unlawful possession of methamphetamine as excessive?
• Should the information regarding Easton's conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled drug be corrected to reflect the appropriate statute?

Findings

• the court erred in affirming the conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine, as the evidence was not sufficient to prove Easton aided and abetted the co-defendant
• the conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled drug was affirmed, as the sentence was within statutory limits and not excessively harsh
• the case is remanded for correction of the Judgment and Sentence document to accurately reflect the conviction for unlawful possession

F-2004-729

Sep. 26, 2005

Candy Mae Easton

Appellant

v

State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

A. JOHNSON, J.: Candy Mae Easton, Appellant, was tried in a bench trial in the District Court of Stephens County, Case No. CF-2004-19. The Honorable George W. Lindley found Easton guilty of Count I, Manufacturing Methamphetamine and Count II, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Drug. The trial court sentenced Easton to eight (8) years imprisonment and a $50,000.00 fine on Count I and eight (8) years imprisonment and a $2,000.00 fine on Count II. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently. From this Judgment and Sentence, Easton appeals.

On January 13, 2004, Investigator Carey Rouse and three other officers went to Jackie Williamson’s home to conduct a knock and talk interview after one of Williamson’s neighbors reported the presence of a strong odor associated with methamphetamine manufacturing emanating from Williamson’s trailer. As the officers approached the trailer, they too detected the chemical odor associated with meth labs. Before the officers stepped foot on the front porch, Williamson met the officers on the front lawn, told them he wanted to cooperate and said there was a female still in the house. Rouse went to the front door and told Easton, who was in the bathroom, to come out. After a minute or two, Easton exited the bathroom and accompanied Rouse throughout the trailer as he confirmed the absence of any other persons. Officers discovered a white powdery substance on the bathroom floor and sediment in the toilet water that tested positive for methamphetamine. Easton told the officers that she was an addict and a methamphetamine user, and that she was aware that methamphetamine was being produced at the house. Easton denied any participation in the manufacturing operation. Various components and materials were collected within and around the house that were consistent with an operational methamphetamine lab. No search warrant was issued, but both Easton and Williamson gave their consent and permission to search the trailer.

In Proposition I, Easton claims her conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine must be reversed because the State failed to prove she aided and abetted her co-defendant Williamson in the manufacturing of methamphetamine. This Court will not disturb a conviction if, after reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, a rational trier of fact could have found every essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. We find this standard has not been met in this case. While there was substantial evidence that Easton was present and knew that Williamson was manufacturing methamphetamine, there is no evidence in the record that Easton said or did anything to encourage Williamson before or during the manufacturing process, only that she used the finished product. We find that Easton’s consumption of the methamphetamine that Williamson manufactured, without more, is insufficient evidence of encouragement to convict her as an aider and abettor. While the participation need only be slight to transform a person into an aider and abettor, there must be proof of some act or words of encouragement relating to the commission of the crime. While this is a case where the evidence of knowledge is so great that it is highly unlikely that Easton did nothing, the State failed to present any evidence that Easton aided Williamson in some manner. Because the evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Easton aided and abetted Williamson, we find that Easton’s conviction for manufacturing must be reversed with instructions to dismiss. The relief granted in Proposition I renders the claim raised in Proposition II moot.

In Proposition III, Easton claims her sentence for unlawful possession of methamphetamine is excessive. We find Easton’s eight-year sentence and $2,000 fine is within the statutory limits and is not so excessive based on this record as to shock the conscience of this Court. Accordingly, no relief is required.

DECISION

The Judgment and Sentence of the district court on Count I is REVERSED with INSTRUCTIONS to DISMISS. The Judgment and Sentence of the district court on Count II is AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED, however, for correction of the Judgment and Sentence document through an order nunc pro tunc by the district court to reflect that Easton’s conviction in Count II is for Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Drug pursuant to 63 O.S.2001, § 2-402. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2005), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

APPEARANCES AT TRIAL

JAMES W. BERRY
OKLAHOMA INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM
P.O. BOX 21803
OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73156
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

JERRY WAYNE HERBERGER
ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY
STEPHENS COUNTY COURTHOUSE
DUNCAN, OK 73533
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

OPINION BY: A. JOHNSON, J.

CHAPEL, P.J.: Concur in Result

LUMPKIN, V.P.J.: Concur in Part/Dissent in Part

C. JOHNSON, J.: Concur

LUMPKIN, VICE-PRESIDING JUDGE: CONCUR IN PART/DISSENT IN PART: I concur in the affirmance of Count II. However, I dissent to the reversal of Count I. Under the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) as adopted by this Court in Spuehler v. State, 1985 OK CR 132, 709 P.2d 202, the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of Appellant’s guilt as an aider and abettor. The trier of fact is the exclusive judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence and despite conflicts in the evidence, this Court will not disturb the jury’s verdict if there is competent evidence to support it. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge, as the fact finder in this judge alone trial, did just that. The evidence in this record supports his finding. This Court’s role is to determine if the evidence validates the decision of the fact finder, not to impose its belief of how that decision should have been made in the first place on the case. I find sufficient evidence exists in this record of trial to meet the standard. I would therefore affirm the judgment and sentence on both counts.

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Footnotes:

1. Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 2-402
2. Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 2-401
3. Rea v. State, 2001 OK CR 28, 1 5, 34 P.3d 148, 149.
4. 63 O.S.2001, § 2-402
5. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)
6. Spuehler v. State, 1985 OK CR 132, IT 7, 709 P.2d 202, 203-204 (Okl.Cr.1985)
7. Easlick v. State, 2004 OK CR 21, I 15, 90 P.3d 556, 559
8. Johnson v. State, 2004 OK CR 23, IT 10, 93 P.3d 41, 45
9. Morrison v. State, 1974 OK CR 18, I 7, 518 P.2d 1279, 1281
10. Spears v. State, 1995 OK CR 36, I 16, 900 P.2d 431, 438
11. Moulton v. State, 88 Okl.Crim. 184, 201 P.2d 268, 271

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

• Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 2-402 - Unlawful possession of controlled drug
• Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 2-401 - Unlawful possession with intent to distribute
• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.8 - Manufacturing methamphetamine

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

• 21 U.S.C. § 841 - Prohibited acts A

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

• Garrison v. State, 2004 OK CR 35, I 61, 103 P.3d 590, 603.
• Spears v. State, 1995 OK CR 36, I 16, 900 P.2d 431, 438.
• Morrison v. State, 1974 OK CR 18, I 7, 518 P.2d 1279, 1281.
• Moulton v. State, 88 Okl.Crim. 184, 201 P.2d 268, 271.
• Rea v. State, 2001 OK CR 28, I 5, 34 P.3d 148, 149.
• Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
• Spuehler v. State, 1985 OK CR 132, IT 7, 709 P.2d 202, 203-204.
• Easlick v. State, 2004 OK CR 21, I 15, 90 P.3d 556, 559.
• Johnson v. State, 2004 OK CR 23, IT 10, 93 P.3d 41, 45.